

## ABSTRACT

DONOGHUE, ELLEN MARY. Community Support Organizations and Community-Based Forest Management in the Philippines. (Under the direction of Frederick W. Cabbage.)

Community-based forest management is a strategy being adopted by many governments in developing countries. One objective is to enhance local control of, and benefits from, local resources. Another goal is to provide some form of management on national or state forestlands and curb the destructive effects of an 'open access' system. By transferring responsibilities to the community group, this governmental strategy, in effect, reduces the role and impact of the government as a resource manager.

Community-based forest management success is highly dependent on the behavior of the community members. Certain non-government and government organizations are considered "community support organizations" because of their roles in providing assistance and influencing the behavior of community groups. Five community forestry sites in the Philippines were examined in this research. The focus was on assistance the community groups received from support organizations in developing skills and abilities in forest management. The support organizations were examined in terms of their ability to provide services, use participatory methods, and build the capacity of the community group. The findings suggest that community groups were in need of much greater levels of assistance to develop collective interests in the resource and build the capacity to implement programmatic requirements in a long-term and sustainable method. Further simplifications of programmatic rules and requirements are recommended, with particular emphasis on finding ways to best meet community needs. One way for the government to

influence the outcomes of this resource management strategy is to provide more incentives for field-level officials to interact and assist community groups in community-based natural resource management.

**COMMUNITY SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS AND COMMUNITY-BASED  
FOREST MANAGEMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES**

by

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## **DEDICATION**

For my little, big, and bigger families--  
my husband,  
my parents, brother and sisters, their partners and children,  
and my friends.

## **BIOGRAPHY**

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADMP	Ancestral Domain Management Plan
ADP	Ancestral Domain Program
AO	assisting organizations
AWP	Annual Work Plan
CADC	Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claim
CBFM	Community-Based Forest Management
CBFMA	Community-Based Forest Management Agreement
CENRO	Community Environment and Natural Resource Officer
CFP	Community Forestry Program
CRMDP	Community Resource Management and Development Plan
CRMF	Community Resource Management Framework
CSC	Certificate of Stewardship Contracts
DAI	Development Alternatives, Inc.
DENR	Department of Environment and Natural Resources
FAO	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
ICDP	Integrated Conservation and Development Project
ISFP	Integrated Social Forestry Program
IUCN	International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
NGO	non-governmental organization
NRMP	Natural Resources Management Program
NRMP-DAI	United States Agency for International Development-sponsored Natural Resource Management Program, under contract with DAI
NTFPs	non-timber forest products
PMO	Project Management Officer
PO	people's organization
TLA	Timber License Agreement
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

# **CHAPTER ONE**

## **COMMUNITY-BASED FORESTRY IN THE PHILIPPINES**

### **Introduction to the Dissertation**

The objective of this dissertation is to address some of the concerns raised by scholars and resource managers about mechanisms and processes for devolving government responsibility for resource management to rural community groups. Given that many communities do not have a history of collective utilization of natural resources, lack financial resources, and have minimal experience as organized groups, it is argued that effective management of government-leased forest resources by community groups is dependent on the quality of the assistance they receive from outside organizations. These organizations are referred to as community support organizations. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are one type of support organization that are increasingly being contracted by governments to assist in the implementation of national programs. However, NGOs are not the only type of organization that influence the ability of community groups to manage resources. Natural resource agencies comprise a second type of support organization. Both at the central and field levels, agencies play important roles not only because their policies affect the actions of community groups, but also because they are a fundamental sources of technical support. A third type of support organization is the technical offices supported by international development agencies. Field personnel from these offices provide useful information and technical assistance to community groups.

Although many factors affect whether or not a community-based resource management strategy will succeed on a national scale, including government budgets, political will, international financial assistance, regional economies, and natural disasters, one important determinant of the success of these programs is the ability of community groups to halt and reverse the effects of forest degradation passed on to them through former forest management strategies. Effective management implies more than complying with management plans. In a community forestry paradigm, effective management involves identifying and addressing community needs, resolving conflicts, regulating access and use of resources, developing leadership, using participatory processes, and strengthening linkages between community groups and government agencies. These factors influence whether or not forest degradation is reversed and the well-being of rural communities is enhanced.

The present situation and history of forest management in the Philippines make it an excellent candidate for better understanding the role of support organizations in the context of natural resource management. The Philippine community-based forest management (CBFM) program, in particular five pilot sites, comprise the focus of this study. Forest management in the Philippines has moved from a timber-dominated, concessionaire-based system of forestry to a more community-based approach. An important component of the transition to socially-oriented resource management has been the contracting of NGOs to assist community groups to become organized and function as resource managers.

By focusing on support organizations in the CBFM program, the dissertation serves two purposes. One is to provide useful information to the Philippine Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) by addressing some key questions. How effective are contract NGOs at preparing community groups for long-term sustainable management of forest resources? And, what are the programmatic rules and procedures that constrain the effectiveness of the NGOs and the development of successful community groups?

Concurrently, the dissertation explores the theoretical issue surrounding the relative function of elements of support in the context of creating sustainable resource management organizations. The theoretical premise is that participatory methods and capacity building are more challenging for support organizations to provide than the service delivery component, which includes training activities. Participatory methods and capacity building, however, contribute more to the sustainability of a community-based resource management and community development. A complete examination of this premise would require the collection of data over a long period of time; it is therefore beyond the scope of this study. However, the objective is to provide some tentative findings that will contribute to the theoretical discussion about the roles and functions of support organizations in the context of sustainable resource utilization. From both theoretical and practical perspectives, the relationship between support organizations and community groups will be examined based on three components of support: delivering services to the community group, using and developing participatory methods, and building the capacity of the group to act on its own behalf.

The dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter one provides the historical context for the emergence of community forestry in the Philippines, discusses the role of non-governmental organizations in implementing government programs, presents some constraints on community-based strategies, and presents the objectives of the dissertation. Chapter two presents the conceptual framework for the relationship between support organizations and community groups. It describes the three components of support examined in this dissertation: providing basic services to community groups, encouraging groups to participate in matters that affect them, assisting leaders to strengthen participation in community groups, and building the capacity for community groups to adapt to circumstances, take advantage of opportunities, and deal effectively with the external world. Chapter three presents the methods of the study and includes descriptions of the study sites. Chapters four and five contain the results and conclusions of the study, respectively.

### **Transitions to Community Forestry**

Over the past two decades, many developing countries have moved away from centralized, government-controlled and timber concessionaire-operated systems of forest management toward more local-level management of public forests (Rao 1985; Peluso 1992; Ascher 1995; Lynch and Talbott 1995; Poffenberger 1996; Baland and Platteau 1996). Coupled with this was the recognition that sustaining the natural resource base could not be separated from the issues surrounding the humans who use and manage the resources (Chambers 1988). As a result, a variety of government strategies have emerged

that involve rural communities and indigenous peoples in forest protection and management. Although management activities tend to be specified by resource-use agreements with the government, the intent of most of these strategies has been to increase local involvement in local resource management. Some strategies also have recognized ancestral claims and have transferred some level of authority for the management of national forestland back to indigenous people (Lynch and Talbott 1995; Walpole *et al.* 1993). Most strategies include some type of pilot program to help smooth the transition from an industry-dominated approach to a more locally-based one.

With years of high deforestation, poorly monitored concessions, negative environmental effects, and overall poor outcomes of state-controlled and industry boom-and-bust exploitation that have occurred over the past century in many less developed tropical countries, bringing communities back into the forest management picture was an appealing and perhaps inevitable trend (Kirchhofer and Mercer 1986; Gregersen *et al.* 1989; Cernea 1991a; Vitug 1993; Poffenberger 1990, 1996). However, many of these approaches, including those supported by foreign donors and described as ‘social forestry,’ have failed largely because they were conceived as technical projects that could be implemented through administrative and legal procedures (Jodha 1992; Borlangdan 1992; Poffenberger *et al.* 1995). For instance, there have been cases of village woodlot projects in which forestry departments took full responsibility for setting up village woodlots which they then handed over to specially constituted, but unprepared village committees (Baland and Platteau 1996). Although community groups planted the seedlings, they tended not to maintain the planted areas. These types of projects have

produced minimal social benefits (Jodha 1992; Utting 1994; Poffenberger and McGean 1996).

With increasing evidence of these type of failures, governments and the international donor community recognized that more and improved local involvement was necessary to restore or enhance the role of local people as custodians of forest resources. As a result, an evolution has occurred over the past 15 years away from tree planting activities to more comprehensive community involvement in forest management. This evolution has necessitated dramatic institutional, bureaucratic, and attitudinal changes within governments and forest agencies. The projects and programs have continued to evolve as lessons have been learned and the social and biophysical outcomes evaluated (Lynch and Talbott 1995; Ascher 1995). Presently, community-based resource management projects exist in a variety of forms and have emerged in number of developing countries, such as Panama, India, Ghana, Nepal, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines (Rao 1985; Adhikari 1990; Hafner and Apichatvullop 1990; Peluso *et al.* 1990; Gibbs *et al.* 1990; Jodha 1992; Poffenberger 1996; Poffenberger and McGean 1996).

One common feature of this period has been the use of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to facilitate the transition to a new management approach (Poffenberger 1996; Warren 1993; Gregersen *et al.* 1989). Large international non-governmental organizations played important roles in the design and implementation of new, people-oriented forestry programs. Organizations such as CARE and the Ford Foundation have had the luxury of being flexible and innovative in developing extensive pilot projects with uncertain benefits. These activities have been influential in shaping

government programs and policies (Aguilar 1986; Olofson 1985; Brechin 1997; Brosius *et al.* 1998). Local-level NGOs, in contrast, have been acting increasingly as contractors by providing services prescribed as part of a government program to communities and groups. Local-level NGOs have assisted local groups in gaining tenurial or ancestral rights to forestlands and have provided technical and organizational support to nascent community resource management organizations. While innovation and experimentation were not precluded by contractual agreements, budget, personnel, and time constraints have limited the ability of local-level NGOs to influence program and policy development (Carroll 1992). The forms of support offered by contract NGOs may be important to the implementation of a sustainable community-based resource management strategy.

The Philippines is an example of a country where social forestry projects have been evolving away from tree-planting projects to more community-based resource management with multiple use and protection components. International organizations, such as the World Bank, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the German and Swedish governments, and the Asian Development Bank, and international NGOs, such as Ford Foundation, have supported the government's efforts (see Soriano 1991). In addition, throughout this transition, local-level NGOs have been contracted to assist communities in reforestation projects and more recently in community-based forest management projects. The collaboration of local NGOs in the implementation of government-sponsored forestry projects in the Philippines and the support they and other assisting organizations have provided to community groups is the focus of this research.

## **Evolution of Community Forestry in the Philippines**

The Philippines has a land area of 30 million hectares on over 7,000 islands, only 2,000 of which are inhabited. The Philippine government claims ownership of more than 60 percent of the nation's total land area. Large amounts of forest cover have been removed due to a number of complex and interrelated social, political, and economic factors. Meeting the demands of domestic and international timber markets and satisfying the needs of wealthy and impoverished citizens residing both within and outside of forests are some of the factors affecting forests in the Philippines and elsewhere. Table 1 provides benchmarks in the history of forest management in the context of critical political eras.

Forest cover in the Philippines fell from 50% of the total land area in 1950 to 21% in the early 1990s (Dugan 1997). Most of the forest cover loss has been in the dipterocarp forests, which produced more than 90% of all commercial forest products in terms of economic value (see Kummer 1992). Other forest types that have been affected include mangrove, molave<sup>1</sup>, tropical montane, pine, and mossy forests. Most of the remaining forest exists in the upland areas, defined as land with slope equal to or greater than 18% (Walpole *et al* 1993). Twenty-five to 30 million people were directly

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<sup>1</sup>The molave forest is a dry, monsoonal forest which is found only in parts of the western Philippines and is usually included in the category dipterocarp (Kummer 1992).

Table 1. Benchmarks in Philippine history of forest management

Period	Philosophy of Forest Management, Forest Statistics, Demographics
<b>1565 - 1898</b>	<b>Spanish Colonial Occupation</b>
1575	Forest cover estimated at 27.5 million hectares (almost 92% of total land area). Human population estimated at 750,000.
1800	Forest cover estimated at 26.1 million hectares.
1863	Spanish establish Bureau of Forestry.
<b>1898 - 1946</b>	<b>American Colonial Occupation</b>
1904	American system of forestry. Forest law gave Bureau of Forestry power to issue timber concessions.
1934	Forest cover estimated at 17 million hectares (57% of land area).
1920 - 1960	Philippines was Asia's largest exporter of rainforest timber.
<b>1965 - 1986</b>	<b>Marcos Era</b>
1950 - 1980s	Forest management dominated by state-controlled, revenue oriented production of timber through Timber License Agreements (TLAs).
1960 - 1970	Deforestation rate peaked at 300,000 hectares/year.
1960s - 1980s	TLAs used to reward supporters, enrich friends and family and keep politicians under patronage.
1980s	Deforestation rate declined to 150,000 has./year.
<b>1986 - present</b>	<b>Post-Marcos Era</b>
Late 1970s - 1980s	Timber concessions canceled, expired, or terminated. Many international timber companies depart.
1982	Several social forestry programs initiated by the government with external financial assistance aimed at individuals, families and groups of families.
1989	DENR launched the Community Forestry Program (CFP) through DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 123, later amended as DAO 22 in 1993. First community-based program.
Early 1990s	President Corazon Aquino included community forest management as a component of the new constitution.
1991	Forest cover 6.4 million hectares. Human population 76.1 million.
1995	Executive Order No. 263 adopts community-based forest management (CBFM) as the national strategy to achieve sustainable forestry and social justice. Land formerly held in Timber License Agreements converted to community-based programs.

Sources: Guiang and Manila 1994; Vitug 1993; Kummer 1992.

dependent upon forest resources with 90% of those people living on public land (Lynch and Talbott 1995). By 1997, the population was 76 million, 12% of which from cultural minorities or tribal origins.

The history of forest use in the Philippines is similar to other countries in the region, such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand (see Peluso *et al.* 1995). Forests have played a critical role in local, national, and regional economies during the colonial periods and after independence. The colonial predecessors passed on to the liberalized states the desire to maintain centralized control over resources. Government policies responded to international demand for tropical hardwoods that stimulated periodic economic booms coinciding with high rates of deforestation (see Repetto and Gillis 1988; Sharma 1992). The emphasis was on: providing legal authority for the exploitation of forest resources by timber companies; generating domestic revenues and foreign exchange; focusing on technical considerations; and, using local people largely as wage laborers (Rao 1985). Control of the forests gave power to state governments and national elites to influence not only economic development but also social and political movements of upland and forest dwelling people (Peluso *et al.* 1995).

Forest management in the Philippines has experienced an important evolution from the period of colonial resource extraction to present day forest management. The policies have been praised for being some of the more enlightened policies in Asia, receiving high levels of international financial and political support. Yet the policies have also been criticized for the excessive number of programs and policies, subsequent programmatic contradictions, and over-dependence on governmental and non-governmental design

combined with a de-emphasis on local initiatives (Guiang and Dolom 1992; Lynch and Talbott 1995; Laarman 1994; Dugan 1997; Acosta and Braganza 1995). The next two sections highlight two important periods of forest policy evolution in the Philippines.

### ***Forestry in the Postwar Philippines***

During the period of colonialism, Spanish and American colonial leaders maintained strong centralized control over natural resources. As with other newly liberalized nations in South and Southeast Asia, the leaders of the Philippines at the end of World War II adopted a centralized control strategy toward natural resources and declared vast areas of forests—many of them inhabited—to be publically owned forests (Kummer 1992; Lynch and Talbott 1995). Centrally controlled exploitation and mining of natural resources continued for several decades with bureaucratic and legal support, but with little consideration of traditional uses of forest-based communities. National elites and international timber companies influenced the formation of forest policies that favored timber-oriented industries and encouraged resource exploitation (Repetto and Gillis 1988; Kummer 1992). Government supported activities progressed further into forestlands creating tensions over resource use and control among indigenous peoples, migrants, and timber companies (Sajise and Omegan 1990).

From the end of World War II to the mid-1970s, timber extraction expanded phenomenally fueled by a number of factors, including growing national and international markets. The deforestation rate peaked in the 1960s at approximately 300,000 hectares per year (Vitug 1993; see Durst 1981; see Kummer 1992). The high deforestation rates

have been attributed to two interrelated processes during this period: the conversion of primary to secondary forest through logging and the removal of secondary forests by the expansion of agriculture (Myers 1980; Capistrano and Fujisaka 1984; Kummer 1992; Bacalla 1993; Dove 1995). During the Marcos era, the role of shifting cultivation by farmers, referred to as *kaingineros*,<sup>2</sup> was blamed by some government officials as the cause of the forest degradation. Media advertisements and billboards pointed the finger at this sector of society. Others argued that the inequitable distribution in society produced a system conducive to forest degradation (Porter and Ganapin 1988; Vitug 1993). While there has been disagreement over the extent of the damage to forest resources due to shifting cultivation, there has been agreement that increased population pressure, poverty, and migration into the uplands contributed to deforestation in the postwar period.

During this period, large timber concessions were awarded to foreign and domestic timber companies. The concessionaire system was referred to as forest management although there was little emphasis on proper silvicultural practices including felling cycles, residual stand conditions, and road maintenance (Burgess 1989). Because the Filipino constitution states that public forestland cannot be converted to private ownership, the Bureau of Forestry developed leasing agreements for timber concessionaires. Public agricultural land, however, could be converted to private ownership. The incentives provided by these two institutions resulted in additional resource degradation. Often after a timber company harvested timber from an area, migrants arrived and finished clearing

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<sup>2</sup>For a discussion of the term “shifting cultivation” as a translation of the *kaingin* system of farming see Olofson (1983).

the area for their crops. Timber companies declared the cleared land “agricultural” and either avoided the reforestation requirement or gained title to the land for plantation agriculture (Burgess 1989; Cruz *et al.* 1992). This provided a strong disincentive to reforest harvested areas.

### ***Emergence of the CBFM Program***

A dramatic shift to a new forestry paradigm began in the late 1970s and early 1980s, leaving behind much of the colonial style system of forestry. The goal was to move away from what was increasingly referred to as an opportunistic, mercenary, and myopic system riddled with professional and political compromise and shortsightedness (Guiang and Manila 1994; Dugan 1997). The new approach would be more people-centered, would be more equitable in terms of how the benefits from national forests were distributed, would focus on conservation and protection, not just utilization, and would begin to devolve the responsibilities of forest management to local communities, local governments, and local forestry administration offices (Briones 1995). Increasing environmental problems, such as erosion, sedimentation, flooding, and fisheries damage also contributed to the shifting paradigm during this period. There was also growing awareness of indigenous rights and concern about overlapping concessions with indigenous territories. The diverse views about the contribution of local people to deforestation remained. At one extreme, local people were considered stewards of the land (see Peluso *et al.* 1995; Rambo *et al.* 1988); while at the other extreme, activities by local people, such as migration and shifting cultivation, were viewed as the cause of the

destruction of forests (Bacalla 1993).

By the early 1980s, stricter controls on timber harvesting were enacted. By 1989, annual timber production had declined to 4.5 million cubic meters from over 15 million cubic meters in 1975 (Walpole *et al* 1993; Durst 1981). By 1987, the Manila Observatory found that less than 22% of the country's land area supported forest vegetation and undisturbed old growth represented less than 3% (Walpole *et al.* 1993). Also by the mid-1980s, much of accessible timber had been harvested and international timber companies began leaving the Philippines. Vast areas of "public" land existed without any formal management (although it has been argued that the timber concessionaires did not practice forest management) and fell victim to further encroachment, migration, and illegal forest products extraction typical of open access systems (Rowe, Sharma and Browder 1992). Social marginalization and political instability furthered the migration of people into the uplands increasing the pressure on primary and secondary forests (Sajise and Omegan 1990; Sajise 1986; Kummer 1992; Church *et al.* 1994). By 1985, the indigenous upland population of 5.3 million had absorbed an additional 12.2 million migrants (Walpole *et al.* 1993).

1982 is often cited as the year that social forestry became the official government strategy for forest development and conservation in the Philippines. The keystone program during this period was the Integrated Social Forestry Program (ISFP), which offered two tenurial instruments--one to families and one to community groups--granting the recipient a 25-year lease on a parcel of land for agroforestry, reforestation, and conservation activities. ISFP became the umbrella program for all preexisting programs,

most of which were tree farming and reforestation programs that did not include tenurial instruments. The social forestry programs in the 1980s also began addressing the issues of poverty and tenurial insecurity in the uplands (Payuan 1987; Gibbs *et al.* 1990; Borlagdan 1992; Lynch and Talbott 1995). Many of these programs were initiated with support from international bilateral and multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank, USAID, and the United Nation's Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and large international non-governmental organizations such as the Ford Foundation and CARE (see Aguilar 1986; Olofson 1985; Brechin 1997). Although these programs were innovative and revolutionary, some had varying levels of community participation and remained top-down driven. A number of factors contributed to low success of these early social forestry efforts, including the history of centralized control, the constraints associated with operationalizing a program at the national level, and the incapacity of the Bureau of Forestry to respond to locally-initiated resource management systems (Payuan 1985; Poffenberger *et al.* 1995).

The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) launched the Community Forestry Program (CFP) in 1989 through DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 123, later amended as DAO 22 in 1993. The Community Forestry Program transferred the responsibility of managing and protecting the forests to organized communities under the DENR's supervision. In 1995, President Fidel Ramos' Executive Order No. 263 adopted community-based forest management (CBFM) as the national strategy to achieve sustainable forestry and social justice by guaranteeing equitable access of people to natural resources, respecting indigenous rights to ancestral domains, and

entrusting communities with the management of national forests (Guiang and Manila 1994; DAI 1995). In return for responsible forest management and protection, communities were awarded the right to extract, process, and sell forest products to generate local employment and income to finance agroforestry development, reforestation, non-timber based livelihoods, forest protection, community enablement and empowerment, and the formulation of management and operational plans through participatory approaches (DENR 1995). Like other social forestry programs, CBFM projects were supported, both financially and technically, by international funding organizations, such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and USAID. The programs continued to be top-down, but with a more pronounced bottom-up focus. Under the CBFM strategy, the DENR began moving away from narrowly focused reforestation projects and individual user-permits for specific forest products, such as rattan. With recognition that forestlands included timber that would provide much needed capital to implement community development strategies, the CBFM strategy permitted timber harvests by community groups (see Laarman *et al.* 1995).

One important tenet of all CBFM programs has been the awarding of a tenurial instrument to a community or organization. The tenurial agreement grants specific resource management, protection, and utilization rights to a community group or indigenous tribe (see Lynch and Talbott 1995 on the role and evolution of tenurial instruments in Asia). Two such programs form the basis of this dissertation, namely, the Community Forestry Program (CFP) and the Ancestral Domain Program (ADP). The study sites consisted of projects supported by USAID and administered by a technical

support unit of the DENR, called the Natural Resource Management Program (NRMP). Four of the sites participated in CFP and one site participated in both CFP and ADP. Table 2 presents these programs and their corresponding tenurial instruments and management plan names. The CFP worked with a variety of community groups, while the ADP worked strictly with indigenous tribes. The CFP tended to work with smaller areas of land, usually around 1,000 hectares, but sometimes up to 5,000 hectares. The Ancestral Domain program dealt with larger areas of land, usually greater than 5,000 hectares. The tenurial instruments between the government and a community group or federation of groups granted usufruct rights through 25-year renewable leases on specific areas of national land.

Table 2. Community-based forest management programs and program components

	COMMUNITY-BASED FOREST MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS	
	Community Forestry (CFP)	Ancestral Domain Program (ADP)
TENURIAL INSTRUMENT	Community-Based Forestry Management Agreement (CBFMA)	Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claim (CADC)
TYPE OF MANAGEMENT PLAN REQUIRED	Community Resource Management Framework (CRMF)	Ancestral Domain Management Plan <sup>a</sup> (ADMP)

<sup>a</sup>Not until 1996 did this tenurial instrument and accompanying management plan recognize indigenous peoples' traditional use rights to the natural resources.

As of mid-1997, there were over fifty USAID-supported pilot sites within the CFP and ADP programs, spanning 550,200 hectares and involving approximately 835 *sitios*,

the smallest jurisdiction of a community in the Philippines (DAI 1997b). Although, there were only a few ADP sites, they typically involved large areas of land and several community groups. The selection of project sites was based on criteria that included: that the community was well-defined and could relatively easily become a registered economic entity; that the forest site was within a certain distance to the community; and that the site was composed of at least 500 hectares of residual and/or old-growth public forestland.

As of December, 1996, twenty-three NRMP sites had received either the CADC or the CBFMA tenurial instrument granting them rights and endowing on them certain responsibilities for forest resources. Appendix A is an example of a CFMA agreement, which was the previous name for the tenurial instrument before the term “community-based” was adopted. Although the tenurial instrument was an important element of a more people-oriented strategy of resource management, groups could not extract forest products until a series of documents were completed and approved, including a management plan, annual operational plan, and other requirements. As of December, 1996, 21 sites had completed their 25-year management plans, though only four had been approved by the DENR. Many details were required in management plans, particularly in the early years of the program. Not surprisingly, budget and personnel constraints affected the ability of the DENR to evaluate and approve the submitted management plans. Unfortunately this meant that even requests for minor revisions took many months to reach the community group. With the hope of speeding up the approval process, in late 1996, the DENR simplified the required format for management plans. Because the fieldwork for this study was conducted soon after this change it was difficult to determine

if the approval process was substantially improved. Once a management plan (either the CRMF<sup>3</sup> or ADMP) was approved, the DENR was in a position to hold the communities responsible for implementing the plan. In cases where the management plans were still being reviewed by the DENR, regional officials issued Interim Resource Use Permits to community groups (DAI 1997a). Twelve of the 53 sites had approved annual work plans (AWP), which was one of the last requirements needed before a community could begin extracting forest products (DAI 1997b). The annual work plan was considered the basis for DENR monitoring and evaluation of the sites. In the ensuing days before a timber harvest, the community group had to obtain from a local-level DENR official (the CENRO) approval of a list of equipment (including serial numbers) that would be used during the harvest. Overall, the process for the development and approval of management and work plans took on average four years, even with assistance from non-governmental organizations, the DENR, and NRMP officials.

### ***Role of NGOs in CBFM program***

In the past decade, the role of local NGOs in community forestry programs in the Philippines has continued to evolve. The Integrated Social Forestry Programs of the 1980s contracted NGOs to train communities in silvicultural practices and form partnerships for reforesting degraded forest land. The programs were designed such that after the departure of the NGOs, the communities would maintain and manage the

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<sup>3</sup>Sites established prior to December, 1996 were required to prepare a more involved and lengthy management plan, referred to as the Community Resource Management and Development Plan (CRMDP).

reforested land and be entitled to a percentage of the earnings from the forests. More recently, as part of the implementation of the pilot projects of the CBFM program, NGOs were contracted by the DENR to organize and train communities to become capable "people's organizations" in the sustainable management of forest resources. The government awarded three-year contracts to NGOs to work with selected communities in technical, financial and organizational assistance.<sup>4</sup> As part of their contracts, NGOs were required to organize, train, equip, and empower rural communities and assist them in conducting resource inventories, preparing management plans, and developing alternative livelihood projects. Other deliverables included location and perimeter operational maps, process documentation, community profiles, and the official registration of the community group. The training involved a variety of activities such as leadership development, financial planning and various resource management techniques. The contract NGOs tended to be small-scale, Filipino organizations. Some had experience in natural resource management. Most had worked in some area of rural development and had only recently begun working with communities in natural resource management.

In recent years, the DENR's NRMP relied less on contract NGOs to provide assistance at the early stages of the project and instead relied on a variety of methods of assistance, including its own staff, contracted professionals hired for specific sites, and collaborative efforts between NRMP, DENR, and the local government at a site. This coincided with the increased emphasis on the part of the DENR to decentralize and move

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<sup>4</sup>Most contracts during the pilot stage were for three years, though some of the more recent contracts were for one year but could be extended.

more staff into the field offices.

Local-level NGOs have existed in a variety of forms and functions in the Philippines and they have played important roles in social development since the people-powered revolution against the Marcos regime in 1985 (Constantino-David 1992). One estimate suggested that there are over 2,000 NGOs in the Philippines that can be classified as intermediary organizations (Constantino-David 1992). These are organizations that work directly with grassroots groups or special sectors of the population. Typically, intermediary NGOs operate with full-time staff and provide a wide range of programs and services for grassroots organizations, such as community associations (Constantino-David 1992). Although many local-level NGOs have worked in rural development in the Philippines, more emerged when the opportunity arose to participate in the CBFM program. For this research, local-level contract NGOs were identified as one of three types of community support organizations<sup>5</sup> that provided assistance to community groups.

The second type of support organization was the field offices of the DENR. In recent years, the DENR began decentralizing many administrative and technical functions to the regional and field levels. One result was that field-level officials were moving into roles that brought them into direct contact with community organizations. The DENR recognized that many foresters were finding themselves in positions for which they were not trained. In response to this the DENR began developing training programs in

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<sup>5</sup>The term “community support organization” was developed because as the research progressed, it became clear that NGOs were by no means the only source of support for communities. The role of government agencies, not as policy makers but as support organizations, merited attention.

community organizing. In addition, a project management officer (PMO) was assigned to one or more CBFM sites. The DENR had been increasing the number of personnel assigned as PMOs and had expanded their training as well. PMOs became increasingly important players in assisting communities with specific technical and programmatic issues and easing the transition during the departure of the contract NGOs. While the DENR's mission statement does not directly describe its function in the arena of rural development, people-oriented policies and programs necessitated that the DENR perform numerous functions similar to those of a rural development organization.

Donor-supported organizations, such as those funded by development banks or governments (e.g., USAID, Germany's GTZ<sup>6</sup>, Sweden, the Netherlands) made up the third type of support organization. Often these institutions funded technical support programs for DENR programs and projects. In the course of their work, personnel from these organizations interacted closely with community groups, though that may not have been their primary function. The United States Agency for International Development-sponsored Natural Resource Management Program (NRMP-DAI), which was a technical support program of the DENR, was a good example of this type of support organization. Because at the time of the fieldwork this program was managed by a U.S.-based consulting firm, Development Alternatives, Inc., it is referred to throughout the study as NRMP-DAI.

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<sup>6</sup>GTZ is the acronym for Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit.

## **Government and NGO Collaboration**

Non-governmental organizations have a unique role in development because of their comparative advantage and their experience working at the local level (Drabek 1987). In some situations, NGOs have been perceived as "filling a gap" in society left by the public sector. They have been credited for having a higher degree of sensitivity to local needs, a greater understanding of community involvement, a strong commitment to participatory methods, and more freedom from the bureaucratic restraints that occur with state programs and projects (Riddell and Robinson 1995). These characteristics and others have allowed NGOs to assist community-based groups in building horizontal and vertical linkages that are important for achieving broader goals of rural development, such as poverty alleviation or improved political processes (Uphoff 1986).

In areas such as group formation and community organizing, NGOs have been viewed as having significant comparative advantage over state intermediaries, because of their non-directive, 'participatory' interaction with intended beneficiaries and their inclination to work on long-term processes (Edwards and Hulme 1992). Like all organizations, NGOs face internal and external shortcomings, including power struggles, limited technical expertise, misplaced idealism, self-interest, rapid turnover, and uncertain funding. But they have become important players in assisting individuals and communities to vocalize and organize to achieve objectives that governments either overlooked or were unable to fulfill.

As part of government programs and through their own efforts, NGOs have been establishing themselves as intermediaries between local communities and local

governments (Cernea 1988a). Many have been able to "carve a distinct 'niche' by establishing themselves as alternatives to the role of government institutions--either as a complementary organization, or as a substitute organization" (Cernea 1988a:21). As with the Philippine DENR, NGOs in other developing countries are finding that government policies increasingly encourage their involvement, particularly in helping villagers who live near forests and in protecting endangered environments (Dichter 1988; Korten 1992).

Increasingly NGOs are invited to support local initiatives because of the type of assistance they bring to the 'process,' such as group formation and leadership enhancement, rather than because of their expertise in the 'content' of specific programs or activities (Edwards and Hulme 1992). Like many local-level NGOs around the world (see examples in Mitlin and Satterthwaite 1992), the contract NGOs in the CBFM program frequently took on dual roles--acting as a catalyst for process-related functions and providing services for the CBFM program.

The trend of utilizing NGOs as government sub-contractors, however, has caused some NGOs to lose some of their independence and flexibility--traits thought of as important to NGO effectiveness in rural development and poverty alleviation. This suggests that at some point the pairing of the state and NGOs may force NGOs to become "reluctant partners" rather than co-supporters (Farrington and Bebbington 1993, in Zadek and Gatward 1996). A related concern has been that NGOs have been co-opted into state agendas (Zadek and Gatward 1996). Yet from a government's perspective, accountability might be reduced when NGOs gained control of public sector programs (see Wood 1997 for an example of welfare program in Bangladesh). As an alternative, governments might

establish mechanisms to receive feedback on NGOs' experiences and enable NGOs to tap the experience and knowledge of government agencies (Riddell and Robinson 1995).

The suggestion that NGOs have a comparative advantage over governments has been criticized for being 'weak and patchy,' largely because little systematic evidence documents the strengths and weaknesses of NGOs (Robinson 1992). Similarly, NGOs have varied in their effectiveness in collaborative projects with governments. Also, the function of NGOs in NGO-government collaboration has been problematic. When collaborations were built on the prevailing assumptions about the capabilities and processes of NGOs, outcomes have occurred that were incompatible with sustainable resource management, including high costs of collaboration due to overlap, low skill NGOs with opportunistic motives, and strong potential for conflict and tension (Maniates 1992). Several factors should be considered before expanding NGO-government collaboration, including: (i) the wide range of interactions that currently exist between the two sectors; (ii) the limitations on efforts to work together; (iii) the preconditions for successful collaboration, in particular, the informal contacts necessary to build up mutual trust; (iv) the limitations, as well as the successes, of NGO actions; and, (v) the extent to which certain functions remain more cost-effectively when performed by the public sector rather than by NGOs (Bebbington and Farrington 1992).

### **Constraints on Community-Based Resource Management**

The history of rural development and resource management projects in developing countries has provided some valuable lessons that should serve as warning signals for the

CBFM program. Also, a number of institutional, programmatic, and social issues constrain the success of the CBFM program. These historical lessons and present day constraints are presented in the next two sub-sections.

### *Lessons from the Past*

Over the past several decades, many development projects have tried to meet myriad participatory, social, economic, infrastructural and service objectives in what have been called “integrated” approaches to development. Several types of “integrated” development programs with environmental foci emerged in the 1990s. Some are referred to as integrated conservation-development projects (ICDPs). ICDPs are distinguished from the integrated rural development projects of the 1970s, in that they are typically run on smaller budgets, managed not just by governments but also local, national, and international non-governmental organizations, and include an additional development component of conserving biological diversity. Wells and Brandon (1992) reviewed 19 best-case projects and found that ICDPs have been influenced from the “bottom up” approach to development and thus face fewer of the problems typically associated with centrally administered rural development. However, with respect to participation, only a few projects showed signs of acting on the lessons of earlier development failures by winning the trust and confidence of local people, eliciting the participation of community members in project activities, and starting institutions for local resource-management decisionmaking. In fact, few projects specified what was meant by local participation, and “most treated local people as passive beneficiaries rather than as active collaborators”

(Wells and Brandon 1992:x). Commitment and motivation of the intended beneficiaries was weakened by poor institutional capacity. Agencies that managed project areas tended to be politically weak, and lacked resources and trained personnel. Wells and Brandon (1992:x) concluded that the flaws of ICDPs were attributed in part to the “failure to consider the well-documented lessons from decades of rural development.”

Social forestry shares similar history with its rural development cousin in failing to implement projects with effective participatory strategies. Recent reviews of projects and reviews from several decades ago point out the need for more widespread and effective social forestry projects (Khan 1994). For instance, in the late 1970s, an assessment of fuelwood projects in Africa found that local inhabitants often do not think that they will get the benefits from tree planting (Hoskins 1979 in Gregersen and McGaughey 1987). Ownership and property rights issues continue to plague social forestry efforts (see Lynch and Talbott 1995). Often this is exacerbated in countries where the history of relations between the government and rural people has not been adequately considered in the design and implementation of social forestry projects. In addition to the lack of attention to land tenure issues, projects often lacked good anthropological analysis of the key social actors, the nature and structure of the village, the history of local organizations, and the physical and technical environment in which groups act (Guggenheim and Spears 1991; Cernea 1991b; Utting 1994; Esman and Uphoff 1984). Uninformed assumptions about human systems have led to inadequately implemented projects that ignore many of the social prerequisites for generating collective action (Cernea 1991b).

### *Constraints on the Philippine Strategy*

In the Philippines, as in other countries in the region, the evolution from timber industry-dominated forestry to community-based forest management has induced a host of institutional changes related to jurisdictional control, linkages to local governments, land and tree tenure, and indigenous rights (Fortmann 1986; Lynch and Talbott 1995; Brosius, Tsing and Zerner 1998). The new focus on community-based forest management has required forestry agencies to train foresters in community organizing, move personnel from central offices to the field, hire specialists, and build a common vision among diverse perspectives in an agency (see Miranda *et al.* 1992). Throughout the development of social forestry and community-based forest management in the Philippines the government has responded by revising policies and agency structure to better prepare itself for a community-based approach. Nevertheless, important bureaucratic and programmatic issues and trade-offs remained that had the potential to constrain the effectiveness of support organizations and the abilities of community groups to act as collective managers of national forestlands.

First, from the government's perspective, the establishment of an effective national community-based natural resource management policy required some degree of statutory uniformity. One concern has been whether uniformity, as opposed to support of local self-directed actions, was the most effective method for dealing with diverse communities and land tenure issues (see Brosius, Tsing and Zerner 1998; Ghai and Vivian 1992; Utting 1994; Ascher 1995; Dove 1995). Similarly, as a resource agency, the DENR was looked at to provide technical and regulatory reparations to a problem that was largely perceived

as deforestation issue requiring a forestry solution, rather than a socioeconomic and political problem requiring a multi-agency policy reform strategy (Gibbs *et al.* 1990). Given the national agenda, the DENR's approach to community-based forestry was largely focused on agency sponsored projects rather than processes (Borlangdan 1992; Poffenberger *et al.* 1995). Some of this was driven by the international financial institutions that required short-term quantifiable measures to assess project implementation. In contrast, encouraging local initiatives and building the capacity of community groups were difficult to assess. A related consequence of the national policy was an emphasis on relatively large-scale projects in communities that had varying experience in collective resource management. One concern was that the DENR was motivated by the view that community timber harvests would produce more visible short-term benefits, while smaller more incremental resource management projects would reflect less positively on a national strategy. Gradual approaches with relatively easy-to-solve, concrete problems and tasks have been viewed by some as being preferable in cases where communities do not have a long tradition of cooperatively utilizing natural resources or where there were no threats to the resource use status quo (Baland and Platteau 1996; Steelman and Carmin 1998).

Second, the CBFM program ascribed to the more typical methods of state programs in which an agency was driven by a national policy, and its mission was to try to induce or educate people to participate (Carroll 1992). NGOs working in collaboration with government programs are affected by this perspective. High functioning NGOs have been characterized as offering "demand driven" services that fit well into particular

situations even if the initial activity was initiated from an external or government-sponsored program (Carroll 1992). In general, demand-driven services arise out of the interests and needs identified by community groups rather than by outside organizations, though they can be developed in collaboration. Are competent NGOs unable to offer demand-driven resource management services because they are constrained by a national policy?

Third, the need to counteract the effects of an open access system was implicit in the government's objective for the CBFM program. Converting an open access system into a community-based resource management approach required a long-term perspective. The move toward 25-year renewable leases, though a relatively short period from a forestry perspective, reflected an important programmatic change. Unfortunately, the history of short-term, narrowly focused social forestry projects has lasting implications. Based on their previous experience with government programs, groups expected to work for short-term wages and were less experienced in considering the costs and benefits of engaging in a long-term agreements with the government (see Johnson 1997).

Fourth, the CBFM program was attempting to convert virtually unmanaged, open access, national forestland into a form of collective resource management. DENR officials realized that the status of the natural resources in the CBFM sites was largely dependent on the action or inaction of the people residing next to the forest (Cernea 1991a). However, research on collective actions processes has revealed that members of a community group are constrained by external and internal issues that influence their willingness to work together and collectively manage common resources. Some of the

conditions that bring people together and cause them to switch to a more coordinated, albeit more costly, strategy of collective action are: pursuit of economic goals; coordination, when it is important for survival or when continuing independent strategies will seriously harm resources; and, costs of decisionmaking about coordinated strategies versus benefits of a coordinated action (Ostrom 1992).

Many factors affect the incentive for people to continue to invest time and effort into the governance and manage of a common property resource. Most scholars agree on a range of conditions and factors that are important to the existence of collective organizations: groups should be relatively small and prior history of coordination is preferable; the boundaries of the resource must be clearly defined and of manageable size; protection of the resource is supported by external authority; people have a high dependence on the common resource; people understand the property and other rights granted to them by the state; people reside near the resource and have prior knowledge of the resource; a group has some homogeneity; criteria exist for membership in a group; rules of use are developed by users and are simple, clear, and flexible; punishment for rule breaking fits the crime and receives external legitimation; and, there exists a level of mutual trust and individual concern for social reputation (see Olson 1965; Netting 1981; Ostrom 1990, 1992; Feeny 1992; Bromley 1992, 1994; Runge 1992; Tang 1992; McKean 1992; Agrawal 1994; McKean and Ostrom 1995; Poffenberger and McGean 1996; Baland and Platteau 1996; Taylor 1998).

### **Theoretical View of Support Organizations**

Support organizations help build community groups for rural development and community-based resource management strategies. International development theorists have examined how support organizations define their relationships with community groups and how their actions contribute to sustainable rural development and local resource management (Bagadion and Korten 1991; Carroll 1992; Cernea 1988b, 1991a). Support organization activities can be divided into three areas: service delivery, participatory methods, and capacity building. Training activities tend to fall under service delivery activities. Most training activities focus on technical subjects (e.g., financial management, tree nurseries) that do not address issues of group cooperation, creativity, and democratic principles. While training activities sponsored by support organizations often lack institution-building elements, one study on NGO performance found that half of the NGOs in the study considered building the capacity of the group to be their primary function. Ironically, 60% of the NGOs perceived their training activities to be a means to other community goals, yet they were less involved in identifying and assisting the groups to achieve those goals (Carroll 1992). Studies have suggested that longer-term positive outcomes from NGOs interactions are more consistent with a participatory style of implementation and management (Cernea 1988b; Carroll 1992). Government institutions have also been found to increase the success of their programs when agency leaders respond to the feedback and experiences of community organizers and field staff who work with community groups and resource users. This often requires a communication feedback mechanism between stakeholders in a project and the administering agencies (Korten 1980). In one study, an irrigation agency adopted a partnership approach with

the community groups that effectively integrated community development principles and socially-trained professionals into project implementation (Bagadion and Korten 1991).

Some of the patterns and trends emerging from evaluations of rural development projects and findings on the performance of intermediary NGOs (Carroll 1992) are combined into a theoretical representation (Figure 1) of the elements of support in the context of capabilities of support organizations and long-term success of resource management strategies. Key functions of support organizations (service delivery, participatory approaches, and capacity building) are arranged by their relative contribution to sustainable development and resource management, while considering the challenges that these organization face in effectively administering these functions. The conclusions from reviews of development projects suggest that support organizations have difficulty developing capacity building strategies, in part because the strategies require more understanding of, and communication with, community groups (Cernea 1988b). While testing this theoretical framework was beyond the scope of this study, the findings may suggest areas for future research. The long-term nature of present day resource management strategies requires a better understanding about where the emphasis of support should be placed.




Figure 1. Elements of support

***Research Objective***

The primary focus of the research for this dissertation is how support organizations define their relationships to community groups with respect to the three categories of support for natural resource management: service delivery, participatory methods, and capacity building. While issues of sustainability are integral to the assessment of performance indicators in this research, the testing of the theory depicted in Figure 1 requires long-term data and is therefore beyond the scope of the research. One

goal of the research, however, is to provide information that would continue the development of theoretical perspectives on the roles of support organizations and the sustainability of resource management strategies. The three types of support organizations studied are: the contract NGOs, the DENR, and the USAID-supported group, NRMP-DAI. These organizations are examined in the context of their connection to the government's CBFM program, rather than in the context of their own programmatic goals and objectives.

The research was designed to answer the question: **Are communities getting what they need and expect from support organizations?** Two sub-questions specify the areas of research addressed in this dissertation:

- (1) **How effective are the service delivery, participatory methods, and capacity building techniques of the support organizations at preparing communities for community-based forest management?**
- (2) **What are the issues and constraints that affect how support organizations define their relationships to community groups?**

Implicitly and explicitly, community groups are given numerous responsibilities in resource management--many that the government on its own has not been able to fulfill or even define. Providing community resource-management groups with necessary support, including appropriate incentive systems, is important to achieving a sustainable resource management strategy. Answering the above questions will help identify some of the strengths, limitations, potential, and unexpected consequences of the CBFM strategy.

### ***Research Justification***

The success of community-based forestry programs depends on many factors, including political will, markets, budgets, international donors, agency capacity, contract NGOs, and community management practices. Coupled with these factors are the relationships and interactions of the groups involved with the implementation of the programs. Because the number and forms of collaborative approaches to locally-based natural resource management are increasing, additional information is needed about the interactions of support organizations and local-user groups. More understanding is needed about how support organizations assist user-groups to fulfill multi-dimensional resource management objectives. One goal of this study is to provide useful information about the function of support organizations to: officials in the Philippine Department of Environment and Natural Resources, international aid organizations, non-governmental organizations, communities involved in resource management, community forestry practitioners, and researchers interested in community-based natural resource management. The research was designed to address some of the issues pertaining to contract NGOs and community assistance that emerged from the first five years of the CBFM programs as identified by Philippine officials in 1995. In addition, a closer examination of the role of community support organizations in building capacity of community groups may contribute to a framework for understanding how the interactions between community groups and support organizations affect the long-term sustainability of community-based natural resource management programs and natural resources.

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## CHAPTER TWO

### CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section discusses the issues surrounding measuring the performance of NGOs. Next, a review of the evolution of participatory methods in rural development will provide the context for the role of participatory methods within the CBFM strategy. Participatory methods and capacity building techniques are related processes. A section on capacity building draws the distinction. The last section in this chapter presents the conceptual framework that guided the research. Because some of the concepts and terms used throughout this paper have several connotations, this chapter begins with some brief definitions.

**Non-governmental organizations** are intermediary organizations that support local groups of beneficiaries and forge links between beneficiaries and governments/donors.

**Community** refers to a community of place, not interest, and is based on the DENR depiction of what constitutes a community in the CBFM program. In the Philippines, governmentally recognized communities come in varying sizes, including the *barangay*, *sitio*, and smaller jurisdictions.

**Community capacity** refers to the ability of a community to adapt to circumstances of all sorts and to meet the needs of its residents (Kusel 1996). It involves the financial, social, and physical capital of the community (Flora 1994). Capacity is continually being eroded or built, and thus, the term capacity building relates to how

outside organizations assist groups to build their capacity.

**Community group** refers to the legally recognized community group participating in the CBFM program. Groups consist of cooperatives, associations, and federations of associations. The Philippine government uses the term people's organizations (POs) when it refers to community groups.

**Common property** is a type of property, unlike private, public, or open-access, where there is "tacit cooperation by individual users according to a complex set of rules specifying rights of joint use" (Runge 1992:18).

**Community support organizations** are governmental and non-governmental organizations that assist local community groups to function as effective forest resource managers. Contract NGOs, the field offices of the DENR and NRMP-DAI were considered support organizations in this study.

### **Measuring NGO Performance**

The literature on the non-governmental sector reveals important lessons about measuring NGO performance. These lessons can be applied to measuring the performance of any support organization, including those described in this study. Several factors make measuring NGO performance a challenging task. One involves the issue of NGO accountability. Accountability is generally understood as a means by which individuals and organizations report to authority and are held responsible for their actions (Edwards and Hulme 1994, in Edwards and Hulme 1996). Depending on the type of NGO, accountability to clients varies from one organization to the next. Some organizations

have clear lines of accountability, while others are more diffuse. Organizations with obscure lines of accountability may be able to de-link their performance from efforts to remain financially stable (Smillie 1996). Whereas the political system is seen as a feedback mechanism between constituents and the government, few formal systems exist that allow beneficiaries to express their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with an NGO providing services (Fowler 1996).

Accountability is often related to the degree of participatory processes used during a performance evaluation. Open consultative processes between NGOs and their clients are associated with accountable organizations (Carroll 1992). Even when lines of accountability exist, the methods for determining stakeholder satisfaction may be lacking. For instance, methods such as client surveys, increasingly are being implemented but are not standardized across stakeholder groups and NGOs. Also, relatively clear lines of accountability may or may not lead to more accurate measures of NGO performance (Edwards and Hulme 1996). For instance, there is a notion that membership-based organizations are more closely linked, and thereby responsive, to their clients, since the clients are members of the organization. But there is little evidence to support this (see Carroll 1992:98; Bebbington and Theile 1993:21).

Another factor that makes measuring NGO performance difficult involves determining *what is* effective performance and *what are* the appropriate indicators to measure it. NGOs come in many shapes and sizes and even if they could be categorized by type (e.g., membership-based, international, local), there are few agreed-upon standards for measuring the performance of a given type of NGO. In the absence of any

form of representative accountability, NGOs are often evaluated by measuring tangible outputs (such as the number of wells built, or the number of people attending a training session) and comparing them to stated plans or intentions (Edwards and Hulme 1996). In arenas where donors play an important role, financial accountability often becomes the default method of evaluation (Tandon 1996; Edwards and Hulme 1996). The adequacy of using financial returns to measure performance is called into question (Fowler 1996) because financial returns do not indicate whether needs of client groups are being met. What is often lacking in assessments is any type of measurement of the crucial elements of development processes, such as people's degree of control over decisions or the capabilities of community-based organizations (Marsden, Oakley, Pratt 1994 in Fowler 1996:176). Also, the very nature of the work of NGOs makes it difficult to construct and apply performance measures. Some processes are difficult to measure, such as an NGO's willingness to experiment with new approaches and ability to apply what they learn as they proceed; some concepts are hard to assess, such as empowerment (Fowler 1996; Edwards and Hulme 1996). And, disaggregating the factors that influence the actions and outcomes associated with NGOs is challenging, particularly those in which an NGO has little control--such as macroeconomic changes and state policy (Edwards and Hulme 1996; Uphoff 1986; Biggs and Neame 1996).

Given these and other challenges, a variety of approaches have therefore been used to conduct evaluations of NGO performance. Fowler (1996) discussed organizational capacity as a basis for NGO performance evaluation in Africa; Riddell and Robinson (1995) examined factors leading to success and failure of NGOs working in poverty

alleviation. Increasingly, participatory methods are being used to develop indicators for assessments of NGOs and the projects they sponsor. Participatory methods and types of social auditing may be effective for developing a framework for NGO performance evaluation, while simultaneously building in lines of accountability (Robinson 1992; Edwards and Hulme 1996; Shah and Shah 1996; Zadeck and Gatward 1996). One important concern is whether agencies are prepared to make the reforms that are identified as necessary through a participatory method of evaluation (Edwards and Hulme 1996; Shah and Shah 1996). A few evaluations have had some success at identifying indicators for measuring NGO performance by taking into consideration the NGO's ability not only to deliver services but also to empower groups through participatory and capacity building activities (Carroll 1992; DAI 1985). However, the literature indicates that more work is needed in developing indicators and measures of NGO performance.

### **Participatory Strategies**

Participatory methods and building the capacity of community groups are components of community-based development strategies. A review of the history and thought on participatory strategies provides context to its role in the CBFM strategy and the conceptual framework of this study.

Over the past two decades, numerous reviews of rural development projects have stressed that the failure of projects is often associated with inadequate consideration of the social dimensions surrounding projects (for example, Lele 1975; Rondinelli 1977; Korten and Alfonso 1981; Ruttan 1989; Cernea 1991a; Wells and Brandon 1992). Concurrently,

the importance of local participation in development projects has been emphasized in documents from governments and international organizations (UNRISD 1979 in Utting 1994; World Bank 1982; IUCN 1989). As early as 1973, for example, the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act stressed the need for participation by the poor in development projects. Throughout the 1980s, there was criticism that development institutions and governments of developed and developing countries had been emphasizing participation in a largely rhetorical manner. Techniques for enhancing participation were inadequate or being ignored (Cernea 1991a), despite increasing evidence that the success of rural development projects depends to a large degree on the amount of energy and support contributed by the rural communities (Ruttan 1989).

Recently, some governments and development institutions have designed and implemented more people-centered strategies. Often, these strategies require important changes in the structure of development assistance, including hiring field level specialists with social science backgrounds and redefining organizational commitment to reflect the necessary time and money needed for longer-term participatory approaches (Bagadion and Korten 1991; Miranda *et al.* 1992; FAO 1997). Even with institutional changes toward participatory approaches, there remain complex socio-political issues that act as barriers to successful rural development.

At some point, however, participation in a group should be self-perpetuating and not dependent on visits by outsiders from assisting organizations (Cernea 1991b; Uphoff 1991). Stable social-organizational structures become essential. Self-perpetuation is an important characteristic and indicator of the capacity of a group. It involves sustaining

participatory activities especially when the initial catalyst for forming a group is less apparent. When the catalyst is a government-initiated project, however, the participatory and capacity building dimensions may be constrained by additional factors, such as government rules and regulations.

Several strategies for participatory processes in rural development have appeared over the years. In the 1980s, the concepts of “assisted self-reliance” and “the learning process approach” emerged. “Assisted self-reliance” emphasized the use of external advice, funds, training, and materials “to strengthen the local capacity to initiate, manage, modify and sustain activities that produce benefits for which the poor are responsible” (Uphoff 1988:47). The “learning process approach” (Korten 1980) involved prospective beneficiaries at all stages of a development project, including decisionmaking, implementation, evaluation, and benefits. People initiated and helped plan the changes that would affect them. The strategy was based on flexibility and feedback from project participants and required close working relationships between the participants and project supporters. In addition to these strategies, several participatory tools and guidelines emerged that were specifically designed to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of designing development projects. Tools such as rapid rural appraisal and participant rural appraisal have been used to incorporate social dimensions into rural development and social forestry projects. None of these strategies are free from some of the obstacles that faced less participatory approaches, namely (i) the dominance of one group over another, or one sector of the population, (ii) the lack of interest of potential participants, (iii) the lack of sufficient time and financial resources, and (iv) institutional restrictions and

fluctuations associated with government agencies and politics (Korten 1980).

According to the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), participation implies not only the willing, informed, and active involvement of people in the decisionmaking process about issues affecting their lives, but also “organized group action and the sharing of political and managerial power” by hitherto disadvantaged groups (UNRISD 1979 in Utting 1994). Many similar definitions of participation are used throughout the literature. For instance, in reference to grassroots development projects, Carroll (1992) adopts the definition that participation is the “process of change in which the members of the project group, by common effort, gain an increasing influence in the decision making of their organization” (Buijs 1982 in Carroll 1992:78).

### **Group Capacity Building**

Participation and capacity building are related concepts in rural development. There are many forms of participation. Some types of beneficiary involvement are referred to as participation and are deemed successful if people are persuaded to undertake a required task--for example, when a group of people are encouraged to plant trees in an area and they do. This form of participation continues to be used by the development community and government agencies, though often it does not produce long-term benefits for the user groups nor ensure long-term results from the project itself because the user groups did not participate in the design of the project (see Jodha 1992; Utting 1994; Poffenberger and McGean 1996). Early assessments of resource management projects emphasized the need for local participation but glossed over issues

of group formation, community cohesiveness, and leadership (Gregersen and McGaughey 1987).

A second perspective, which has gained more wide-spread use in the last decade, involves setting of objectives and goals by the people who in turn will manage a project or program. Participation implies enhancing the ability of a community group to adapt to circumstances and meet the needs of its members. Development theorists suggest that more benefits accrue when people behave as an organization rather than individually (Esman and Uphoff 1984; Zaman 1984). This type of participation can lead to enhanced capacity of a group. Participation of this sort is not limited to the time and labor contributed by people. Instead the focus is on “putting people first” (Cernea 1991b) or “putting the last first” (Chambers 1983). Participation of this type involves assisting groups of people to design projects that fit their needs and assisting them to implement, monitor and evaluate their projects.

Group capacity building is often an implied dimension of the latter, more complex participatory approach. It is considered separately here because of the long history of participatory efforts that lacked long-term mechanisms for beneficiary involvement and subsequently led to failed rural development projects. Capacity building is viewed here as a long-term component of a participatory strategy. But, what is meant by *group capacity building*? A brief deconstruction of the term may provide a better understanding of the concept.

First, what is meant by *group*? Groups participating in social forestry projects may range from family units to communities and community subgroups (Cernea 1991b).

The identification or creation of groups is a task that requires both sociological and anthropological understanding and consideration of the methods for social organization (Cernea 1991b). Too often assumptions about beneficiaries of a project ignore considerations of subgroups, social classes, relations to the state, and other group dynamics. This is important because the “‘organizability’ of grassroots groups depends very much on the degree of shared interest and motivation among the membership” (Carroll 1992:102). For instance, the goals and values of subsistence-oriented people differ from those of people who produce crops for cash (see Kottak 1991:328). Apart from having specific though not always widely understood interests, goals, and needs, groups are fluid and go through numerous mutations over time (Carroll 1992; Kottak 1991).

Like the group itself, *capacity* is a dynamic dimension and is continually being eroded or built. Capacity can be considered the financial, social, and physical capital of a community group (Flora 1994). Social capital tends to be more abstract than financial and physical capital. Norms, mutual trust, and leadership are examples of social capital. Group cohesiveness is a good example of the dynamic quality of capacity. Even groups that start out being highly participatory and cohesive can lose these features over time because of a dominating leader or some external force, such as shifting regional political alliances (Hornsby 1989b in Carroll 1992). Some organizations are helping rural communities and groups identify and measure their level of capacity through workbooks that provide menus of indicators of capacity and offer guidelines on how groups can measure and monitor their capacity (Aspen Institute 1996).

*Building* refers to the self-directed and externally-assisted *efforts* that enable local groups to adapt to circumstances of all sorts and to meet the needs of their residents (Kusel 1996). In this way, external assistance is not about providing routine services (Brown and Korten 1989), but about developing the capacity of groups. Support organizations “perform important social functions, but unless they are developing capacity of indigenous organizations to replace them in their functions on a self-sustaining basis...they cannot claim to be doing development work” (Brown and Korten 1989:11). One way to understand capacity is to consider it in terms of internal and external dimensions (Carroll 1992). The internal dimension of capacity building is about the group learning how to manage resources collectively (e.g., nursery, marketing, group credit). The external dimension is about learning how to negotiate with and make claims on the government, banks, and other power holders (which respect to legal petitions, indigenous rights, etc.). Common to both of these dimensions is the capacity to work effectively as a group, interact democratically, reach a consensus, manage conflict, limit corruption and free ridership, and forge networks (Carroll 1992). Thus, building group capacity is not simply “learning how to accomplish certain technical tasks, but is about being able to adapt to new circumstances and deal more effectively with a dynamic external world” (Carroll 1992:33). It is about building a leadership that fosters and nurtures mutual trust and group cohesiveness. However, dynamic groups can be difficult to define and categorize. There is no cookbook for building group capacity and thus efforts must be tailored to meet the interests and needs of specific groups.

## **Conceptual Framework of Community and Support Organization Interactions**

The conceptual framework adapts current thought on NGO performance evaluation (see Cernea 1988a; Carroll 1992; Riddell and Robinson 1995), addresses shortfalls of prior assessments, and applies this to the relationship between community support organizations and community groups in the CBFM program. Most assessments have not previously measured crucial elements of the development process, namely beneficiaries' degree of control over decisions, and the capabilities of community-based organizations (Fowler 1996; Fowler 1997; Edwards and Hulme 1996).

Following the Esman and Uphoff (1984) approach, this dissertation in the Philippines focuses on the factors that surround change, primarily the processes and interactions between the NGOs, other support organizations, and the communities. As such, this dissertation differs from some of the more conventional evaluations of NGO performance (Cernea 1988a; Carroll 1992; Riddell and Robinson 1995) where the objectives were to determine the factors that made for successful NGO performance and to assess the long-term existence, development, and abilities of a diverse set of NGOs. These studies evaluated NGOs as institutions and looked at impacts and effectiveness of NGOs and their projects.

Components of the conceptual framework for this study (Figure 1) such as service delivery, participatory methods, and capacity building, originate in the work of Carroll (1992). The unit of analysis in this study is not the NGO, but the relationship between the community group and the support organization. Thus the functions of support organizations that are beyond

this relationship are not examined in this study. Carroll (1992) developed criteria to evaluate and better understand NGO performance based on his team's combined experience and the work of other scholars. The criteria were divided into three components: service delivery, participation, and wider impacts such as innovations and policy impacts. Sector-specific indicators were also used to account for the diversity of NGO functions.




Figure 1. Conceptual framework of community and support organization interactions

The conceptual framework shown in Figure 1 served as a guide for data collection and analysis. The framework depicts the processes associated with the interaction of support organizations and community groups. The processes include the interplay of actors, events, and setting. Both the community groups and the support organizations entered into their partnership bringing certain levels of experience, capabilities, and norms. From this, the support organizations were expected to carry out several types of

organizational and service-delivery functions. The community responded to these actions and absorbed or used some level of the information and training. A feedback mechanism, or absence thereof, to the support organization allows for modification of support organizations' actions, but depends on the community's responses and behaviors toward the actions. Finally, a level and type of resource management results from the actions and behaviors on the part of the community as they interact directly with the natural resources. Whether or not natural resources are properly managed is one outcome of the support organization-community group interactions.

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## CHAPTER THREE

### METHODS

This chapter presents the methods of the study, background on the indicators, and descriptions of the study sites.<sup>1</sup> Qualitative methods were selected for this study because they reveal conditions, factors, and elements about the interactions of community groups and support organizations that do not normally appear in quantitative methods, such as a survey. Understanding latent, underlying issues and the local context was arrived at through in-depth interviewing, participation, observation, and unobtrusive measures (Yin 1994; Miles and Huberman 1994; Marshall and Rossman 1989; Taylor and Bogdan 1984; Becker and Geer 1957). Throughout the research, the objective and conceptual framework served as the basis for the rationale used to make choices and decisions about developing indicators, collecting data and proceeding through the analysis.

#### Methods

A multiple case study approach was used to enhance analytic generality by looking at cases that had similar and contrasting characteristics. The intent was to strengthen the conceptual validity of the study and determine the conditions under which the findings would hold (Miles and Huberman 1994; Marshall and Rossman 1989). For this research, a “case” was the interactions of the community group and its respective support

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<sup>1</sup>The sites are referred to as sites A, B, C, D, and E in order to preserve the anonymity that was assured to informants. Anonymity was important because informants were asked to comment on relationships that were not always equal in terms of power and influence.

organization(s) at a community-based forest management site. Three types of support organizations were considered, though all three may not have existed at each site. The support organizations included the non-governmental organization contracted to work with the community group, the DENR field office, and the DENR-affiliated unit, NRMP-DAI.

During the period from April through June, 1997, five sites were selected and visited. The sites were located in geographically different areas spanning four regions and two of the larger islands in the Philippines. The map below (Figure 1) shows the provinces within which sites were located. Site A was in Northern Luzon; sites B, C, and D were on the large island, Mindanao, but were spread out to the north and south; and site E was in the eastern part of central Luzon.

### Provinces Where Study Sites Were Located




Figure 1. Map of study sites

### *Site Selection*

Many factors contributed to the selection of the case sites. The approach was more akin to “replication logic” than “sampling” logic (Yin 1994) and similar to the approach for selecting “typical,” “disconfirming,” and “exceptional” cases described by Miles and Huberman (1994). Cases were not randomly sampled; instead, each case was carefully selected so that it would either (a) predict similar results (*a literal replication*) or (b) produce contrasting results but for predictable reasons (*a theoretical replication*) (Yin 1994). Though this replication design tends to be more experimental in nature, it has useful functions for practical, policy-oriented approaches as well.

The strategy for selecting cases reflected the diversity of characteristics among sites and respective support organizations. The design of a sampling procedure for studies involving NGOs can be challenging because of the overwhelming diversity of NGO types and their operational contexts (Riddell and Robinson 1995; Farrington and Lewis 1993). For this research, the site selection criteria included several components: (i) the status of the DENR-contracted NGO at the site; (ii) whether or not the community group had been awarded a tenurial instrument; (iii) whether or not the community group was seeking an ancestral domain claim; (iv) whether or not timber had been harvested or would be harvested in the near future; and, (v) the degree of ‘achievement’ of the community group, based on the perceptions of Natural Resource Management Program (NRMP) staff.<sup>2</sup> Information on these components was provided by personnel of the NRMP of the DENR.

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<sup>2</sup>A supplemental criterion addressed the existence of non-timber forest products (NTFPs) management at the site to satisfy an initial emphasis of the study. Only two NRMP-DAI sites were utilizing NTFPs; both were included in the study.

The research focused on NRMP-supported sites, numbering over fifty at the time of the fieldwork. The Asian Development Bank and other funding organizations supported other CBFM sites.

The information about the sites was put into a matrix to structure the diverse characteristics of the sites. Some sites were eliminated because they were inaccessible due to distance, weather-related road conditions, or personal safety issues resulting from social conflict. The remaining sites made up the sample frame. A supplemental selection criterion emerged that involved the likelihood that arrangements could be made to hire a translator and an assistant (community liaison), who was familiar with the community leaders and could make introductions, given the duration and budget of the fieldwork. Even with the matrix as a guide for selecting cases, this latter criterion played an important role in influencing the ‘purposeful sampling’ (Patton 1980:101) procedure of this study.

Through conversations with NRMP staffers about the roles, function, and history of the relationship between the NGO and the community group, information was gathered to identify sites where NGOs had satisfactorily fulfilled their contracts and those with NGOs that failed to fulfill their contracts.<sup>3</sup> Additionally, lessons learned from previous work with NGOs prompted the NRMP unit to develop a new support strategy that did not involve NGOs. With considerable assistance from the NRMP-DAI personnel, local governments and DENR field personnel assumed an active role as the support

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<sup>3</sup>Note that this study does not define 'NGO performance' as its ability to fulfill the DENR contract. Instead, fulfilling the contract is one criterion for selecting sites. It assumes that different information about groups and their support organizations can be gleaned from sites where NGO were either retained or released by the community group.

organization for the community groups. This type of strategy was being implemented at in one case, site B.

The week prior to each site visit was a preparatory period usually occurring in a nearby city where a regional DENR or NRMP office was located. This period allowed for gathering information on the site, talking with officials and staffers familiar with the site, making arrangements to go to the site, and hiring translators and assistants. Because of the various dialects in the different regions and high transportation costs, new translators were hired for each site (except site B, which did not require a translator). In all cases, except for site A, the translator was not known by the community members. Site visits lasted approximately one week. For all sites, except site B, the research team resided at the site, either in the community forestry training center or community office. This provided good opportunities to participate and observe a number of activities associated with the community group. Because the offices and training centers also served as a social centers for the group, residing there allowed for some immersion into the lives of the community members. In all sites, the research team was welcomed and encouraged to participate in social activities involving meals or entertainment.

### ***Informant Selection***

Informants were sampled to get at characteristics of settings, events, relationships, and processes (Miles and Huberman 1994) that were important to understanding the relationship between the support organizations and the community groups. Informants were selected using a “snow ball” sampling approach (Miles and Humberman 1994) in

which selection of informants began with the most study-relevant informants and progressed to individuals less central to the CBFM program but who were important because of their reasons for being less actively involved. A variety of contacts, mostly from NRMP-DAI central office, helped identify individuals affiliated with community support organizations to be first round key informants. These key informants, mostly from NGOs, DENR, and NRMP-DAI field offices, helped identify community-level informants and opened up the way to meet them. Community leaders and the community liaison helped identify additional informants from the community and from some local organizations. The resulting list of informants included past and current leaders and members of the community organization; members of the community not affiliated with the organization; DENR field staff, including individuals at the Community Environment and Natural Resource Office (CENRO) level and lower; DENR staff at the central office or regional level; representatives from the NGO; and personnel affiliated with NRMP and NRMP-DAI units. Over 70 individuals were interviewed during the course of the fieldwork. In-depth interviews occurred in governmental and non-governmental offices, community group training offices, homes, small stores, and in forests and cultivated fields. Informal interviews occurred while having refreshments or taking breaks, while walking to forest sites, during meals, and many other occasions when there were no scheduled activities and opportunities arose for further dialogue.

### ***Data Collection***

Data collection was accomplished through observation, in-depth interviewing, informal interviewing, and unobtrusive measures. Some degree of participation (see Marshall and Rossman 1989) was possible at some sites, but adopting a more involved role, such as a participant-observer, was not feasible (see Filstead 1970 on winning trust). Though I functioned mostly as an observer, the instances when observation was coupled with some form of participation (e.g., participating in a ceremony giving thanks for a new project office for the community) were highly informative. Gaining access to the daily lives of community members was, at times, achieved and observation during those times was important. This allowed for observation of how people interacted with each other, for instance how the leaders interacted with the members of the community group.

Interviews were combined with field observations to aid in checking descriptions against observed facts (Marshall and Rossman 1989). Interviews were the most efficient means for gathering data given the limitations of time (Taylor and Bogdan 1984; Becker and Geer 1957). In addition to gathering data about informants' feelings and attitudes, the interviews provided second-hand accounts of informants' experiences and perceptions. These accounts may have been subject to some types of fabrications, deceptions, exaggerations, and distortions as discussed by Deutscher (in Taylor and Bogdan 1984). These and other shortcomings of interviews (see Becker and Geer 1957) were guarded against through triangulation of data collection methods. Informants were advised that the purpose of the research was to better understand the CBFM program and the type of external support received by community groups. Specific information about the indicators was not provided to informants, though some details became evident as conversations

progressed.

The interviews can be divided into two types: in-depth and less formal interviews. In-depth interviews were nonstandardized and open-ended and were modeled after a conversation between equals, rather than a formal question-and-answer exchange (Taylor and Bogdan 1984). Usually the time and place of the interview were prearranged by the research assistant or community liaison. This added a sense of formality to the setting, though most informants appeared relaxed and in good humor. A semi-structured interview guide (see Miles and Huberman 1994; McCracken 1988) was developed prior to each interview to reflect the emphasis of the interview and to tailor the line of inquiry toward the background of the informant. The interview guide contained “prompting” or “probing” questions designed to help flesh out topics and other questions that served as a reminders not to overlook particular lines of inquiry with a given informant. Certain key informants were particularly well-informed, prominent, or influential and were interviewed two or three times (see discussion on “elite interviewing” in Marshall and Rossman 1989).

Some informants participated in less formal interviews as well. These discussions occurred while relaxing during the mid-day heat, at meal time, or during walks to visit the forest sites. They were intentional conversations often used for clarification or elaboration of specific topics, but in less formal environments. During both types of interviews I tried to put informants at ease, pay attention, be sensitive, reserve judgement, and allow people to talk openly (see Taylor and Bogdan 1984:94-96 for characteristics of a good interviewer).

The role of “gatekeepers,” who are community or group leaders, was important in

this research (see Becker 1970 in Taylor and Bogdan 1984; Taylor and Bogdan 1984; Van Maanen 1982). “Gatekeepers” react to the researcher’s presence in ways that can influence how community members react. At all sites, I was introduced to community group leaders by individuals familiar with the community in such a way so as not to appear threatening to the group. In sites A, C, and E, the group leaders made arrangements for accommodations and meals for the research team. These arrangements provided an “in” into the community because we had people “looking after us” and thus we were able to interact with a variety of community members informally. However, because the community leader oversaw these arrangements, we were, in some ways, associated with the gatekeeper’s affiliates. The extent to which this affected the information collected about the leadership of the organization and other factors is unknown.

Unobtrusive data collection included historic information, archival records and public documents (see Berg 1989; Denzin 1978:219) associated with the CBFM program, the community groups, and the contract NGOs. Some of the documents were copies of NGO-DENR contracts, Community Forestry Management Agreements, Forest Management plans, NGO quarterly reports, and NRMP-DAI reports. Other written documents such as official reports, memos, and some letters were obtained. These sources provided a deeper and clearer understanding of the setting, relationships and people being studied. As with other qualitative methods, ethical considerations, such as confidentiality, were preserved when using unobtrusive measures.

## **Indicators**

Instrument standardization is required to compare findings during the analysis. Thus, in addition to the conceptual framework, a preliminary set of indicators was developed prior to the fieldwork. The indicators evolved as the data collection progressed (Miles and Huberman 1994; McCracken 1988). The processes of writing-up and coding field notes contributed the most to the development of the indicators.

As presented in the conceptual framework, three areas of action between the support organizations and community groups were the focus for this study: service delivery, participatory methods and capacity building. The three areas represented categories under which sets of indicators were developed to measure the performance of the support organization and the capability of the community group. Following the data analysis, each indicator would be assigned a “score.” Many of the indicators were adapted from Carroll’s work (1992) and modified to fit specific characteristics of the CBFM program. For instance, training services included specific forestry and group organizing activities. Concepts from work on common property resource management regimes (Ostrom 1990; Bromley 1992; Runge 1992) were also incorporated into the indicators of the capacity building category.

Service delivery, participatory methods, and group capacity building are interrelated and some of the indicators overlapped categories. In particular, capacity building and participatory activities were considered separate but related events. Consider for example a group that was assembled to plant trees in a project that was not of their own design or interest. Participation in this activity could be high, but it may have only minimally enhanced the capacity of the group. Carroll suggested that “a participatory

style is essential to the gradual strengthening of base capacity, but many forms of participation, such as open communication or broad consensus, do not themselves build capacity” (1992:95).

As a distinct category, service delivery refers to the ability to deliver services that are needed or requested by a beneficiary group, such as group formation, and training in leadership and financial management. This is key to strong support organization performance. Services should be provided in such a way that they build a foundation for other accomplishments by the beneficiary group (Carroll 1992). Service delivery indicators reflected issues related to community needs and livelihood, sustainability of acquired skills and services, and the effectiveness of the means by which support organizations helped communities build linkages. Table 1 presents the service delivery category with brief descriptions of some of the sub-categories for which indicators were developed.

Table 1. Sub-categories of service delivery

<p><b>Service Delivery</b></p> <p>1. Community Needs and Livelihood</p> <p>a. Training services are of the type and quality that meet the needs of the communities, such as in the area of training for inventory and surveying, techniques for growing and extracting products, bookkeeping and financial planning, marketing strategies, forest protection, and</p>
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- leadership.
- b. Services efficiently delivered.
- c. Share of target population actually reached by the service.
- d. Appropriate process for delivering service.
- 2. Sustainability
  - a. Evidence that along with service, skill transfer or experiential learning is taking place.
- 3. Linkages
  - a. The support organization has developed linkages to financial, technical, and political resource centers for which the community group will benefit.

Participatory methods refer to the ways in which assistance is provided to community groups from support organizations and the ways in which members of community groups participate in group activities and processes. Although participatory methods are both a means and an ends, they are easier to observe as a process rather than an outcome because the relationship between those who are providing assistance and those who are receiving it can be observed (Carroll 1992). For instance, one can observe if support organizations are encouraging the community groups to articulate their needs and participate in decisionmaking about their well-being. Participation also refers to accountability and whether the members of a group can hold the leaders accountable for certain actions. Participatory indicators relate to decisionmaking, implementation of activities, support organization and community leader accountability, and equity and contribution associated with mobilizing resources to implement an activity (Table 2).

Table 2. Sub-categories of participatory methods

<p><b>Participation</b></p> <p>1. Initial Decisions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Opportunities for consultation or for shared decisionmaking during design of projects or activities.</li> </ul>
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- b. Availability and use of mechanisms to facilitate involvement.
- 2. Implementation
  - a. Degree members participate and see the benefit of participation.
- 3. Accountability
  - a. Degree of representation of community members and leaders.
  - b. Community members have access to records, information.
- 4. Resource Mobilization
  - a. Community member contribution (labor or materials) to the project outputs.
  - b. Relative equity of sharing labor and other costs within the community group.

Indicators associated with group capacity building reflect both the effectiveness of the support organization at building capacity of the group and the level of capacity of the groups (Table 3). Carroll (1992:33) suggested that group capacity “manifests itself as self-help, or the internal ability of groups to manage their own resources and operate enterprises destined for collective benefits, and as mobilization for influencing the outside environment,” or representing their stake in an issue. Group capacity building also includes elements of collective action pertaining to cooperative efforts to manage resources. The start-list of indicators, codes and code comments for the three categories are presented in Appendices C and D.

Table 3. Sub-categories of group capacity building

- Group Capacity Building**
- 1. Group Creation
    - a. Enhancing and supporting group formation .
    - b. Involvement as a way of increasing capacity.

2. Collective Action
  - a. Evidence that group is learning to cooperate in effective management of common resources or collective tasks.
  - b. Reinforcement of system of rewards and sanctions for compliance with group norms.
3. Capacity Growth
  - a. Growth in ability to group to resolve conflicts.
  - b. Ability of support organization to resolve conflicts.
  - c. Leadership development to deal effectively with members needs and the outside world (e.g., bargaining, mobilization).
4. Transition away from Support Organization
  - a. Progress toward greater degree of independence and autonomy.
  - b. Progress toward acquisition of linkages to public or private services/resources once role of support organization diminishes.

The categories do not represent all the dimensions of assistance from support organizations, but focus on factors important for community development and for the success of the CBFM program. In general, evaluations of NGO performance, such as the work of Carroll (1992) and Riddell and Robinson (1995), examined the role of a grassroots support organization beyond its direct relationship with grassroots groups, such as its ability to raise funds for its purpose, or how it networks with the international community. These actions and experiences affect how they function with the community groups. But, in this research they were considered part of the "background," or the capacity of the support organization, that only indirectly affected day-to-day interactions with the community groups.

Indicators were rated on a scale of "failed", "initiated", "developing", "established", and "outstanding." An indicator received a "not applicable" (n/a) rating if the indicator did not pertain to a particular site and a not evident (n/e) rating if there was not sufficient evidence to determine a rating, or it was not possible to measure. Ratings were related to the objectives and standards of the CBFM program, rather than on the

performance of one site compared to another. The ratings were determined by the researcher based on the analysis of the data compiled from in-depth interviews, observations, and documents. Most of the ratings in the service delivery category reflected the ability of the support organization, while many of the ratings in the participation and capacity building categories reflected the ability of the community group. These have been specified in the discussion and results in chapter four. The ratings associated with the community groups, however, reflect the interactions between the support organization and the community.

### **Study Sites**

All five study sites received support from the USAID-funded NRMP-DAI division of the DENR. Sites A, C, D, and E received assistance from USAID-funded NGOs, contracted by the DENR specifically to assist communities in the CBFM program. The indigenous residents in site E also had an ancestral claim as part of the Certificate for Ancestral Domains Claim program for approximately 8,000 hectares around several small communities. For the sites in the program that had contract NGOs, the phase out of the NGOs often occurred simultaneously with the hiring of an assisting professional, hired by NRMP-DAI to work with a specific community group. After the departure of the NGO, the community group also received assistance from a variety of specialists and consultants working with NRMP-DAI.

Based on information gathered from program officials during the site selection process, sites A and C were considered examples of fairly good interaction between the

support organization and the community group. Site D was considered a failed relationship between the contract NGO and the community group, resulting in the termination of the NGO's contract. Site E was the only site where an NGO was in the process of fulfilling its contract during the time of the fieldwork. Instead of the standard 3-year contract, NGOs contracted after 1996 received only one-year contracts (with the possibility for renewal). In site B, a new collaborative approach was being implemented, in which there was no contract NGO, but instead, assistance was provided through a multi-organizational effort involving the local government, the DENR, and NRMP-DAI.

The study sites, as well as most NRMP-supported CBFM sites, existed within former timber concessions (Timber License Agreements) that either expired, were canceled due to improper management, or were abandoned as the forest resources were depleted or become too costly to extract. All were located in mountainous or hilly areas and some were quite difficult to access. Most of the sites included more hectares of residual forest than old growth forest, except for site E which was unusually large because it involved an indigenous ancestral claim in an area that had experienced relatively less intensive logging.

At the time of the fieldwork, community organizations had been formed in all of the five sites, except site B which was in the preliminary stages of the program. The leadership structure of the community groups was fairly consistent, with a chairman or president, officers and committees (see Appendix B for examples of community organizational charts). The committees had two main functions, timber harvests and livelihood development apart from timber. For most of the groups, vacancies existed for

some of the committee positions. The officers and staff (e.g., bookkeeper and secretary) in sites A received some salary, while the officers in sites C, D, and E volunteered, though the plan was that once the group generated income they would pay the officers. Most committee positions were volunteer.

In all of the sites, some degree of extraction of timber and non-timber forest products (NTFPs) was occurring for in-house, subsistence purposes. The management plans at site A and E either identified, or were going to identify, plans for the extraction of NTFPs by the community group for commercial purposes. Only in site A was the community group commercially extracting a NTFP, in this case bamboo (*Schizostachium lumampao*), locally called *boho*.

The community groups were at varying levels of advancement in the CBFM program at the time of the fieldwork. Table 4 presents characteristics of the sites with respect to management plans and timber harvests.

Table 4. Characteristics of selected CBFM cases (as of mid-1997)

Sites	NGO Status <sup>a</sup>	Management Plan Status (plan = CRMDP)	Harvest Status <sup>b</sup>	Forest Site Size (has.)
Site A	completed	completed & unapproved	harvest	3,778
Site B	no NGO	too early in program	no harvest	not determined
Site C	completed	completed & approved	harvest	1,000
Site D	canceled	completed & approved	harvest	1,000
Site E	current	not completed	no harvest	14,470

<sup>a</sup>NGO Status:

Complete = the three-year NGO-contract had been completed.

Current = an NGO had been contracted and working at the site.

Canceled = three-year NGO contract was canceled by community group.

No NGO = no NGO used; instead, assistance involved collaboration among local government and DENR field personnel, with assistance from NRMP-DAI.

<sup>b</sup>Harvest Status:

Harvest = in the midst or was about to engage in first timber harvest

No Harvest = community group had not harvested timber at the time of fieldwork

Forest protection was an important component of the CBFM program and participating communities agreed to assume responsibility for forest protection. No site had any legally deputized forest officers, though plans existed for the DENR to train and deputize members of the community. The duties of the forest protection staff included: patrolling forested and reforested areas; protecting the area from fire; preparing and maintaining fire lines; and reporting to the community organization any illegal activity observed in the area. More site specific information is presented in the following five descriptions.

***Site A***

The “community group” at site A was a federation of five associations from five communities. The site was one of the earliest pilot projects and was one of the few sites where a non-timber forest product, in this case bamboo, was being managed by a community group. The contract NGO’s three year term began in mid-1992. The five community associations were organized to provide opportunities for livelihood projects to ease pressures on the dwindling forest resources. The federation concentrated on long-term forest management and income generation. The five associations had memberships ranging from 51 to 239 individuals with a total federation membership of approximately 800, almost half of the approximately 1,700 heads of households within the five communities. Some of the livelihood projects developed by the community associations included cooperatively owned farm equipment and a rice mill.

Only about half of the federation membership had benefitted from resource management-related labor opportunities. At the time of the fieldwork, ten personnel in varying capacities were being maintained and compensated by the federation. The federation oversaw the five community associations formed for the Community Forestry Project. While each community association had its own livelihood programs, the federation provided additional income-generating opportunities by providing employment through several Asian Development Bank-funded activities, such as reforestation.

The group was awarded a tenurial instrument, the Community Forest Management Agreement (CFMA)<sup>4</sup>, in December of 1994. By the spring of 1997 the group’s

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<sup>4</sup>After 1995, the name of the tenurial instruments changed from CFMA to Community Based Forest Management Agreement (CBFMA).

management plan, the Community Resource Management and Development Plan (CRMDP), had not been approved by the DENR, though the group had been issued Interim Use Permits to extract bamboo. The CFMA gave the federation the right to manage, develop, protect, rehabilitate and sustainably utilize the forest resources within a 3,778 hectare area. In addition to the activities supported by NRMP-DAI particular to the terms of the CFMA, the federation was also involved in other DENR contracts. The most important contract was to rehabilitate and reforest over 1,000 hectares of forestland with funding from the Asian Development Bank. Involvement in multiple programs and projects was the source of some confusion within the group. In addition, parts of the community forestry site were in the process of being redistributed to the resident-cultivators in the form of DENR's Certificates of Stewardship Contracts (CSCs). Several hundred CSCs were being considered.

The forest site was located at the foot of a mountain. The site was accessible from all of the five communities by old logging roads that had been reduced to foot trails due to soil erosion and lack of maintenance. Depending on the location of the community, the boundary of the site was between three to eight kilometers (km) away; the forested areas within the site were several kilometers further. The 3,778 hectare site was almost equally composed of residual forest, brushland, and openland. There were approximately 60 hectares of cultivated farmland within the site. Dipterocarps and leguminous trees, bamboos, rattan and vines were the major forest resources in the residual forest. The openlands were the result of logging activities and had been invaded by two grass species. One grass, *cogon*, was harvested and sold as a roofing material. Brushlands were

dominated by bamboos and smaller tree species.

The site was located approximately 50 km by bus from a large city. Forty-eight communities comprised the municipality within which the communities at site A resided. The total population of the five communities (*barangays*) was approximately 8,000. The municipal center was a few kilometers from the federation's training center and office. Three of the five communities comprising the federation in site A had an elementary school and one had a high school.

Farming was the main occupation in all five communities that made up the federation. The average farm size was less than a hectare. Slash and burn agriculture was also occurring in upland areas. Corn and upland and lowland rice were the dominant crops. Rice was for consumption and sale, while corn was strictly for sale. Only a few lowland farmers had irrigated crops that could sustain three crop seasons. The remainder had rainfed farms that were tilled for only one crop season. Lowland crops tended to be cash crops, while upland crops tended to be for subsistence, including bananas, legumes, rootcrops and vegetables. However, if a farmer only had an upland farm, he tended to plant rice for consumption and fruits and vegetables for cash crops. Some agroforestry techniques such as intercropping and contouring were observed.

Off-farm livelihood activities included the harvesting of grass (*cogon*) during the dry months (January to March) and the year-round harvesting of bamboo and wood. In some communities fish were raised in fish paddies for household consumption and income. Some residents derived income from paid farm work and others served as laborers for local traders and employees of local institutions.

Forest guards were trained to fight forest and grass fires, not to apprehend illegal loggers. In addition, apprehending neighbors and family members for illegal logging was thought to create serious adverse social consequences. The federation and guards felt the DENR did not make clear to them how the logs the federation confiscated (if they were to confiscate illegally cut logs) would be disposed of. Forest patrollers earned 1,500 Pesos per month and the full-time officers and staff of the federation earned between 2,000 and 4,000 Pesos per month.

### ***Site B***

While less background and field data were available for site B, its uniqueness merited its inclusion in the study. This site was a new site and had not been issued a tenurial agreement, nor had the process of forming community groups within the site been initiated. The site was innovative because there were no plans to contract an NGO to work with the community groups, unlike the four other study sites. Instead, the NRMP-DAI office was leading an effort to form a collaborative partnership between the local DENR office and the local government to gather baseline social and biophysical information to develop a CBFM project at the site. At the time of the fieldwork, the organization had begun some discussion with nine communities that resided within the foothills of a mountain range about the possibilities for multiple group management of the forests within the mountain range.

At the time of the fieldwork, a memorandum of agreement between the local government and the DENR had been signed and staff from these organizations and

NRMP-DAI were gathering social data as part of a social resource inventory. Community members were involved in the process of gathering household data. The method of community mapping not only provided important demographic information to the agencies and would-be community groups, but perhaps more importantly created opportunities for community members to become familiar with the government and non-governmental representatives and the CBFM program. The collaboration planned to produce not only social data, but also a resource inventory which would lead to the development of a Municipal Land Use Plan. Once this Plan was created, the objective was for each community to form an organization and each obtain a tenurial instrument for a portion of the forestland.

The intended communities at this site were spread out along a 20 kilometer area in which there was little public transportation and traveling was difficult in the rainy season. The local government, the municipality, was located in the center of this mostly linear span of communities along the base of a mountain ridge. The site was approximately two hours from a large city.

### *Site C*

The community group at site C was a community cooperative that had a tenurial agreement (CFMA) with the Philippine government for 1,000 hectares of forestland. The area was part of a former Timber License Agreement with a regionally based timber company that was canceled by the DENR for forestry law violations. The area was a dipterocarp forest of mostly second growth residual forest, one-third of which was

harvestable. Almost half of the forest existed on slopes too steep to harvest (50% slope) or was higher than 1,000 meters above sea level—the altitude beyond which harvesting was prohibited. The remaining area was open brushland, grassland, or cultivated land.

The terrain of the area was generally rugged with steep slopes in some parts of the forest where harvesting occurred. A larger portion of the area had an average 25% slope. The elevation ranged from 500 to 1300 meters above sea level. The area was drained by several rivers that were tapped to irrigate some 400 hectares of rice fields in nearby areas. The community was blessed with a large supply of potable water and throughout the community faucets were left open and running.

The cooperative was governed by a seven member Board of Directors as mandated by its General Assembly and had the responsibility to manage and oversee the operations of the cooperative. The group became a registered group in 1993, about one year after beginning with the assistance from the contract NGO, but did not become a cooperative until mid-1996. The group's management plan was approved in early 1997. The community group had approximately 100 members. The population of the community was just under 3,000 people.

In the spring of 1997, the cooperative began its first timber harvest. At the time of the fieldwork, the group was in the process of harvesting a nine hectare area with an allowable cut of 340 cubic meters. The group had sold two-thirds of its harvest and was searching for a buyer for the last third. Members and non-members worked as laborers for the harvest. Their wages were based on the type of work they did (e.g., chainsawing, hauling) and the number of trees they worked on. Each chainsawer carved his name into

the logs he worked on; this insignia then identified the names of the men who worked on his team.

The officers and project manager worked almost full-time for the cooperative and had subsequently reduced the amount of farming that they had been doing. Most of the members were farmers who planted upland rice, corn, and vegetables.

The nearest city (small-sized by comparison to the cities within two hours from the other study sites) was one and one-half hours drive away by local transportation. The local DENR office was located in this town. People from households within the community shopped for produce and other household items in this city, as very little was available within the community itself.

#### ***Site D***

Study site D was unique in its relationship with support organizations because the community group took action leading to the termination of the NGO's contract in the beginning of its third year. The group believed the NGO was mismanaging funds, abusing its position, and inadequately assisting the group to meet the requirements of the CBFM program. After the termination of the NGO, the group managed its own affairs for a period of time with some technical and other assistance primarily from NRMP-DAI. Later, with financial assistance from a locally operating mining company, the group hired a project manager/forester. Like site A and C, the site was also one of the earliest pilot projects, beginning in 1992.

The community was made up of several villages (*sitios*) and had a population of

approximately 4,000. The group became registered in 1994 and their management plan was approved in early 1997. The group had a membership of approximately 225, though the membership had been divided on a several issues and a large portion were inactive.

Soon after the group formed, the members protested illegal logging activity by creating a human blockade on a road used by illegal loggers. While this helped generate connections and support from the DENR, it also led to a period of tension in which death threats were made against the group's leaders.

The forestland within the site consisted largely of residual forest, though almost half of the site had not been inventoried. There was a small amount of brushland and occupied or cultivated upland farmland. The community and villages were spread out and the average distance to the forest from each village was about eight kilometers. The road was in disrepair and passed through a large creek numerous times. At the time of the fieldwork, the group prepared for and began its first timber harvest. Although I was invited to the site to view the timber harvest and participate in a ceremony associated with the cutting of the first tree, military personnel at a military outpost located halfway to the forest site would not permit me to pass because they said they could not guarantee my security. The area had a history of social unrest. I was not able to observe this forest site, except through photographs that a community member took with my camera.

### ***Site E***

Site E was an indigenous site and covered a larger area than the other four sites. The area was a watershed that ranged between two provincial jurisdictions. The basin

drained into one large river that flowed within the boundaries of the site. The site was 14,470 hectares and ranged from 1,000 meters to the mountain peaks of 1,700 and 1,900 meters. V-shaped valleys, sharp-edged ridges, and steep slopes dominated the entire water basin. In the upland, 81% of the area had slopes greater than 35%. Massive landslides, rockfalls, and river escarpments were highly noticeable features of the landscape, occurring in logged over and old growth areas. The region had experienced a high number of cyclones compared to the other regions in the study.

About one-third of the forestland was estimated to be old growth. Large dipterocarp trees remained a prominent feature of the old growth areas and there was little evidence of logging. Over one-third of the forest was residual growth, which had recovered from logging. One noticeable feature in the forested areas were trails used by gatherers of non-timber forest products, such as rattan. About a sixth of the forest was consider “degenerated” and consisted of abandoned swidden farms, small pockets of logged over forests, bamboo thickets, landslides and other land configurations. A band of grasslands divided the communities/villages and the residual forests. According to local people the grasslands were formerly forestlands that were commercially logged and then encroached upon by slash and burn farmers (*kaingeros*).

The local people perceived three distinct groups of people heavily engaged in watershed use activities in this site. These included the indigenous forest users, the non-indigenous upland farmers, and the non-indigenous rattan gatherers. The Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claim (CADC), which was the tenurial instrument for the community group at this site, was designed specifically for indigenous tribes. Like the CFMA tenurial

instrument used in the other three sites, the CADC prescribed the terms and conditions of the group's participation in the CBFM program. However, other governmental programs and agreements existed among the non-indigenous forest users. Some of these agreements overlapped boundaries.

Of the three groups located in or near this site, many of the people either gathered rattan as their primary source of income or combined rattan gathering with upland farming and hunting. About 1000 people were dependent on livelihoods from direct resource use activities within the site. Only about 12% of these people were of indigenous heritage. The indigenous people in this area were highly dependent on the natural resources and upon this they based their ancestral domain claim.

Rattan gathering ranked as the most important forest use activity for the indigenous group. The relationship between the rattan gatherer and his/her financier had existed for many years, though there were some signs that it was evolving or deteriorating. Typically, the financier provided a cash advance required by the rattan gatherers to buy food for consumption while working in the forests and to leave behind for meals for his/her family. The rattan gatherers were often indebted to their respective financiers for a variety of reason, such as when the gatherers relied on loans when there was a family illness. The relationship was referred to as the *tabong* system. Two interrelated indicators of change in the tabong system were the declining supplies of rattan and the increasing reluctance on the part of the financiers to continue to finance rattan gatherers.

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## CHAPTER FOUR

### DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

The data analysis process consisted of assessing and synthesizing the judgments and perceptions of individuals associated with communities, NGOs, the DENR, and USAID-supported NRMP, and synthesizing observed and documented information. In general, data from qualitative fieldwork are not immediately available but require a certain amount of processing. For this research, field notes were written up, entered into a word processor, edited, and reviewed during and after visits to the sites. Interview tapes were used to check field notes. After the field notes were compiled and edited, the files were imported into a qualitative data analysis software, *Atlas/ti*. The software contained a variety of tools for systematically accomplishing tasks necessary for preparing the data, such as selecting, coding, and annotating text. The field notes were coded and recoded, and memos and comments were attached to the data files. The meaning and context of spoken words were considered carefully during the coding process (Miles and Huberman 1994). The software facilitated qualitative data analysis and interpretation, but in no way automated what was a dynamic, iterative process requiring complete participation of the researcher.

Prior to the fieldwork, a start list of indicators (see Appendix C) was developed. The categories and indicators were used as “sociological constructs” to organize the coded material, including interviews, field observations and documents (Strauss 1987; Berg 1989; Marshall and Rossman 1989). Codes were then created to be relevant to these

indicators or to new indicators that emerged as the analysis proceeded. It was important to remain mindful of the unique experiences at each site and not attempt to force fit the data into preexisting codes. The final set of codes, including code comments is presented in Appendix D.

Once the material was completely coded, the codes were used to retrieve, categorize, organize, and compare the information (Berg 1989). While there could have been benefits to conducting the coding as an on-going process during fieldwork (see Miles and Huberman 1994), time restrictions at each site permitted only a limited amount of coding to take place in the field. Consideration of the conceptual structure of the indicators facilitated the post-field coding process. Triangulation from multiple sources of data helped illuminate and corroborative the findings on each indicator (Denzin 1978). The coding and recoding process was completed when the categories were considered “saturated” and there were a sufficient number of regularities emerging from the data (Strauss 1987; Lincoln and Guba 1985 in Miles and Huberman 1994).

The final stage of analysis constructed bridges between the codes and categories of indicators. The data were continually reduced to smaller layers of information. Emerging from this process were several types of matrices displaying the ratings of indicators at each site and depicting how key issues emerged from the information on key indicators. The results are presented in three sections: (i) a comprehensive view of the indicators, (ii) cumulative findings, and (iii) key issues associated with key indicators.

## **Comprehensive View of Categories of Indicators**

The Philippines' CBFM program was one of the new attempts to devolve some control and responsibility for forest resources from the central government to local communities. The program was new and as such focused on relatively more straightforward technical and planning functions. This involved developing a host of new management responsibilities, partnerships, and philosophies. Sorting through these activities led to less focus on certain areas of support to communities in the first years of the program. Two of the sites in the study (sites B and E) were relatively new to the CBFM program. All of the sites were going through a learning process. The rating standard for assessing each indicator at each site was set at the level of program expectations and objectives. For instance, most indicators were assessed based on the goal of long-term sustainability of a resource management strategy. Many indicators received "initiated" ratings, indicating that processes had been enacted, but abilities had not yet emerged. This may have reflected the newness of the CBFM program, the inexperience of the community groups, and the capabilities of the support organizations. In some sites, some indicators received "established", "not evident", and "developing" ratings. Findings for each indicator are presented below under the three categories of indicators: service delivery, participatory methods, and capacity building.

### **Service Delivery**

The service delivery category contained four indicators for examining the performance of support organizations and the subsequent abilities of the community

groups: training activities, target population, linkages, and the process of delivering services. Service delivery indicators reflected issues related to community needs and livelihood, sustainability of acquired skills and services, and the effectiveness of the means by which support organizations helped communities build linkages. The indicators were adapted from existing work on NGO performance evaluation (Carroll 1992) yet were modified to reflect particular characteristics of the CBFM program. Table 1 identifies the primary support organization that was the focus of the indicator assessment and presents the ratings for each indicator or subindicator at each site.

Table 1. Support organizations ability and effectiveness at delivering services, 1997<sup>a</sup>

Service delivery indicators and subindicators	Support organizations	Sites				
		A	B	C	D	E
Training Activities						
<i>Financial Management</i>	NGO	n/e	n/a <sup>b</sup>	n/e <sup>c</sup>	n/e	initiated
<i>Forest Protection</i>	DENR	initiated	n/a	n/e	initiated	initiated
<i>Resource Inventory</i>	NGO	n/e	n/a	n/e	n/e	n/e
	DENR/NRMP- DAI	initiated	n/a	initiated	initiated	initiated
<i>Leadership Training</i>	NGO	n/e	developing	n/e	n/e	n/e
<i>Marketing</i>	NGO	developing	n/a	developing	developing	developing
<i>Forestry Techniques</i>	NGO	initiated	n/a	n/e	initiated	initiated
Target Population	NGO	n/e	developing	n/e	initiated	outstanding
Linkages	NGO	initiated	developing	initiated	n/e	initiated
Process	NGO	initiated	established	initiated- established	initiated	n/e

<sup>a</sup>The findings reflect the status of the indicators during the period May through June, 1997.

<sup>b</sup>n/a (not applicable) implies that the indicator did not pertain to the situation at the specific site.

<sup>c</sup>n/e (not evident) implies that there was not sufficient evidence to rate an indicator, or that it was not possible to measure.

### *Training activities*

The training activities indicator was comprised of a set of six subindicators related to delivering specific training services: financial management, forest protection, resource inventory training, leadership training, marketing, and forestry techniques. As part of their contract, NGOs were to required to conduct or oversee a number of training activities. Although some NGOs offered training activities beyond those that were required, most NGOs appeared overwhelmed by the amount of training they were required to offer in the duration of their contract. In addition to the required training activities, NGOs in sites A, C, D, and E offered training in farming practices and techniques because that was what people wanted or because these were areas in which NGOs had some experience. Three of the four contract NGOs (at sites A, C, and E) had some connections with rural development practitioners from universities or other non-profit institutions and they solicited outside assistance for some of the training. The collaborative approach implemented in site B had good potential to include several organizations to assist in training activities. The NGOs in sites A, C, and D had little, if any, background in forest management and thus often turned to DENR or NRMP-DAI for technical assistance in forest management training activities. The NGO in site E had considerable experience in natural resource surveying and mapping and some experience in forest management.

There was evidence that groups began feeling overloaded with and burnt-out on training activities during the course of the NGO's contract. A representative from the contract NGO that had worked in site C said that at one point people involved in the

program were ridiculed by other members of the community because they were having so many trainings, yet no income was being generated. In site A, the officials of the contract NGO decided to build a training center at the site because of the high emphasis on training in their contract. Since the completion of this NGO's contract, training events rarely occurred at this site and the center was primarily used as a meeting place for the group's officers.

Specific discussions pertaining to the six subindicators under training activities are presented below.

**Financial management.**—The subindicator on financial management training was assessed based on abilities of the contract NGOs to train the community groups in financial planning and management. For sites A, C, and D the findings were “not evident” because it was difficult to determine if the level of financial abilities of the community group were the result of the training activities provided by the contract NGO or the result of other factors, such as the assistance received from other organizations after the NGO departed or the pre-existing abilities of the community leaders. The community group leaders in sites A and C explained that their groups had bookkeepers and treasurers who had been trained by the contract NGOs. Both groups received additional support in financial planning after the NGOs' contract expired. The group at site C continued to receive assistance from their NGO and the group at site A received assistance from field personnel of NRMP-DAI. Also in sites A and C, the NGO contracts expired just when the

community group had progressed through the CBFM program to the point where the development of a financial system was appropriate and necessary.

In site D, financial mismanagement on the part of the staff of the contract NGO led to the termination of the NGO's contract. The treasurer and bookkeeper of the community group in site D were not as active as their counterparts were in sites A and C. Instead, the project manager at site D, who was hired by the community group and was not originally a member of the community, and the president of the community group maintained the financial records for the group.

Some community members from site E said that they needed more financial training because the group did not know how to manage funds and plan for activities that the group would like to fund, such as an educational program. Although the contract NGO at this site was in the midst of fulfilling its contract, it maintained control over the group's funds, such as the money that was paid to families of community members who participated in the resource inventory. The personnel from the NGO explained that their intention was to relieve some of the burden from the leaders of the community group. They fully intended that one day the community group would manage its funds, but had not developed a strategy to achieve this.

**Forest protection.**—The forest protection subindicator related to the training the community groups received in forest protection. The subindicator was assessed based on the effectiveness of the DENR, rather than the contract NGO, because the DENR had the

means to provide the technical training on forest protection. Community groups in all the sites (except site B which was too early in the CBFM process) had members who worked as forest guards. The forest guards from sites A, C and E said their primary function was to be the eyes and ears of DENR. They would report suspicious actions such as illegal harvesting or burning to the DENR and to the community group leaders rather than directly confront the suspected party. They did not have the legal authority to apprehend suspected violators. The community leaders from sites A, C and D commented on the important role of the forest patrols. They recognized that the DENR was devolving some of the responsibility for forest protection to the community groups and they explained how it was in the group's own interest to protect the community forest. The guards had not yet been deputized by the DENR and did not carry weapons or communication devices. Some guards were paid and others volunteered. Table 2 presents more information on the forms of forest protection at each site.

Table 2. Forms of forest protection by community groups, 1997<sup>a</sup>

Site	Forest Protection	Compensation?
A	Foot patrol (12 members) divided time between nursery work and patrolling.	Yes. Paid small salary.
B	N/A. Site too early in process for forest patrols.	N/A.
C	Teams of two alternated week-long patrols in the forest.	Yes. Paid small salary.
D	Guards manned a check point at road leading from forest site. Forest too distant to effectively patrol by foot.	No. Given stipend for food. Volunteered but the plan was that the group would pay them eventually.
E	Teams patrolled forest site by foot.	No. Volunteered but the plan was that the group would pay them eventually.

<sup>a</sup>The information reflects forest protection during the period May through June, 1997.

The forest guard informants at sites A, C and E identified the potential dangers of their jobs, given that arson, land disputes, civil unrest and other issues associated with the land tenure existed within the CBFM sites. Because many forest guards worked in potentially dangerous situations and because they were ill-equipped to be effective at their jobs, the DENR received an “initiated” rating in its ability to train and prepare members of the community in forest protection. While there was mention in sites A and E of an upcoming course that when completed would deputize community members in forest protection, the groups in sites A, C and D had existed for approximately five years without a formal course.

**Resource inventory.**—Resource inventory was one of the “deliverables” required in the NGO contracts. The DENR viewed the inventory as the foundation upon which other

program elements were to be built. For instance, before the management and operational plans could be developed, the community group had to know what resources existed in the forest site. However, the perception of some informants in sites D and E was that the DENR wanted to know the extent of available resources more than the community group. The community leader in site E said that the resource inventory educated them about which trees were valuable for timber production. Personnel from the contract NGO at site E feared that without more preparation and community organization the community group could be taken advantage of by outsiders because the resource inventory gave the group more knowledge about the value and location of the timber resources.

Although there was a clear programmatic emphasis on resource inventory, there was little evidence to suggest that the community groups retained, would continue to use, and would pass on the skills they learned about resource inventory. In sites A and E, for example, the resource inventory was seen as a requirement that had to be fulfilled in order for the group to proceed to the next stage in the program. All of the contract NGOs received “not evident” ratings in this category because there was little documentation about their involvement in resource inventory.

The “not evident” findings may have been due to the conflicting programmatic emphasis on resource inventories. Although the DENR required a resource inventory at each site, it was not clear that the intent was to train and prepare community members for future resource inventories. DENR officials on several occasions described the concept of “borrowing from the forest” in which CBFM groups would conduct one or two timber

harvests in order to generate financial capital. The financial capital would then be used for other community development activities. The idea was that for a year or two groups would “borrow” capital from the forest and in return they would protect the remaining trees and forest resources. The implication was that the timber harvesting element of the CBFM program would be short-lived. While community members in sites A, C and E said that they had acquired enough skills to do a resource inventory again, none described when or under what conditions that might occur. In all the sites that had resource inventories (A, C, D and E), the DENR and/or staff from NRMP-DAI participated in measuring and marking trees for future harvests. The community members were not noticeably involved in these pre-harvest decisions.

**Leadership training.**—The leaders from each of the community groups (sites A, C, D, and E) said they had received leadership training from the contract NGO at their site. However, most sites received “not evident” ratings for the leadership subindicator because it was difficult to draw a connection between the leaders’ abilities and specific leadership training activities.

Personnel from the contract NGO for sites A and C described how the community leaders had acquired certain leadership skills, such as conducting and organizing meetings. Some meetings were observed during the fieldwork and the leaders appeared quite capable at these tasks. However, the CBFM program required leaders and community groups to implement and develop a complex new project, full of detailed and specific requirements.

Although each group had one or two highly motivated individuals, the leadership training had not sufficiently prepared them for these formidable challenges.

Similarly, leaders in sites A and D were unable to deal effectively with the problems of unmotivated and disillusioned members. The leaders in sites A and C were not prepared to improve their relationships to the local government official in their communities. The leader in site E was affected by some issues involving anti-government unrest. This leader was receiving moral support from the contract NGO and he appeared to be dealing with the situation well, yet it was not clear that any type of “leadership training” would have better prepared him for those duties. The support organizations in site B were involving community members in the early stages of the CBFM program and there was good potential there that leaders would receive a broad range of training from a diversity of organizations.

**Marketing.**—The marketing training received by the community groups from the contract NGOs had not been fully developed, but showed signs of potential and received a “developing” rating. Since marketing was initially planned as an activity following timber and non-timber harvests, minimal specific marketing training occurred during the period of the contract NGOs. The indicator did not receive an “established” rating because the community groups were not well informed of the marketing implications of both timber and non-timber production. Although NGOs were not required to provide marketing information, no NGO took the initiative to provide this service to the community group.

However, one support organization, NRMP-DAI, recognized the need to assist community groups in understanding changing and emerging markets. At the time of the fieldwork, NRMP-DAI had just hired two staff members to assist the community groups in marketing. Also, DENR field-level officials in site A said that they were assisting the community group by looking for markets for non-timber products harvested at the site.

**Forestry techniques.**—The forestry techniques subindicator referred to the provision of training related to managing, growing, and extracting forest resources. Contract NGOs in sites A, D and E received “initiated” ratings. In site A, where bamboo was being harvested by the community group, the contract NGO did not provide training courses to bamboo harvesters on how to improve bamboo stands and sustainably harvest bamboo. Instead, the bamboo harvesting continued as it had when an open access system prevailed, except individual harvesting actions were legal.

In site D, the contract NGO initiated a mango planting project with the intention of forming a fruit cooperative. However, the NGO ordered more seedlings than the community wanted and could use. The staff of the NGO also did not instruct people on the proper care of the seedlings and haphazardly distributed the seedlings to community members. What had the potential to become a fruit production cooperative became a minor addition to the home gardens of the few people who successfully cared for their trees.

In site E, the contract NGO was not emphasizing forestry training, nor was

forestry emphasized as a potential income generating activity for the community. A community member from site E said that the group did not plan to cut trees for income because the resource inventory was not conducted to produce a plan to cut all the trees. Personnel from the contract NGO explained that they wanted to provide services that were complementary to the existing tribal values, which did not include harvesting timber. Instead of promoting sustainable forestry practices, the NGO emphasized improved farming techniques and other income generating activities.

When the NGO's contract in site C had expired, the community group had not begun any natural resource management projects. It was unclear if the contract NGO effectively trained the group in forestry methods. However, at the time of the fieldwork, the community group in site C was in the midst of its first harvest. They had received forestry support from the DENR and NRMP-DAI and appeared well prepared to complete the harvest.

### ***Target population***

This indicator reflected the ability of the contract NGO to reach a large and diverse share of the community residents. The indicator was specific to the contract NGOs, rather than other support organizations, because the DENR gave the NGOs the initial responsibility of interacting with the communities and building support for the CBFM program.

Reaching out to a broad and diverse population may have been a lower priority

than completing resource inventories and preparing management plans. While the contract NGOs in sites C and D did not effectively involve the local government in forming the community group, beyond that, it was unclear if they were effective at involving a diversity of community members.

In site D, the contract NGO offered opportunities for work and involvement in the group to people with whom the NGO staff had developed favorable personal relationships. After the departure of the NGO, however, the leaders of the group inherited a legacy of ill-feelings and mistrust from some community members. While it could not be verified, the widespread low morale of members of the group in site D may have been due to the ineffectiveness of the NGO in the early stages of the project.

The contract NGO in site A worked with five community organizations and the federation of organizations. Given the short time frame and high workload, the NGO was effective at organizing and forming six legally recognized groups. Since the departure of the NGO, however, the community groups in the federation were conducting few, if any, community development or resource management activities. The leaders complained of low morale and poor membership participation. However, the DENR plans for the CBFM project at site A may have affected the ability of the NGO to effectively define and reach a “target population”. Only one of the five communities was located near the forestry site, yet the DENR required that five communities participate in the CBFM program. The contract NGO had to sell the idea of community-based forest management to people who were mostly farmers and had little connection to the natural forest. For practical

purposes the NGO encouraged the groups to begin farm equipment cooperatives and other non-forestry related activities. This resulted in some confusion among group members about for whom and for what the CBFM program was intended.

In contrast, the contract NGO in site E went beyond the DENR's implicit definition of the "target population." The NGO worked not only with the indigenous tribe, the intended participants in the CBFM and Ancestral Domain Claims programs, but also with two other groups made up of upland farmers and rattan gatherers. It helped to establish a collaborative partnership among the groups. Defining and working with a target population was less problematic for the contract NGO in site E because the indigenous community already had close connections to its members.

The support organizations that were working in site B had the potential to reach a broad and diverse number of individuals from the numerous communities. Their collaborative effort was providing a strong presence for the CBFM program and this was helping to spread the word about potential opportunities for community groups.

### ***Linkages***

Building and securing linkages to other institutions is an important service that successful support organizations impart to their clients. Building linkages was not a specific requirement of the NGO contracts. Two of the older sites, sites A and C, received "initiated" ratings in the ability of NGOs to develop linkages that would benefit the community group in financial, technical, and policy-related matters. Unlike the NGO

in site C, the NGO in site A ceased working with the community group soon after their contract expired. At the time of the fieldwork, a couple years had passed since the NGO departed, and the community group had ceased developing and implementing projects. The group had formal but weak linkages with the DENR. According to the group leaders, the DENR's Project Management Officer (PMO) infrequently visited the site and was not providing the assistance they needed. The leaders were unable to identify organizations that would assist in re-engaging community development and resource management activities.

In contrast, the NGO in site C maintained a presence in the community after the contract expired. Part of this presence was aided by the hiring of one of the NGO personnel for a one-year technical assistance position with NRMP-DAI in site C. The continuity helped further the group's relationship with the DENR for fulfilling the group's timber harvesting objective, but the additional presence did not facilitate important connections to timber buyers and financial institutions.

The NGO in site D failed to complete the tasks required by their contract and did not conduct activities that were for the benefit of the community group beyond contractual obligations. However, it was unclear whether or not some linkages had been formed during the duration of the contract.

The contract NGO in site E attempted to involve community leaders in meetings with other organizations, but they felt that it was usually more efficient and less taxing on the over-burdened community leaders to conduct the work themselves. While the NGO

was motivated with the best interests of the community group in mind, few linkages were being made and the rating they received was “initiated.”

Some of the more positive signs of NGOs and other support organizations assisting community groups to build linkages included: (i) the use of cross-visits, whereby leaders of the group visited another site to learn about how that group was managing a project (sites A, C, D and E); (ii) the creation of a network of leaders of all community forestry sites within the CBFM program that allowed leaders to learn from each other and attempt to affect program policies; (iii) the implementation of an innovative collaborative approach to the CBFM program in site B that had the potential to build linkages to local government and DENR administrators as the program was being implemented; and, (iv) the initiative on the part of some contract NGO staff (at least sites C and E) to bring one or two community leaders with them when they visited a local or regional DENR office to submit papers or discuss some issues related to the CBFM site. Assistance in this last linkage was important because community leaders rarely initiated visits to the local or regional DENR offices because of the time and cost of traveling.

### ***Process***

This indicator reflected whether the process by which the support organizations delivered their services was appropriate given the needs, experiences, and history of the community group. Each site had a history of involvement in some type of government or non-governmental sponsored program or activity. Frequently these programs were

supported by international organizations, for example the Asian Development Bank and Plan International. The contract NGOs entered communities that had expectations about externally driven programs that conflicted with the philosophy behind NRMP-DAI-supported CBFM sites. As one informant in site A explained, one reason why the community groups had high overall numbers of members, but low numbers of active members, was because people were used to internationally funded programs providing aid or benefits free of charge or, at least, with specific wage earning opportunities.

Given these types of expectations among community members, the NGOs faced a challenging task. However, the NGOs should have more carefully considered the history of projects. The “initiated” ratings received by the contract NGOs in sites A and D reflected their inability to successfully reshape the expectations about the CBFM program. While the NGO in site C stood out for its willingness to immerse its staff into the community and build bonds and trust within the community, they were only minimally successful in convincing people that this program was a grassroots effort that did not include start-up capital for the group. Because communities had histories of unsatisfactory experiences with government programs, the DENR and NRMP-DAI should have expected conflict to arise over incorrect expectations. The “initiated” ratings indicate that process for working with communities did not adequately address this issue.

Since the implementation of the CBFM project in site E was in the early stages, it was difficult to determine if the contract NGO’s process was effective. The NGO had done a thorough job learning about and understanding the socio-cultural and biophysical

characteristics of the site. Their approach to working with the community group, in general, was to relieve the community leaders of many of the administrative burdens of the CBFM program. It was not clear, however, if this would be effective in the long-run.

The collaborative approach being implemented at site B received a strong rating because it was an innovation that specifically responded to problems occurring in past government projects. The organizations in the collaborative effort were learning from each other about effective processes for working with the community members.

### **Participatory Methods**

The category for rating the performance of support organizations with respect to their use of participatory methods contained five indicators: access to information, consultation and decision making, contribution, degree benefit, and availability and use of mechanisms to enhance participation. The findings are presented in separate discussions about each indicator and in Table 3. For three of the five indicators, the community group, not a specific support organization, was the focus of the performance assessment. The community group's ability to be effective at participatory methods reflected the assistance and support it had received and the support it continued to need.

Table 3. Support organizations ability and effectiveness at participatory methods, 1997<sup>a</sup>

Participatory methods indicators	Support organizations	Sites				
		A	B	C	D	E
Access to Information	NGO (unless otherwise indicated)	initiated (DENR)	n/a <sup>b</sup>	established (NGO & DENR)	initiated	established
Consultation and Decisionmaking	NGO DENR (field level) NRMP-DAI	n/e <sup>c</sup> initiated established	n/a established established	established n/e established	initiated n/e established	established initiated n/a
Contribution	community group	initiated	n/a	initiated	initiated	initiated
Degree Benefit to Members	community group	initiated	n/a	established	established	n/e
Availability and Use of Mechanisms to Enhance Participation	community group	initiated	established	established	initiated	n/e

<sup>a</sup>The findings reflect the status of the indicators during the period May through June, 1997.

<sup>b</sup>n/a (not applicable) implies that the indicator did not pertain to the situation at the specific site.

<sup>c</sup>n/e (not evident) implies that there was not sufficient evidence to rate an indicator, or that it was not possible to measure.

### *Access to information*

This indicator referred to community group members' access to information and records from the support organization and whether the community group was holding the support organization accountable for the information. There were mixed results from this indicator. In sites A, C, D, and E, the support organizations, including the NGOs, DENR, and NRMP-DAI, controlled some of the documents and information relating to the community group, such as reports, plans, and agreements. While the community group often had copies of documents, community informants suggested that the NGO or NRMP-DAI were responsible for document storage.

In site D, the contract NGO was suspected of mismanaging funds, indicating that for a period of time the community leaders were not informed of the financial transactions of the NGO on behalf of the community group. In site A, the community group members had been waiting for months to be paid for reforestation work. The payment was to be distributed by the DENR, though the funds originally came from a foreign funder (Asian Development Bank). However, the community group did not know why the payment had been delayed, and they were having a difficult time holding the DENR accountable. This greatly affected the morale of the community members. In sites C and E, the relationship between the community group and the NGO was more open, and in the case of site C continued after the contract ended. In sites C and E there appeared to be an effort to share as much information as possible with the community group.

### *Consultation and decisionmaking*

The degree to which the support organizations involved the leaders and community members in decisionmaking is an important component of the participatory process. Opportunities for consultation and shared decisionmaking during the design of projects or activities were related components of this indicator. The ratings for the consultation and decisionmaking indicator were strong and developed overall, but some findings were “not evident”.

Partly because the contract NGOs had to complete a set of prescribed “deliverables,” community members often perceived that they were not consulted about the support organizations’ actions or activities. The contract NGOs may have omitted information to spare community groups from mundane or tedious bureaucratic details.

Another issue was about opportunities for consulting with support organizations, including NGOs, DENR, and NRMP-DAI. For site E, the only site with an existing contract NGO, the opportunities to consult were frequent and on-going. However, for sites where the NGO contracts had expired (A and C) or been terminated (site D), the frequency of opportunities to consult with support organizations went down. NRMP-DAI had field staff who filled some of the need for consultation that was either not being met by the DENR or was noticeably absent upon departure of the contract NGO. Community members and leaders in sites A, C, D, and E said that the DENR-assigned field official (the PMO) made only infrequent visits to their sites.

### ***Contribution***

This indicator referred to the community members' contribution to project outputs and did not directly relate to the function of the support organization. As with other indicators in the participatory category, the findings indicate the extent to which participatory methods were practiced by the support organizations and were being continued by the community group. Success in achieving this indicator was rated "initiated" across all the sites (except site B where it was not applicable).

Because community groups in sites A, C, D, and E had few on-going activities at the time of the fieldwork, there were few opportunities for members to contribute their labor or materials to the community group. In sites A, C, and D, the three sites with the longest history in the CBFM program (approximately five years), informants estimated that between 30 to 70 percent of the members were inactive. Informants also explained that often people were busy with their own activities, primarily farming, and did not have the time to attend meetings. People wanted to participate in specific activities that would lead to income generation and were less interested in planning and developing such activities.

Contributions to projects by community members were frequently associated with direct and short-term income generating activities, rather than volunteering or working for some longer-term income generating opportunity. Some informants indicated that their participation reflected their desire for wages, rather than to contribute to something that would benefit the group as a whole. Several community group leaders reflected that

people were less willing to contribute time and effort for the benefit of the community group because they only wanted to participate when payoffs were immediate. Most participants in the CBFM program had participated in other DENR programs that often involved wage-labor activities, such as reforestation projects, and thus there was an expectation that this DENR program would be similar. Even though DENR, NRMP-DAI, and NGO personnel explained that the CBFM program was different, not all community members heard, understood, or accepted this information.

In sites D and E, members were volunteering as officers or as forest guards. In all sites (except site B which had yet to establish community groups), individual members contributed to the group by paying small membership one-time capital start-up fees and annual fees.

### ***Degree of benefit to members***

This indicator related to the ways in which members benefitted from their participation. More often than not, the opportunity to earn a wage was viewed as the “benefit” for participating in the group. However, groups offered few wage-earning opportunities. Some member inactivity was attributed to the lack of benefits. In sites A, C, and D the workers involved in the timber and bamboo harvests were benefitting from wages. However, a leader from site D explained that because of low morale and group confidence, they were having a hard time finding timber harvesting labor among the hundreds of registered members in the group. The leaders at site C did not hesitate to hire non-members when the arduous harvesting work needed to be done.

The group at site E differed from the three other groups in how members were compensated for their work in the resource inventory. The men who participated in the resource inventory were not paid directly for their work because the contract NGO and group leaders did not want members to expect wage earning opportunities, but wanted to foster a sense of working for the good of the community. Thus the workers' families were given money for the food that could not be provided by the male head-of-the-household while he was in the forest participating in the resource inventory. People in the community had differing impressions about the source of that money. Some felt it came from the community group, others felt it came from the DENR or the NGO. Some also saw it as a form of payment and the attempt to avoid that perception was not completely successful.

#### ***Availability and use of mechanisms to enhance participation***

A community group's ability to understand and assess the mechanisms for facilitating participation emerged as an important characteristic. Except in site B, the lack of opportunities to benefit and frustration with the group leaders produced low morale and apathy. One problem perpetuated the other. As a result, the leaders faced considerable challenges to motivate members. While there was some evidence that the community leaders wanted to enhance participation, there was little evidence that they had developed strategies to achieve this.

Although the project was in the early stages of site B, various communities were enthusiastic about participating. People wanted to form groups and get started with the

CBFM program, but the support organizations preferred to wait until preliminary work was complete, such as the boundary and social surveys. Site B's community motivation may have reflected the new collaborative approach. Because representatives from several support organizations communicated and interacted with community members, people from the communities appeared highly motivated.

In the initial days of the projects at sites A, C, D, and E community leaders had difficulty encouraging people to come to meetings. Leaders from group A, C, and E explained that they went house-to-house to talk to people. At site E, individuals on the group's council visited each household to inform people of the meeting and the proposed agenda. Group leaders from sites A and C commented that one method for enhancing participation was to continually talk about the CBFM program.

Because of the ineffectiveness of past governmental programs, the support organizations had to draw a distinction between the CBFM program and past DENR programs. In the early stages of the CBFM program (in sites A, C, and D), the DENR and other support organizations may have "over sold" the benefits of the CBFM program and placed insufficient emphasis on the long-term, grassroots, collective nature of this particular program. The lack of immediate benefits from the CBFM project in sites A, C, and D was cited as a reason people had lost motivation. In site A, the situation of inactive and demoralized membership was so bad that some informants felt it would not be possible to restore membership confidence. In that community, the leadership had not identified a mechanism to renew the membership.

One mechanism identified by the NRMP-DAI and the DENR for encouraging

participation was to educate people on the principles and ideas behind the CBFM program. At about the time of the fieldwork, the DENR and NRMP-DAI began an Information and Education Campaign designed to train local facilitators to educate people and disseminate information about the CBFM program.

The evidence from the sites suggested that group motivation was more often taken for granted rather than nurtured. One community member in site C noted that it was more difficult to repair than to build community motivation. The group (not just the leaders) in site D had the lowest morale and motivation of the four groups, partially attributed to the termination of the NGO's contract. They were required by DENR to re-do the community resource inventory because the work the NGO had done was incomplete and dated. The group leader explained that this was very taxing on the group because it was another example of their slow progress in the program.

Even when their abilities seemed fairly high, leaders were challenged to motivate people in the CBFM program because of others constraints on their time. Leaders from groups in sites C and E commented that their time and energy were taxed because they were trying to support their families (e.g., keep up with the farming) while taking care of issues facing the community group.

### **Capacity Building**

The category for rating the performance of support organizations with respect to their ability to build the capacity of the community group contained eight indicators: group formation, involvement as a way of increasing capacity, collective effort, community

group's ability to resolve conflict, NGO's ability to resolve conflicts within community group, leadership development, linkages, and transition from support organization assistance. The findings are presented in separate discussions about each indicator and in Table 4. As the table indicates, the community group was the focus of the measurement for half of the indicators. For the other four indicators, the ability of the contract NGO to build the capacity of the community group was measured (except for some sites, see table).

Table 4. Level of group capacity and effectiveness of support organizations at building capacity, 1997<sup>a</sup>

Capacity building indicators	Support organizations	Sites				
		A	B	C	D	E
Group Formation	NGO	n/e	developing <sup>b</sup>	n/e <sup>d</sup>	n/e	developing
Involvement as a Way of Increasing Capacity	(see specific organization under rating)	initiated (DENR)	developing (DENR-NRMP-local govt)	established (NGO)	failed (NGO)	n/e (NGO)
Collective Effort	community group	initiated	n/a <sup>c</sup>	established	initiated	n/e
Community Group's Ability to Resolve Conflict	community group	initiated	n/a	established	established	initiated
Support Organization's Ability to Resolve Conflict	NGO	n/e	n/a	n/e	n/e	outstanding
Leadership Development	community group	n/e	n/a	n/e	n/e	established
Linkages	community group	initiated	n/a	initiated	initiated	n/a
Transition from Support Organization Assistance	NGO	initiated	n/a	initiated	n/a	developing

<sup>a</sup>The findings reflect the status of the indicators during the period May through June, 1997.

<sup>b</sup>For site B, the rating relates to the DENR-NRMP-local government collaboration effort.

<sup>c</sup>n/a (not applicable) implies that the indicator did not pertain to the situation at the specific site.

<sup>d</sup>n/e (not evident) implies that there was not sufficient evidence to rate an indicator, or that it was not possible to measure.

### *Group formation*

The findings pertaining to whether the support organizations effectively assisted the community in forming a group were “not evident”, largely because the group formation process included several steps and most occurred before the study took place. For the sites that had contract NGOs (sites A, C, D, and E) the group formation process was similar. At the beginning of the project, personnel from the NGO had one or more informal meetings with the community to explain the objectives of the CBFM program. They explained how the program required the collaboration of a community-based organization. Most communities had experience with other government programs that required the formation of a group. After a period of time, a group was formed, officials were elected, and the group’s name was registered with the appropriate agency, such as the Securities Exchange Commission. Though this occurred in all the sites with contract NGOs, it was difficult to determine if the process for forming the group included a broad range of people, did not show favoritism, encouraged diverse viewpoints, and, for the leadership positions, included individuals with potential leadership skills, not just individuals who indicated that they wanted a leadership role.

Thus forming a group in the legal and organizational sense was fairly straightforward for most of the contract NGOs and was a fairly uncomplicated deliverable for them to produce. Informants from two of the four NGOs (from sites A and E) said that it was fairly easy for them to fulfill their contractual obligation to form a legally recognized CBFM group. What was more difficult, they said, was to achieve a

satisfactory level of “community organization” during the time period of a three-year contract. While the donor agency and DENR may have viewed the formation of the group as an end in itself, at least two of the NGOs considered it one rather minor step toward the broader goal of building the capacity of the community group.

***Involvement as a way of increasing capacity***

While community leaders and members participated in the activities that were organized by the support organizations, other opportunities existed to involve the members and leaders in activities that involved decisionmaking, strategizing and communication. Occurring with or without planning and preparation, these types of activities could have been useful for incrementally increasing the group’s level of experience with the CBFM program. Such activities had the potential to increase the capacity of the leaders of the group and the group itself. Support organizations varied in the level of involvement that they encouraged and created for community leaders. For site A, the highest field-level official of the DENR in that area commented that the community groups were only accessories to the preparation of the management plan because of some of the technical matters precluded their involvement. The DENR, in this situation, considered what people wanted in the plan, but did not determine that it was necessary for the group to be directly involved in devising the plan.

One positive example of how involvement helped build the capacity of a group was a micro-lending corporation that was initiated in site C in the beginning of the project.

The group lent money to help members start small businesses, such as informal stores within one's home where neighbors could purchase basic cooking and household items. This experience helped the new officers test their skills at organization and financial management and helped build rapport with community members. However, because the objectives of a micro-lending differed from the concept of community-based forest management, the promotion of the micro-lending program may have added to the confusion about the objectives of the CBFM program. However, the leaders recognized a need and took the initiative to implement this project and gain experience.

In site E, the contract NGO did many tasks that could have involved the leadership of the community group. Some of these tasks included traveling to talk with officials, obtaining signatures, delivering documents, and writing reports. The NGO determined that in many situations taking the community leaders away from their livelihoods in order to do numerous tasks would put too much burden on the leaders and their families. The NGO recognized that one day the community group would have to take responsibility for these tasks. They did not view these activities as missed opportunities to build the capacity of the community group. Though the contract NGO in site E had only a one year contract, personnel indicated that they did not intend to abandon their work with this group even if their contract was not renewed. Thus, they may have had a long-term strategy for building the capacity of the group.

### *Collective effort*

This indicator related to the ability of a group to cooperate in effective management of common resources or collective tasks. In two of the sites (A and D) there was observable evidence that some group projects were in a state of only partial completion or had fallen into ruin. One common reason for this was the inability to amass people to complete or sustain a project. In site A, for instance, an area of 100 hectares was reforested as part of a companion project of the CBFM program. The program focused on getting the seedlings in the ground, while offering little guidance on management and upkeep. As a result, the one and one-half foot-high seedlings, mostly mahogany, stood beneath three-foot high grass. The community group did not view the seedlings as an opportunity and did not take nor consider a collective approach to the management of their trees.

Some of the community groups that were members of the CBFM federation had implemented cooperative projects, such as a rice mill and a farm machinery cooperative. In these situations, either the machinery was in disrepair and the group did not have the capital to repair it, or the group no longer had the incentive to manage the machinery and oversee how it would be shared cooperatively.

The group in site D had a large tree nursery for which one member was responsible. The seedlings were large and were becoming root bound and the group did not have a strategy for planting them. The seedlings were not viewed as an opportunity to work collectively and plant and manage trees for the long-term benefit of the group.

In particular, the informants who were members in sites A and D did not view themselves as part of a collaborative effort. They viewed the CBFM project as a way to make wages when the leaders of the group and the DENR developed opportunities or a way to receive specific benefits, such as goods from the cooperative store.

### ***Community group's ability to resolve conflict***

Internal and external sources of conflict affected the community groups in most of the sites. One common type of external conflict involved claimants, people illegally clearing and farming land within or near the community forestry site. In sites A, C, and E, the leaders had to deal with the issue of the claimants. Some of the claimants had or were in the process of acquiring tenurial instruments from the DENR that would make their presence legal, albeit potentially conflicting. The group in site C devised a mechanism for compensating claimants if their crops were damaged during the harvesting of trees. In site A, an incident of suspected arson of a reforested area was thought to have resulted from an unresolved conflict between the community group and claimants adjacent to the site. The leadership at that site was not dealing directly with this problem, but deferred to DENR authorities.

Another conflict involved the relationship between the community group and local government officials, most often the highest ranking local level official, the *barangay* captain. In sites A, C, and D, the community groups had conflicts with the *barangay* captains. None of the leaders of these groups were making plans to try to resolve these

conflicts, though all felt it was necessary. The conflicts were often political and arose because the leader of the community group and the local government official were from opposing political parties. The conflicts affected the group because they created tensions within the community at-large about the control of the CBFM project, individual loyalty, and decisions to participate in activities.

Other pervasive conflicts involved the existence of disgruntled and unmotivated members, particularly in sites A and D. While the sources of these conflicts differed, the leaders showed little or no capability to resolve them. In site A, the workers were waiting to be paid for reforestation work they had completed months earlier. At the time of the study, the group had an opportunity to plant additional trees in 120 hectares of their site. Though it was in the interest of the community group to plant the seedlings, the leaders were unable to increase the members' confidence that they would be compensated for their work.

The leaders in site D decided that rather than develop activities or a strategy to directly involve inactive members they would complete the majority of the work on their first timber harvest as a positive, successful example to motivate members.

Some external conflicts were exceedingly challenging for the community group leaders to resolve. For instance, though the group in site D successfully blocked a road that was used for illegally transporting timber, subsequent death threats were made against the group's leaders. After that, the group sought additional government assistance to apprehend illegal loggers. Once the conflict diminished the group continued its campaign

to stop illegal logging, yet they were most successful in apprehending illegally cut timber, rather than the individuals who cut the timber.

***Support organization's ability to resolve conflict***

Because the officers of the groups at most of the sites were relatively new and still gaining experience, they were not expected to be able to resolve effectively all internal and external conflicts. Thus, this indicator reflected how effective the support organizations were at helping the community leaders resolve conflict and return to their duties. This indicator received “not evident” results for all sites with established groups, except for site E. The contract NGO in site E developed and implemented a strategy to ward off a potential conflict by actively seeking the cooperation and participation of two non-CBFM groups conducting activities that had the potential to come into conflict with the objectives of the CBFM group. The NGO's actions were neither prompted by a requirement of the DENR program, nor were they encouraged by DENR officials. However, the NGO's initiative appeared to be defusing a potentially bad situation and turning it into something positive; the three groups shared experiences and exchanged ideas about land management, including agroforestry and rattan production.

The contract NGO in site C recognized that it was ineffective at helping resolve the conflict between the local government and the community group. One NGO official commented that the NGO's actions in the initial days of the CBFM project may have contributed to the negative feelings that the *barangay* captain had toward the CBFM

program and the community group. The NGO did not involve the *barangay* captain as much as they later realized they should have. The contract NGO in site C, however, did help the group determine how it would deal with the damages the timber harvest would cause to the crops of members and non-members. Because events like these happened in the past, it was difficult to determine the overall effectiveness of the contract NGO at helping resolve the conflicts. This was also the case for sites A and D.

### ***Leadership development***

The indicator on leadership development was assessed from the perspective of the the community group. It reflected the abilities of the group to develop future leaders who could deal effectively with the members' needs and interact with organizations outside of the community in tasks such a mobilizing resources and bargaining on behalf of the group.

Personnel from the former contract NGOs at sites A and C commented that the leaders of those groups had "come a long way" from when the NGOs first arrived at the site. They went from having few organizational skills to being able to organize and conduct community meetings. It was not clear, however, that the leaders had learned how to deal with some of the complex issues mentioned above (see "Community group's ability to resolve conflict"). And, there was no evidence that the leaders had a strategy for building future leaders. Leaders from site A and C stated that more "leadership training" would be beneficial, but they could not articulate specifically what they wanted the training to include.

The leader from site E, however, had initiated some tasks specifically designed to develop future leaders. The leader of the group initiated a rotation plan among the council members of the group (the leadership core) for the responsibility to facilitate the monthly meetings. This gave council members the opportunity to "face people and talk." If a council member appeared shy or reluctant to facilitate a meeting, the more experienced leader would assist him or her and use the experience as a learning opportunity.

### *Linkages*

This indicator was related to the leadership development indicator but had specific emphasis on building linkages to other organizations and institutions. The focus was on the group as a whole and whether the community group had made progress toward securing linkages to institutions, particularly as the role of the support organizations was diminishing. Only three of the five sites (A, C, and D) were far enough along in the program that they no longer had contract NGOs. However, based on the evidence from these sites none of the groups had developed strong linkages in the form of good communication and interactions with organizations, such as financial institutions, university extension offices, other non-governmental organizations, and the DENR.

The group in site D had established a relationship with a mining company that allowed them to hire a project manager and build a nursery. The project manager handled the majority of the coordination with the DENR. It was not clear that the leaders of the group were learning about CBFM procedures and getting prepared for when they might

not have (or be able to afford) a project manager. In site C, the group relied on assistance from NRMP-DAI to identify potential timber buyers and had not developed many contacts of their own. The leaders in site A felt that they were not getting much assistance from the local DENR officials, and they did not know where else to go for assistance about how to make a profit from their bamboo cooperative.

*Transition from support organization assistance*

The process of the community group making a transition away from the assistance of the contract NGO or other support organizations (as in the case of site B) was assessed in terms of the ability of the contract NGO to make the transition smooth and effective. The assessment of this indicator was only applicable for sites A, C and E. While there were no specific contractual requirements for the NGO to prepare the community group for the transition, most informants from both the contract NGOs and the community seemed aware of the importance of the transition process.

In sites A and C, there was evidence that the contract NGOs took some action to reduce their role and build the independence of the community group. Community leaders consistently ran meetings, tended to certain matters, and oversaw the bookkeeping and other financial responsibilities. In site C, one officer of the group explained that their leaders felt comfortable communicating to the NGO when they wanted more responsibility or when they needed more direct assistance.

Officials from contract NGO at site A said that they increasingly encouraged the

community group to take more responsibility and the NGO felt the group was in a good position to act on its own behalf. However, the leader from the community group felt that the group was adversely affected by the departure of the NGO. Furthermore the group did not have strong overall capacity. Some of their projects were half-completed and they were losing money on their bamboo extraction project. In addition, the group did not have effective linkages with the DENR or other institutions, with the exception of some NRMP-DAI field staff. Community members still referred to their training center that was built during the tenure of the contract NGO as the NGO's training center, although it belonged entirely to the community group.

At the time of the fieldwork, the contract NGO in site E was only partially through its contract. Although the contract NGO was overseeing much of the CBFM procedural responsibilities for the group, there was an indication that the contract NGO would be highly sensitive to the ramifications of its impending withdrawal from the site. They were committed to working with the community group even if their CBFM contract was not renewed.

Some of the problems that the community groups faced once the NGOs departed were partially attributed to the complex requirements of the CBFM program, many of which had not yet been completed by the time the NGO's contract expired, and less to the inadequacies of the support organizations or the community group leaders. Representatives from each of the contract NGOs (excluding the one that was fired) indicated that the duration of their contracts was not long enough to carry out the

community organizing. The process of acquiring the tenorial instrument (the CBFMA) and preparing the various management plans usually took up the entire duration of the contract. In no case did the community group complete all the programmatic requirements and begin its first harvest within the duration of the NGO's contract.

### **Cumulative Findings**

Cumulative findings on the ratings for the three categories of indicators (service delivery, participatory methods, and capacity building), the different organizations associated with the indicators, and the sites are presented in Tables 5, 6, and 7. The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of indicators in each category receiving the related rating. In Table 5, for example, four out of nine indicators received an “initiated” rating under the service delivery category for site A. Also, each table has a column depicting the overall ratings for the three indicator categories at all sites. For example, in Table 5, for the service delivery category, seven out of the 45 indicators received “developing” ratings. Not evident (n/e) ratings indicate insufficient evidence to rate an indicator, or that it was not possible to measure. Not applicable (n/a) ratings indicate no relevance between a particular indicator and the situation at a site. An example of the latter occurred in site D, where the NGO departed before an expected transition phase could occur, and thus the ability of the NGO to transition from the assisting the community was not applicable. Tables 8, 9, and 10 show the percentages of ratings received in the three indicator categories corresponding to Tables 5, 6, and 7.

Table 5 depicts the ratings for key indicators associated with the contract NGOs. Within each of the three indicator categories, the overall ratings of indicators across the five sites span the spectrum of the rating scale, from failed to “outstanding” scores. The service delivery category ranged from “initiated” to “outstanding” with a median rating of “initiated”.<sup>5</sup> Participatory methods were stronger, ranging from “initiated” to “established” with a median rating of “established”. The group capacity building category ranged from failed to “outstanding” with a median of “developing”.

Focusing on the site columns in Table 5, contract NGOs played important roles for sites A, C, D, and E. The contract NGOs in sites C and E were most effective at using participatory methods and at preparing the community leaders to practice participatory involvement. One characteristic of these two contract NGOs was that staff members resided in or near the communities and had day-to-day contact with the community members. If the motivation behind the collaborative effort in site B could be sustained, the support organizations had the potential to create innovative approaches that could enhance the service delivery, participatory methods and capacity building for the communities in site B.

Several programmatic issues affected the ability of the contract NGOs to effectively complete the tasks required under their contract. For instance, the contract

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<sup>5</sup>Not evident and not applicable ratings were not included in the derivation of median ratings.

NGOs were bound by the duration of their contract (one to three years, depending on the site) to advance complex rural development objectives, such as of group organization and leadership development. The NGOs felt that the durations of their contracts were inadequate for allowing them to be successful in some of these areas. The NGOs from A and C had experience in community development and were aware of the time commitment required to produce lasting results.

In addition to contractual time constraints, NGOs questioned the intent of some of the required deliverables. For example, the contractual requirement for forming a group, which included organizing meetings, electing officers, and gaining official recognition as a group, was only partially consistent with the type of capacity building roles that some of the contract NGOs envisioned they would undertake (sites A, C and E). The NGO at site E had experience working with indigenous communities and knew that some processes were complicated by political, legal, and cultural factors. The NGO not only emphasized patience and cultural sensitivity over desires for timely action, but also intended to commit to helping build a strong community organization after their contract expired. Also some NGOs, such as in sites C and D, were contracted to work in communities where they had little prior experience. The contract NGOs in site C dealt with this by focusing their early efforts on building trust and confidence within the community. The NGOs in sites A, C, and E were regarded by agency officials as competent and effective organizations in the rural development arena. It is not surprising, therefore, that some of them portrayed a commitment to the community groups above and beyond the requirements of their CBFM

contracts. Not all NGOs had this commitment were lax at fulfilling contractual obligations. Although the DENR and other agencies have responded to lesson learned from working with a variety of NGOs and modified their criteria for selecting contract NGOs, more work is needed that would enable agencies to evaluate an NGO's commitment to capacity building processes.

Table 6 presents the indicators related to the community group and therefore does not include any of the service delivery indicators that pertained to the support organizations' abilities to provide services to the community groups. "Initiated" and "established" ratings appear for the seven indicators. Although both participatory methods and capacity building categories had sites receiving "established" ratings, the median rating in both those categories was "initiated".

With respect to each site, the abilities of the community groups correlate, for the most part, with the effectiveness of their respective contract NGOs (see Table 5). The community group in site C had more success with participatory methods and had achieved a level of community capacity that was somewhat more advanced than that of the other community groups. The group in site A was the least adept at designing income or skill building opportunities for members, motivating members, resolving conflict, and building their capacity as an organization. The group with the least experience in the CBFM program, site E, showed good potential in participatory and capacity building abilities. As members of an indigenous tribe, the group had preexisting social and cultural norms that served as a foundation for the services and processes embarked on by the NGO,

particularly the participatory processes. The group had tribal elders, for instance, who had a history of managing tribal matters. While the group in site D had overcome difficult situations, it had not yet become successful in encouraging participation and building the capacity of the group.

Table 7 presents the cumulative ratings for all indicators related to support organizations and community groups. The category rows integrate support organizations' actions with the responses and actions of community groups, as depicted in the conceptual framework by the center box and the box on the center-right (Figure 1, Chapter 1). The cumulative findings confirm some of the patterns emerging from the indicator discussions presented above. Looking down the site columns and aggregating all the indicators represented under the three categories, sites C and E exhibit the strongest ratings. The sites can be ranked by their median cumulative ratings, beginning with the strongest: site C ("established"), sites B and E ("developing"), and sites A and D ("initiated"). This suggests that relative to the other sites, the community group in site C experienced the highest quality of training services from support organizations, received and adopted some level of participatory methods, and developed some capacity.

A great degree of variability exists across the three categories of indicators. The service delivery category ranged from "initiated" to "outstanding" with a median rating of "initiated". The participatory methods category ranged from "initiated" to "established" with a median rating of "established". The greatest degree of variability occurred in the capacity building category, which ranged from failed to "outstanding", with a median

rating of “initiated”. For both the DENR field offices and most of the contract NGOs, building the capacity of the community group and assisting them to be prepared to function without the assistance of the contract NGO received “initiated” ratings. While there were instances of successful capacity building, the “initiated” ratings indicate underdevelopment in several areas. This is the result of a number of factors. First, contract NGOs worked within a constrained period of time and were required to fulfill numerous obligations related to satisfying the requirements of the CBFM program. The contract NGOs involved community members in many of these activities, such as the resource inventories and management plans, and this is reflected in the relatively stronger participatory ratings. Although community members participated, they often had peripheral roles in these activities. Their lack of involvement in highly technical components and activities that required report writing and communicating with DENR officials diminished their capacity to conduct such tasks in the future and develop important linkages with the DENR and other institutions.

These problems reflect programmatic constraints as well as abilities of the contract NGOs. In order to expedite tasks, meet deadlines, and not overburden community leaders, NGOs frequently shouldered a major portion of these responsibilities. Although their intention was not to deny community leaders capacity building opportunities, contract NGOs could have been more attentive to opportunities that would have helped build the group’s capacity. Some examples of this include involving community leaders in discussions with the DENR, increasing their participation in writing management plans,

and empowering the leaders to set agendas and make decisions. Nevertheless, constrained by contract obligations, paperwork, and standardized program requirements that were not tailored to individual sites, contract NGOs considered capacity building activities a lower priority. Recent simplifications of the implementing rules and regulations of the CBFM program indicates that the DENR is being adaptive during the development of the CBFM program. While there is still room for altering, simplifying, and increasing the flexibility of the CBFM program, the greatest gains in capacity building will be met by those activities that encourage not just the participation of community groups members, but the actual doing by community members. Among other things already mentioned, this will require a commitment to longer and stronger relationships between the community groups and support organizations.

The DENR and contract NGOs are not alone in their need to be creative and develop mechanisms that foster capacity building. The international donor community plays a key role in determining the set of deliverables required by the contract NGOs. Again, increasing flexibility, tailoring deliverables to the specific needs and interests of the community group, and holding NGOs accountable for processes rather than paperwork, are ways to increase a programmatic emphasis on capacity building.

Table 5. Cumulative ratings of indicators associated with the contract NGOs, 1997<sup>a</sup>

Indicator Category (specific indicators)	Ratings within Sites Related to Contract NGO			
	A	B <sup>c</sup>	C	D

<b>Service Delivery</b> (all indicators in this category )	n/e (4) <sup>b</sup> initiated (4) developing (1)	n/a (5) <sup>d</sup> developing (3) established (1)	n/e (6) <sup>e</sup> initiated (1) developing (1) initiated-established (1)	n/e (4) initiated (4) developing (1)	n/e (3) initiated (4) developing (1) outstanding (1)	n/a (5) n/e (17) initiated (13) developing (7) init.-estb. (1) established (1) outstanding (1) <b>median = initiated</b>
<b>Participatory Methods</b> (Access to information; Consultation and Decision-making)	n/e (1) initiated (1)	n/a (1) established (1) <sup>f</sup>	established (2)	initiated (2)	established (2)	n/a (1) n/e (1) initiated (3) established (5) <b>median = established</b>
<b>Capacity Building</b> (Group formation; Involvement to increase capacity; Ability to Resolve Conflict; Transition from Assistance)	n/e (2) initiated (1)	n/a (2) developing (2)	n/e (2) initiated (1) established (1)	n/a (1) n/e (2) failed (1)	n/e (1) developing (2) outstanding (1)	n/a (3) n/e (7) failed (1) initiated (2) developing (4) established (1) outstanding (1) <b>median = developing</b>

<sup>a</sup>The findings reflect the status of the indicators during the period May through June, 1997.

<sup>b</sup>The number in parentheses indicates the number of indicators receiving the related rating.

<sup>c</sup>There was no contract NGO in site B, thus the ratings were applied to the collaborative approach used there.

<sup>d</sup>n/a (not applicable) implies that the indicator did not pertain to the situation at the specific site.

<sup>e</sup>n/e (not evident) implies that there was not sufficient evidence to rate an indicator, or that it was not possible to measure.

DENR and NRMP-DAI ratings were combined for the consultation and decisionmaking indicator.

Table 6. Cumulative ratings on categories of indicators for community groups, 1997<sup>a</sup>

Indicator Category (specific indicators)	Combined Ratings with Symbolic Representation of Indicators Related to Community Group Abilities					Overall Ratings
	A	B	C	D	E	
<b>Participatory Methods</b> (Contribution; Degree Benefit to Members; and, Availability and Use of Mechanisms to Enhance Participation)	initiated (3) <sup>b</sup>	n/a (2) <sup>c</sup> established (1)	initiated (1) established (2)	initiated (2) established (1)	n/e (2) <sup>d</sup> initiated (1)	n/a (2) n/e (2) initiated (7) established (4) <b>median = initiated</b>
<b>Capacity Building</b> (Collective Effort; Group's Ability to Resolve Conflict; Leadership Development; and, Linkages)	n/e (1) initiated (3)	n/a (4)	n/e (1) initiated (1) established (2)	n/e (1) initiated (2) established (1)	n/a (1) n/e (1) initiated (1) established (1)	n/a (5) n/e (4) initiated (7) established (4) <b>median = initiated</b>

<sup>a</sup>The findings reflect the status of the indicators during the period May through June, 1997.

<sup>b</sup>The number in parentheses indicates the number of indicators receiving the related rating.

<sup>c</sup>n/a (not applicable) implies that the indicator did not pertain to the situation at the specific site.

<sup>d</sup>n/e (not evident) implies that there was not sufficient evidence to rate an indicator, or that it was not possible to measure.

Table 7. Cumulative ratings on categories of indicators for support organizations and community groups, 1997<sup>a</sup>

Indicator Category	Combined Ratings and Symbolic Presentations of Indicators (includes indicators related to support organizations and community groups)					Overall Ratings
	A	B	C	D	E	
<b>Service Delivery</b>	n/e (4) <sup>b</sup> initiated (5) developing (1)	n/a (6) <sup>c</sup> developing (3) established (1)	n/e (6) <sup>d</sup> initiated (2) developing (1) initiated- established (1)	n/e (4) initiated (5) developing (1)	n/e (3) initiated (5) developing (1) outstanding (1)	n/a (6) n/e (17) initiated (17) developing (7) initiated-established (1) established (1) outstanding (1) <b>median = initiated</b>
<b>Participatory Methods</b>	n/e (1) initiated (5) established (1)	n/a (4) established (3)	n/e (1) initiated (1) established (5)	n/e (1) initiated (4) established (2)	n/a (1) n/e (2) initiated (2) established (2)	n/a (5) n/e (5) initiated (12) established (13) <b>median = established</b>
<b>Capacity Building</b>	n/e (3) initiated (5)	n/a (6) developing (2)	n/e (3) initiated (2) established (3)	n/a (1) n/e (3) failed (1) initiated (2) established (1)	n/a (1) n/e (2) initiated (1) developing (2) established (1) outstanding(1)	n/a (8) n/e (11) failed (1) initiated (10) developing (4) established (5) outstanding (1) <b>median = initiated</b>

<sup>a</sup>The findings reflect the status of the indicators during the period May through June, 1997.

<sup>b</sup>The number in parentheses indicates the number of indicators receiving the related rating.

<sup>c</sup>n/a (not applicable) implies that the indicator did not pertain to the situation at the specific site.

<sup>d</sup>n/e (not evident) implies that there was not sufficient evidence to rate an indicator, or that it was not possible to measure.

Table 8. Percent of indicators receiving rating associated with the contract NGOs, 1997<sup>a</sup>

<b>Indicator Category (specific indicators)</b>	<b>Indicator Ratings<sup>c</sup> Across All Sites</b>	<b>Percent<sup>b</sup></b>
<b>Service Delivery</b> (all indicators in this category )	initiated	56.5
	developing	30.4
	initiated-established	4.3
	established	4.3
	outstanding	4.3
		(n = 23)
<b>Participatory Methods</b> (Access to information; Consultation and Decision-making) <sup>d</sup>	initiated	37.5
	established	62.5
		(n = 8)
<b>Capacity Building</b> (Group formation; Involvement to increase capacity; Ability to Resolve Conflict; Transition from Assistance)	failed	11.1
	initiated	22.2
	developing	44.4
	established	11.1
	outstanding	11.1
		(n = 9)

<sup>a</sup>The findings reflect the status of the indicators during the period May through June, 1997.

<sup>b</sup>Percentages may not total 100, due to rounding; n/a (not applicable) and n/e (not evident) are not included in percent calculations.

<sup>c</sup>There was no contract NGO in site B, thus the ratings were applied to the collaborative approach used there.

<sup>d</sup>DENR and NRMP-DAI ratings were combined for the consultation and decisionmaking indicator.

Table 9. Percent of indicators receiving rating for community groups, 1997<sup>a</sup>

Indicator Category (specific indicators)	Indicator Ratings Across All Sites	Percent <sup>b</sup>
<b>Participatory Methods</b> (Contribution; Degree Benefit to Members; and, Availability and Use of Mechanisms to Enhance Participation)	initiated established	63.6 36.4 (n = 11)
<b>Capacity Building</b> (Collective Effort; Group's Ability to Resolve Conflict; Leadership Development; and, Linkages)	initiated established	63.6 36.4 (n = 11)

<sup>a</sup>The findings reflect the status of the indicators during the period May through June, 1997.

<sup>b</sup>Percentages may not total 100, due to rounding; n/a (not applicable) and n/e (not evident) are not included in percent calculations.

Table 10. Percent of indicators receiving rating for support organizations and community groups, 1997<sup>a</sup>

<b>Indicator Category</b>	<b>Indicator Ratings Across All Sites</b>	<b>Percent<sup>b</sup></b>
<b>Service Delivery</b>	initiated	63.0
	developing	25.9
	initiated-established	3.7
	established	3.7
	outstanding	3.7
		(n = 27)
<b>Participatory Methods</b>	initiated	48.0
	established	52.0
		(n = 25)
<b>Capacity Building</b>	failed	4.7
	initiated	47.6
	developing	19.0
	established	23.8
	outstanding	4.8
		(n = 21)

<sup>a</sup>The findings reflect the status of the indicators during the period May through June, 1997.

<sup>b</sup>Percentages may not total 100, due to rounding; n/a (not applicable) and n/e (not evident) are not included in percent calculations.

## **Key Issues**

The government of the Philippines has tried to convert its forest policies from an open access system to collective action management. In examining some of the first areas undergoing this shift, many problems were identified, as would be expected. Several indicators were particularly important because the “initiated” ratings reflected key underlying programmatic and community issues affecting the community group’s ability to work collectively as resource managers.

Table 11 identifies the key issues, indicators, and sites that were affected, and provides illustrative highlights. Most of the key indicators appearing in the second column received “initiated” or mixed ratings. The issues that emerged from the data on these key indicators related to mutual trust within the group, leadership skills, resource protection, boundary delineation, whether or not the group viewed itself as collective resource managers, how the group related to the forest resources, and how the members of group were compensated for their participation. Brief descriptions of these issues follow the table.

### ***Mutual Trust***

Programmatic characteristics of the CBFM may have inhibited building mutual trust in ways that have occurred in historically successful common property resource management. For example, the program did not provide information or guidelines about how to deal with conflict and other issues that might arise from encouraging a diverse

Table 11. Issues that affected the ability of community groups to work collectively, 1997<sup>a</sup>

Issues	Key Indicators	Illustrations
Mutual Trust	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Group's Ability to Resolve Conflict (CB)<sup>b</sup></li> <li>• Availability &amp; Use of Mechanism to Enhance Participation (PA)</li> <li>• Target Population (SD)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conflict between local government official and community group. (A, C, D)<sup>c</sup></li> <li>• Low motivation among members. (A, D, E)</li> <li>• Issue of claimants and illegal users of resources. (A, C, D)</li> <li>• Few functioning small-scale projects to build trust. (A, D, E)</li> </ul>
Leadership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Leadership Development (CB)</li> <li>• Consultation &amp; Decisionmaking (PA)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Highly motivated individuals as leaders. (A, C, D, E)</li> <li>• Limited plans to develop future leaders. (A, D)</li> <li>• Key leaders took on big responsibilities alone. (D, E)</li> <li>• Support organizations tended to many potential communal duties. (A, C, E)</li> <li>• Leaders placed low emphasis on spirit of collective effort. (A, D)</li> </ul>
Resource Protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Collective Effort (CB)</li> <li>• Forest Protection (SD)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Forest guards faced uncertainty or danger when confronting suspected violators. (A, C, D, E)</li> <li>• Guards not deputized by DENR. (A, C, D, E)</li> <li>• Group emphasis on specific employees/volunteers as guards—no collective protection strategy. (A, C, D, E)</li> </ul>
Boundary Issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Group's Ability to Resolve Conflict (CB)</li> <li>• Capacity Building Linkages (CB)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Boundaries defined to include claimants and overlapping tenures. (A, D, E)</li> <li>• Area difficult to patrol given distance or terrain. (D, E)</li> <li>• Forest guards worked as volunteers. (D, E)</li> <li>• Want more support from DENR in forest protection. (A, C, D, E)</li> </ul>
Identification with the Concept of Collective Action	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Collective Effort (CB)</li> <li>• Degree Benefit to Members (PA)</li> <li>• Resource Inventory (SD)</li> <li>• Forestry Techniques (SD)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Uncertain "ownership" of training center. (A)</li> <li>• Desire among members for immediate rewards upon participating in activity. (A, C, D)</li> <li>• Leaders more aware than members of the meaning of collective action. (C, E)</li> <li>• Indigenous community had longer history of group norms. (E)</li> <li>• Development of management plans not considered a collective process. (A, C, D, E)</li> </ul>

Table 11. (continued)

<p>Identification with the Intended Common Property Resource</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Collective Effort (CB)</li> <li>• Resource Inventory (SD)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Management plans did not specify appropriate individual behavior toward forest resources. (A, C)</li> <li>• Low involvement of community members in management plan development. (A, C, D, E)</li> <li>• Resource inventory viewed as an end in itself–type of work. (A, C, E)</li> <li>• Reforestation activities lacked long-term vision. (A, D)</li> <li>• DENR’s notion of “borrowing from the forest.”</li> </ul>
<p>Financial Compensation</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Contribution (PA)</li> <li>• Degree Benefit to Members (PA)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Expectation of wage earning opportunities provided by the support organizations. (A, D)</li> <li>• High expectation that community group leaders would provide opportunities to members. (A, C, E)</li> </ul>

<sup>a</sup>The findings reflect the status of the indicators during the period May through June, 1997.

<sup>b</sup>SD = Service Delivery Category

PA = Participatory Methods Category

CB = Capacity Building Category

<sup>c</sup>Sites associated with illustrations appear in parentheses, e.g., (A, C, E).

membership. Most of the groups had several hundred members of varying degrees of involvement. In three of the sites (A, C, and D) a portion of the members were inactive. Low participation and apathy affected group morale. Also, there existed conflicts with claimants, people who illegally cleared and farmed land within or adjacent to the community site. Leaders were challenged to overcome these problems.

The number of users of forest resources in a site was unknown, but likely exceeded the number of members in a group. This may have affected the development of trust because the resources were being depleted, but the members did not know who to hold accountable. Ideally, a common property management approach would define the users of the resource. Mechanisms would exist to punish illegal outside users and members of the group who harvested without authorization. Mutual trust among resource users is important for successful resource management in a collective action system.

### ***Leadership***

Several indicators pointed to the challenge that the leaders face in managing members, boosting morale, and encouraging involvement. The leaders of the four community groups were charismatic and had beneficial experience outside of the community. In sites A, C, and D the leaders did not have strategies for dealing with the low morale of some of the group members. Rather than build a collective spirit, the leaders put their energy into completing tasks and program requirements. In site D, the leaders had difficulty generating support for the first timber harvest. Their plan was to do

the majority of the work themselves and use the success of the efforts as a way to encourage future involvement. The leaders faced serious challenges in trying to foster the collective interests of the group.

### ***Resource Protection***

Protecting resources from illegal users is an important characteristic of a collectively managed resource. The CBFM program transferred certain responsibilities for forest protection to the community groups. The leaders in sites A, C, and D needed more help from the DENR in forest protection since forest protection was more responsibility than the group could handle. The forest guards explained that most illegal action tended to be from outsiders cutting trees or harvesting non-timber forest products for sale. Usually, the guards noted the action and informed either the DENR or the community group leaders. Most forest guards had not received any formal training, though the DENR was in the process of organizing a forest guard training course. Most community groups allowed members to harvest some forest products for household consumption. Other than this, there were few formal rules regulating individual behavior toward the resource.

### ***Boundary Issues***

Within a given municipality that contained from 40 to 100 communities, there were

often a multitude of community-based programs, such as CFP, Integrated Social Forestry, and Ancestral Domain Claims, and programs which dealt with land holdings at the individual level, such as Certificate of Stewardship Contracts. Heightened coordination among agencies, departments, local governments and communities became necessary, and municipal CBFM Councils were formed in some regions to facilitate that coordination.

Part of the CBFM site selection process was the delimitation of the site boundaries. In most of the cases, once the DENR established the boundaries of the site, the newly formed community group immediately had to deal with potential conflicts from within the borders of the site. In some cases, the CBFM borders were defined to include individuals who had been awarded a different tenurial instrument, a Certificate of Stewardship Contract (CSC). Some of the CSC holders felt threatened by the overlapping CBFM program. One DENR official explained that because both these programs were within CBFM, it was acceptable that the boundaries of the different projects overlapped. He hoped that the individuals with the CSCs would see the success of the CBFM project and would join with the project and adopt some of its management principles. This put a large responsibility on the community group, particularly since the CBFM program was new and the groups had not implemented many successful activities that would encourage widespread involvement and participation. The groups were inexperienced and unlikely to be able to resolve land-tenure conflicts.

### ***Identification with the Concept of Collective Action***

The findings for several indicators indicated that the community groups had weak identities as collectives. The leaders were more aware than the members of the importance of the collective commitment to the objectives of community-based forest management. The attitudes of the members reflected the history of their involvement in government programs in which people would be individually compensated for their participation. Though reforestation projects, for example, were intended for the benefit of the community, individuals viewed them as opportunities to earn wages. As a result, the members had little experience in projects that emphasized group or collective benefits. Several community leaders commented that many of their members expected the community organizations to provide for them, rather than the members working for the benefit of their organization.

### ***Identification with the Intended Common Property Resource***

While all community groups had rules for participation in the group, such as membership fees and dues, the groups had few, if any, defined rules related to individual behavior toward the common property resource. This was reflected in an overall low identity with the common property resource. For example, the resource inventory and report was usually conducted by someone from the DENR or the contract NGO and there was only minimal involvement of the community members. The resource inventories were not developed as a means to introduce the members to the resources and build their

identification with it as caretakers and managers. A reforestation activity was another example of group action that reflected low identification with the resource. Once the seedlings were planted, some groups were unable to generate the volunteerism needed to tend to them. The members did not relate to the resources as though the trees belonged to the group and to their children.

Many of the contract NGOs tried to meet some of the needs of the community groups by implementing smaller projects, such as rice mills and small business loan cooperatives. Some of these met with success, others failed. None, however, appeared to contribute to the group's identity with the forest resources and to its role as managers of the resource. Several operated under the label of CBFM, but they were not developed as opportunities to increase awareness of the member's role in the CBFM program.

Also, the DENR's concept of "borrowing from the forest" (described above under Resource Inventory) may have given people the impression that the timber harvesting component of the CBFM program would be short-lived. If the members did not develop long-term perspectives toward resource management, they would not make long-term commitments to protect the resources.

### ***Financial Compensation***

One important principle of collective action is that members of the community group will participate when the benefits of their participation exceed the costs. Members

said that there had been numerous training activities and meetings, but that the groups had not developed activities from which the members could benefit. The CBFM program was not structured so that early on in the program members would receive some type of benefit for their involvement. Few groups had start-up projects that provided incentives for members to stay involved. Some members appeared to be waiting for the benefits of the timber harvest, but, at the time of the study, only two groups (sites C and D) had conducted timber harvests. These harvests occurred four to five years after the CBFM program was introduced.<sup>1</sup> Overall, members expected the DENR program or the community group to provide wage earning opportunities.

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<sup>1</sup>At the time of the fieldwork, DENR had just adopted new Implementing Rules and Regulations (Executive Order 263, 1996) which simplified some procedures and devolved more authority to regional and provincial DENR offices. The hope was that this would increase the momentum for implementing management objectives at CBFM sites (DAI 1997).

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## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS**

The Philippine's multi-objective strategy of involving communities in the management of national resources was intended to initiate management on national forestland that had received little, if any, management under previous government forest policies. A secondary goal of the strategy was to build the economic and social capital of forest-based communities. This dissertation argues that support organizations, broadly defined, have a crucial role in a long-term resource management strategy because the ability of community groups to function as managers of national resources depends upon the nature and extent of the support they receive. The long-term success of the CBFM program may be less about achieving a particular outcome and more about the process of the people working toward an outcome.

With limited human, physical, and financial resources, these marginalized rural communities were expected to do what no other institution, either timber company or government agency, had achieved to date in the Philippines. The conclusions are presented in two sections. The first section discusses the effectiveness of support organizations from both programmatic and theoretical perspectives. The second section focuses on the DENR, the contract NGOs, and the community groups, and identifies challenges and opportunities for overcoming constraints in the CBFM program.

## **Support Organization Effectiveness**

### ***Programmatic Perspective***

While the contract NGOs (except in site D) were capable of delivering the basic services required by the contracts, such as forming officially recognized groups and conducting resource inventories, the findings suggest that these activities only partially contributed to the effectiveness of the groups. One explanation is that the NGOs' contracts were geared toward short-term, specific outcomes. The more successful NGOs recognized that in order to develop group capacity and participatory norms, they had to function beyond the scope of their contracts. Involving leaders in design of management plans is one example of an activity that was not specifically required by the contract, but had capacity-building implications. This is an example of a type of action that would be expected of an NGO acting on its own, apart from a government contract. Some of the NGOs in the CBFM program have considerable experience working with rural community groups and have learned that the process of building leadership and forming strong groups requires effort and time. The NGOs felt they needed three to five years to build a foundation from which resource management and other community development practices could emerge. The duration of the NGO contracts should reflect not only the expressed needs of the community group but also the skills and experience of the NGO.

Compared to participatory involvement, service delivery was technically less problematic for contract NGOs to provide to the community groups. However, many "initiated" ratings occurred because the services being provided, in particular the trainings,

were not consistent with the needs of the community groups and were often provided without immediate opportunities for the groups to practice or implement what they had learned. Furthermore, the services provided by the contract NGOs were not demand-driven (Harker 1997; Carroll 1992), which means the types of services provided by the NGOs did not arise out of the interests and needs of the community groups. Instead the services were identified by the DENR as tasks that the contract NGOs had to fulfill to meet their contractual requirements.

One reason the DENR specified the required services for the NGOs was to provide a standardized method for implementing the CBFM program on a large scale. Agency-wide mechanisms are important, but should not preclude the development of mechanisms for tailoring training activities to meet the needs of community groups. Ideally this should be a give-and-take process, where the DENR explains to a community group the types of skills it believes the group should develop to function as resource managers and the group identifies areas where it needs training.

Some contract NGOs conducted community development and farming improvement activities that went beyond the services defined in their contracts in order to address the stated needs of the community groups. This was most effective in sites C and E. These activities provided good opportunities for group involvement, decisionmaking, financial management, and livelihood enhancement. However, the objectives were detached from the concept of community forestry and thus did not build familiarity with and ownership in the CBFM program. The CBFM program should not exist apart from a

holistic approach to rural development. Activities within a CBFM site should reflect the interests of residents. But because of the diversity of interests, priority should be given to those interests that relate to natural resources. In the case of farming practices, for example, training in soil conservation and agroforestry practices would increase the well-being of the families and decrease the pressure on forest resources.

Because the CBFM program differs dramatically from other government programs, increased emphasis on educating people about the program is necessary and would best be achieved by a diverse group of support organizations. Changing the perception of the CBFM program has been a difficult undertaking. However, changing it from ‘the government’s natural resource programs are opportunities to earn short-term wages’ to ‘the management of a community forest requires a consistent and collective commitment by community members’ may be important to the long-term success of the CBFM program. Additionally, participants need to see evidence that their involvement in the program will not only lead to improvements in the health of the resources, but will enhance their economic well-being. How does the DENR encourage people to get involved in and adhere to the principles of sustainable resource management reflected in the CBFM program? The DENR and the international technical support offices, such as NRMP-DAI, were in the process of developing an information and education campaign about the CBFM program. More emphasis may be required in this area.

While there exist unique social, political, and physical environments in all CBFM sites, many sites throughout the CBFM program were similar to those included in the

study. Many had been in the program for two or more years and were still in the preparatory stages for timber or non-timber harvests. Most had contract NGOs, though the NRMP-DAI-supported sites were moving away from contract NGOs and were using their own staff or promoting collaborative approaches, as in site B. Conflict between the groups and other political or local government factions was a consistent impediment to progress in other CBFM sites. The contract NGOs functioned under similar contracts; therefore the general findings about contract NGOs in this study may be useful in understanding other sites.

### *Theoretical Perspective*

The use of contract NGOs in the CBFM program provided an opportunity to examine the theoretical function of the elements of support in the context of creating sustainable resource management organizations. The theoretical premise is that participatory methods and capacity building are more challenging for support organizations to provide than the service delivery component, which includes training activities. Participatory methods and capacity building, however, contribute more to the sustainability of a community-based resource management and community development. While long-term data and a larger sample would be needed to test the theoretical depiction of the elements of support to community group presented in chapter one (Figure 1), the findings provide insight into the difficulty support organizations have in defining their relationship to community groups, providing services, using and encouraging participatory

methods, and building capacity. Because of the short duration of the study, the findings provide no insight into how, theoretically, these components contribute to sustainable resource management.

The relevant evidence is portrayed in Table 5 (chapter four). The median ratings across the three categories of indicators can be interpreted as the relative challenge that support organizations (contract NGOs, in particular) face in working in the three areas of support. For instance, an “initiated” rating in the service delivery category would be depicted as a high challenge in the theoretical depiction in Figure 1 (chapter one), indicating that the contract NGO had not yet been able to assist the group to develop a skill or process identified by the indicator. While the findings relate to the effectiveness of support organizations, it can be assumed that effectiveness is related to the difficulty that support groups have in defining their relationships to community groups. Looking at the median scores of the three categories of indicators, service delivery rated “initiated”, participatory methods rated “established”, and capacity building rated “developing”. From a theoretical perspective, one would expect service delivery to be more developed, with a stronger rating, than participatory methods, and capacity building to have the least developed rating.

One explanation for the discrepancy is that, in the CBFM program NGOs functioned within government contracts, whereas the theory is based on the performance of NGOs working on their own projects, fulfilling their own objectives. Such NGOs seek funds and implement projects they believe (or can justify) to be worthwhile. The

theoretical perspective does not focus strictly on the performance of NGOs as government contractors, although it is not uncommon for NGOs to contract with governments.

This discrepancy leads to the question: how do government contracts affect the ability of NGOs to provide training, participatory, and capacity building assistance that contribute to sustainable resource management? Some findings of this study suggest that the NGOs were overwhelmed by the service delivery-type deliverables required in their contracts. While most were able to provide the required training courses, there was little evidence that the training had lasting benefits. A compounding factor was that training activities were not selected by the community groups, but were part of a contract. By contrast, a key objective of many NGOs that work independent of government contracts is to meet the needs of the intended beneficiaries; therefore, it is relatively less challenging for them to be successful at providing services. The services are desired by and often designed in conjunction with the intended beneficiaries, and are usually services where the NGO has expertise. When NGOs act as part of a government contract their work is influenced not only by their own mission and agenda, but by the mission of the government program. The most visible and perhaps influential way that the government's mission is imparted to the NGOs is through the set of deliverables that required by the government contract.

The experience that most of the NGOs in the study had working in community development probably accounts for the relatively more advanced rating of the participatory category compared to service delivery. Three of the four contract NGOs in

the study were considered examples of good contract NGOs, as described by DENR and NRMP officials.

The capacity building category received a rating that would be expected, according to the theory. Capacity building activities require long-term commitment and unique sets of skills and are therefore challenging for NGOs to implement. Also, because the CBFM program was new, it focused on the relatively more straightforward technical and planning functions. This involved developing a host of new management responsibilities, partnerships, and philosophies. Sorting through these activities led to less focus on community capacity building in the first years of the program. For instance, NGOs were required to assist community groups in completing their comprehensive management plan during the period of the contract. The DENR expected that the NGO would complete a substantial portion of the management plan without involving the community. Thus, in several cases (sites A, C, and E), the NGOs facilitated the development of the plan, but in only limited ways involved the community members in the process. Involving the community groups in implementing and complying with the CBFM program was not emphasized as a means to build the capacity of community groups to manage natural resources over the long-term.

### **Overcoming Constraints**

Governments, communities, and contracted non-governmental organizations are constrained in how they function in the CBFM program. Social, historical, and

programmatic factors affect the quality and effectiveness of the support provided to community groups. Some challenges and opportunities for overcoming several constraints are discussed below.

### ***Government***

The current government inherited the legacy of a timber-oriented, concessionaire-dominated forestry system. This legacy produced situations that constrain the effectiveness of the CBFM program. The first pertains to resource accessibility. After decades of timber mining, the remaining forests are located in areas that are too remote to be profitable to timber companies, or exist on canceled timber concessions that subsequently fell victim to open access harvesting by local residents and illegal loggers. Thus, the best primary and secondary forests that the DENR has to offer communities in the CBFM program exist on remote, rugged, and fragile terrain. When the DENR matched communities with parcels of national forestland, they had difficulty identifying sites that would be convenient to communities. It is not surprising that some groups and members were confused about their involvement in a community-based program. They welcomed the idea of training in farming techniques and other livelihood opportunities, but the ways in which forest resources would benefit them were not as clear. The selection process for CBFM sites should include the resource use patterns and history of the communities situated near the forest. Communities where residents harvest products from the forests may be better situated (both experientially and physically) to participate in the

CBFM program.

Over the past two decades, government forestry projects created specific expectations among community groups about the benefits of participation. Years of wage earning opportunities from participating in forestry projects, particularly reforestation projects, produced expectations of short-term benefits that the CBFM program has not been able to fulfill. In addition, previous social forestry projects created unclear expectations about tree tenure and included almost no training or education about forest management. Therefore, when the DENR introduced the CBFM project to community groups, members were unfamiliar with the roles and responsibilities that were expected of them. They had almost no experience working on projects that required their consistent participation in order to achieve long-term benefits. One example of this involved the participation in the resource inventories, which served as the basis for the Community Resource Management and Development Plan (CRMDP). In general, this activity helped build the capacity of the leadership to organize and conduct future resource inventories and it provided some technical training to the members. However, community leaders stated that the major benefit from having the community group participate in the resource inventory was the financial gain to each individual, rather than skill accumulation or group capacity building. Also, at some sites, where the CBFM program existed for at least four years, the members expressed their disappointment that the CBFM program had not produced more work for them. The expectation was that the government program would provide the work, not that the community effort would create work. In addition to

increased information and education about the objectives of the CBFM project, there is a need for smaller, perhaps incremental, projects that can be quickly approved by the DENR and that clearly demonstrate benefits of participation in the program. Small harvests of timber, rattan, or bamboo coupled with value-added applications would increase the skill of the community members and also help solidify their understanding and sense of commitment. Of course, the economic benefits from small projects may be minor, and any decision to expand such projects would require a business plan and market analysis. However, during the four years (on average) that communities waited to conduct their first timber harvest, members developed few forest management and product manufacturing skills. Small, incremental projects would decrease frustration and build incentive for participation.

Although the CBFM program has been steadily expanding, the extent of unmanaged forests remains daunting. Because of limits on budgets, personnel, and other factors, the DENR will continue to be constrained by the inability to effectively manage vast areas of public land. As long as open-access resources exist, rural residents, dubious businesspeople, and urban residents in search of livelihood opportunities will continue the unsustainable depletion of products from national forests. This is the situation faced by governments in many countries, not just the Philippines. It is made more problematic by the fact that in some areas, in the Philippines and elsewhere, the remaining forest resources are in critical condition.

Given the current status of forest resources and rate of forest degradation, the

community forestry paradigm may be one of the last strategies for forest conservation and utilization. This resource management strategy requires a commitment to the community-based component of the strategy. Communities, while not bearing full responsibility, will determine the fate of such strategies. Some important trade-offs need to be considered. The findings suggest that more resources are needed to enhance participatory and capacity building components. One option would be to put more resources into existing sites, or some specific set of high priority sites, rather than expand to new sites, in order to achieve enduring results before there are few forests left to manage.

Like many natural resource agencies around the world, the DENR is a forestry-focused agency functioning in a country where rural well-being and forest resource use are inseparable. Within the CBFM program, untapped opportunities exist for improving social conditions and regenerating the natural resource base. For example, with respect to the process of preparing for the departure of the contract NGO, there is an opportunity for the DENR to heighten its support to community groups. This would involve increasing the roles and responsibilities of DENR field personnel, in particular the Project Management Officers (PMOs). The transition process from contract NGO to the DENR field offices had not been effectively developed at the time of the study. For instance, there was no mechanism for identifying tasks or processes that the NGO had only partially completed, or identifying where the NGO felt the community still needed assistance. Except in the collaborative effort in site B, there was little evidence that the contract NGOs and the PMO had developed working relationships. Nationwide, the PMOs were

being trained in community organization, but they needed increased resources for salaries and positions, increased training in rural development, and an improved incentive system to increase job performance. Salaries need to be competitive to attract well-trained graduates of social forestry programs, such as from the University of the Philippines in Los Baños.

Finally, the recently initiated collaborative approach to working in CBFM sites is promising because agency and local government partnerships have the potential to provide strong support bases for communities, encourage institutional exchanges and learning opportunities, and develop linkages from community groups to influential institutions and players. At the time of the study, however, the majority of the sites in the CBFM program involved contract NGOs working with communities. The programmatic emphasis, therefore, has been on three separate relationships<sup>2</sup>: (1) government and community; (2) government and NGO; and (3) NGO and community. Represented in a simple Venn diagram (Figure 1), the relationships are indicated by the overlapping sections. What is largely missing from the CBFM program is the triangular portion in the center of the diagram where discussions, decisions, processes, and outcomes are the result of the interaction of the three parties. For example, community groups were removed from some of the tasks, such as report writing, that occupied the NGOs' time and energy.

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<sup>2</sup>Although international donors interact independently with communities and NGOs, they are pooled with the government sector for this discussion.




Figure 1. Relationships in the CBFM program

Involving the community groups in the design and decisionmaking about the NGOs' set of deliverables will build understanding about the role of the support organizations and secure lines of accountability not just to the government and international donors but to the primary beneficiaries: the community groups. The DENR has taken some important steps to involve groups in the selection process of the contract NGOs. The next step is to involve communities in the determination of the set of NGO deliverables that are used to implement and evaluate contracts.

### *Non-governmental Organizations*

While all support organizations were constrained by some form of social or programmatic factors, the contract NGOs in particular were required to complete numerous tasks during the relatively short period of their contracts. This may have affected their ability to deliver services, use participatory methods, and build the capacity of community groups to manage forest resources. Although one case (site D) was an example of a failed NGO-community group relationship, the contract NGOs in three of the sites (A, C, and E) had good intentions and appeared to be doing the best that they could. These three NGOs were considered by NRMP-DAI officials to be some of the better examples of contract NGOs working in the CBFM program. Even so, few indicators in the service delivery, participatory measures, and capacity building categories received “established” or more advanced ratings in this study. This does not indicate that NGOs were not capable or that the DENR was misguided in contracting those NGOs. Indeed, the DENR had personnel and other constraints that made the use of more experienced rural development specialists a promising feature. Continued procedural simplification, investments in community development specialists and social foresters, and heightened commitment to involving communities in selecting NGOs and defining the terms of the contracts will increase the effectiveness of contract NGOs.

The process of preparing the communities had many components and involved several stages, including group formation, organization, resource inventories, and

designing management plans. Contract NGOs were considered to be successful if they completed these tasks as specified by their contracts. These were tasks deemed necessary for getting the CBFM program underway. There was no reward or incentive system that encouraged NGOs to be innovative at achieving outcomes that are difficult to quantify and measure, such as using effective participatory methods or involving the community leaders in activities for the purpose of increasing the group's capacity to function with less assistance. The contract NGOs were given limited flexibility to tailor training activities to the expressed needs and experiences of the community groups.

### *Community Groups*

One important constraint affecting the ability of community groups to function in the CBFM program is their lack of experience in treating forest resources as common property rather than an open access system. This lack of experience in working collectively as resource managers is complicated by programmatic elements that restrain communities from making collective resource management decisions. For instance, although communities were required by their lease agreement to practice sustainable resource management, they could not judge for themselves the appropriate use of the resources. Instead the utilization of timber and non-timber products was subject to DENR approval. Communities were responsible for protecting environmental qualities such as watershed health and for guarding the resources from illegal activity. These were functions that the government and former timber concessionaires had not been able to

fulfill. To some degree, the government and its foreign donors recognized that for most communities the challenge to fulfill these responsibilities was a daunting one. This was one reason that NGOs were contracted to assist the communities.

The CBFM program was an example of a program that could have triggered collective action (Cernea 1991), given that the status of the resource was largely dependent on the action or inaction of the people residing next to the forest. However, several features of the CBFM program made the building of collective action problematic. First, conflicting land tenure agreements within community forestry sites produced disputes that were difficult for community leaders to resolve but which could have been minimized with better planning from the DENR. Second, while the CBFM program had the laudable goal of shifting responsibilities to local groups, the abrupt shift of the burden of forest protection to the community groups placed communities in precarious situations for which they were inadequately prepared. Finally, the CBFM program did not emphasize building a sense of ownership of the resource among community members. For instance, for most of the resource inventories, the DENR, contract NGOs, or NRMP-DAI completed the majority of the work of the resource inventories. Also, the rights granted by the two types of tenurial instruments (the Community Based Forest Management Agreement and the Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claim) may not have been well understood by the community groups, or were understood but did not sufficiently instill a sense of ownership necessary for the community members to exert the required effort to manage and protect forest resources. These and other practices were not effective at

building the group's identity as managers of a collective resource.

Another programmatic feature that constrained the ability of the community group to identify with the forest resources was the DENR's expressed view that the CBFM program was a way for communities to "borrow from the forest." This notion of borrowing from the forest sent mixed messages to community leaders who were under the impression that they had accepted a long-term responsibility to manage and protect forest resources and yet they were being told that their financial connection to the resources was on a short-term basis only. Referring to the groups as community-based resource managers yet encouraging them to only use the forest resource for short-term capital development presented mixed messages to groups already constrained by several factors affecting their ability to collectively manage forest resources.

Three types of relationships are important to communities engaged in the CBFM strategy: the relationship to the natural resources, the relationships within the group itself, and the relationships to external organizations and institutions. There has been heavy emphasis on the first one, partial on the second, and minimal on the third. It is hard to imagine how resource degradation will be curbed if community groups cannot control the behavior of their members, provide opportunities for members, and function in uncertain external environments where information about rules, procedures, and opportunities is essential. This suggests that the assistance to community groups must be more well-rounded if the CBFM sites are to succeed. Beyond technical and financial skills, groups must understand participatory methods, how to prioritize needs, how to make decisions,

and how to implement activities. Stronger linkages to agencies, not just natural resource agencies, but also rural development, health, education and other organizations, will assist communities to build their social and human capital.

Community groups around the world are involved in government initiated, internationally supported reforestation, woodlot, agroforestry, and natural forest management projects. Either through tenurial agreements, stewardship contracts, or other means, communities acquire legal responsibility for specified types of resource management. Communities welcome the potential benefits that such projects present to them, such as increasing economic well-being, gaining tenurial rights to lands that have cultural importance, and participating in activities that provide for the welfare of future generations. These alluring benefits mask some of the costs and challenges, such as group organization, leadership development, and compliance with government rules and regulations.

Severely disadvantaged groups are not well-served by the CBFM program. In some cases, the contract NGOs had difficult tradeoffs to consider. In cases where communities are extremely poor, where heads of households struggle to feed their families each day, the DENR may need to re-evaluate whether these sites are appropriate for the current CBFM program. If there are overriding circumstances that strongly indicate that the program should remain, for instance if the site involves an ancestral domain claim and the program is a means to further the land tenure rights of an indigenous group, then the DENR and its foreign donors may need to commit to a longer-term role for support

organizations and more involvement on the part of field-level DENR at these sites.

Continued simplification of program logistics and bureaucratic rules and regulations will assist disadvantaged groups to build their capacity to fulfill the objectives of the program. Because of the devastating effects of low morale, as found in several cases in this study, it is important that the DENR strive to set community groups up for success.

As such, the long-term success of the CBFM program may be less about achieving a particular outcome and more about the process of the people working toward an outcome. The DENR has made good use of its forestry expertise in advising communities how to develop management plans and harvest trees. However, the emphasis on technical training and sustainable forest practices (outcomes) has outweighed the emphasis on processes, such as building partnerships, participation, and community capacity. The time and energy put into measuring, marking, and harvesting forest products will be spent in vain unless more emphasis is placed on the long-term components of the CBFM program. Why isn't building group capacity as essential as conducting a resource inventory? A number of factors, including agency culture, lack of trained personnel in social sciences and community development, complex political dynamics between rural and urban sectors, and the general intangibility of social capital building processes, contributed to the de-emphasis on capacity building. Indeed, the findings from this study reinforce that capacity building processes are difficult to achieve. However, as mentioned earlier, incremental projects and experiences that focus on short-term capacity building outcomes may be effective to building a sustainable strategy.

The national focus of the CBFM strategy and some of the DENR reforms devolving responsibility to local governments and DENR field offices indicate that the Philippine government is gaining valuable experience with innovation, shifting responsibilities, reaching out to communities, and managing national resources in a new way. The government is taking important steps by designing and implementing a natural resource management strategy that involves forest-based communities as partners in resource management, rather than as laborers in reforestation projects as was the prevailing mode of involvement. Like many government initiatives, the CBFM program objectives focused more on quantifiable and technical activities, such as resource inventory, planning, and monitoring. Developing community capacity, leadership, and collective interests were more challenging dimensions of the CBFM strategy, but were necessary for developing enduring resource management practices and community development. Heightening the ways in which the CBFM program reflects the interests, norms, and objectives of the local resource users may help in developing a resource management strategy that would have more enduring effects. This would require the Philippines to frame the CBFM strategy with the explicit, rather than implicit, intention of building the capacity of groups to work together and collectively manage forest resources.

### **Future Research Needs**

Further research is needed in the development of indicators and measures for assessing the performance of support organizations over the long term. Improved

standardization, for instance, would assist researchers in examining the performance of diverse sets of support organizations. Considerable resources would be required to study the role of support organizations in contributing to the long-term sustainability of community development and resource management practices. Methodologies that would make that type of research more feasible would be useful. Better information about how support organizations build the capacity of community groups over the long term would be extremely useful to rural development practitioners and policy makers interested in the attributes, not rhetoric, of sustainability. Established

A thorough examination of the theoretical premise that certain support components, namely capacity building and participatory methods, are more challenging to the support organizations to provide, but contribute more to the sustainability of a community-based resource management approach than other services would require a long-term, in-depth inquiry. In addition to a budget and time commitment, it would require a larger, more diverse sample. Such a study would probably require at least a decade of investigation to understand the issues surrounding sustainable resource use, community management, and long-term assistance provided by support organizations. In order to make inferences about the relative role of service delivery, participatory, capacity building components of assistance in achieving sustainable resource use a significant research commitment is required.

In addition, with the increasing use of NGO-government collaborations, more knowledge is needed about the ways in which government programs affect the

performance of NGOs, particularly with respect to the assistance provided to community groups. Though some of this was touched on in this research, much more is needed. This type of inquiry would benefit from involving key stakeholders in the identification of indicators for evaluation.

The CBFM program was an attempt to bridge conservation and forest protection with rural economic development. The combination of these two approaches presented an interesting set of rules for community members. We need better understanding of how the “external” rules, which are reflected in the structure of the CBFM program, mesh with the “internal” rules and norms of the community group. In addition to further development of the theoretical explanation for why people come together to collectively manage resources (Ostrom 1990), what is also needed is more understanding of the linkages between the collective action processes and the structure of government programs. This would provide better information about the types of incentives and disincentives that governments provide for building collective action.

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## **APPENDICES**

**Appendix A. Example of a CBFM Agreement**

CFMA NO. \_\_\_\_\_

**COMMUNITY FORESTRY MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT**

KNOW ALL MEN THESE PRESENT:

This agreement made and entered into this \_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_ and between the Republic of the Philippines, represented by Secretary Angel C. Alcala of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources hereinafter referred to as the DENR and the \_\_\_\_\_ represented by \_\_\_\_\_ hereinafter referred to as the COMMUNITY.

**WITNESSETH**

WHEREAS, the DENR has the authority and jurisdiction over the COMMUNITY FORESTRY PROJECT (CFP) site at \_\_\_\_\_.

WHEREAS, the COMMUNITY has filed an application for Community Forestry Management Agreement (CFMA) over the CFP site in the aforementioned barangays pursuant to the provisions of DAO 22, Series of 1993.

WHEREAS, implementation of the CFP shall include the following components:

- a) reforestation, assisted natural regeneration, forest protection, agroforestry and timber stand improvement;
- b) development of alternative livelihood opportunities not necessarily dependent on forest products;
- c) forest product extraction, utilization and sale by the COMMUNITY, and;
- d) other activities that may be identified in the future.

WHEREAS, the DENR after having evaluated the application of the COMMUNITY, hereby favorably considers the said application for the Community Forestry Agreement (CFMA);

NOW THEREFORE, for the consideration of foregoing premises, the DENR has authorized the COMMUNITY under the COMMUNITY FORESTRY MANAGEMENT

AGREEMENT (CFMA) to develop, manage and protect the CFP area situated at Barangay(s) \_\_\_\_\_, Municipalities of \_\_\_\_\_, Province of \_\_\_\_\_ containing an \_\_\_\_\_ hectares technically described and/or shown in the attached map which forms an integral part of this agreement subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. The DENR shall:
  - 0.1 Provide livelihood opportunities to the COMMUNITY through contract reforestation, timber stand improvement, and employment through activities covered by the CFP-AO Services Contract such as the conduct of resources inventory and perimeter survey;
  - 0.2 Issue Certificates of Stewardship Contract (CSC) upon recommendation of the CFMA Holder;
  - 0.3 Protect and ensure exclusive occupation and use of the land covered by this AGREEMENT and the forest products within the COMMUNITY, subject to prevailing laws, rules, regulations and prior rights;
  - 0.4 Furnish other assistance to the COMMUNITY as part of DENR'S normal operations, more particularly on the updating of the approved Community Resources Management and Development Plan (CRMDP).
2. The COMMUNITY shall:
  - 2.1 Reimburse the expenses advanced by the DENR for the CFP-AO Service Contract by reforesting/rehabilitating at COMMUNITY expense, an area of not less than fifty (50) hectares within the duration of the CFMA;
  - 2.2 Deposit in the trust fund less than thirty percent (30%) of gross revenues of timber sales and revenues from the sale of minor forest products to finance reforestation pursuant to paragraph 2.1 and reforestation, forest protection, TSI and other obligations under existing rules and regulations;
  - 2.3 Provide quarterly reports to DENR on utilization of the funds referred to in paragraph 2.2 above;
  - 2.4 Follow all duty-promulgated laws, rules and regulations pertinent to forest products utilization, forest development and forest management including

provisions covering joint venture, co-production or profit sharing which will be specified in the management/development plan;

- 2.5 Actively participate in the preparation of the CRMDP. Update the CRMDP at the end of third year and every five (5) years thereafter including the conduct of 100% inventory of forest products prior to harvesting of the same, for all areas not covered by the initial inventory.
- 2.6 Reforest all open, denuded and marginal areas as prescribed and scheduled in the CRMDP. As a general rule, reforestation shall be undertaken from the sale of forest products. However, reforestation may also be undertaken through contract with the DENR.
- 2.7 Develop suitable areas into agroforestry farms based on results of the inventory, provided the improvements to be undertaken through contract with the DENR.
- 2.8 Organize forest protection teams that will work closely with the DENR to prevent destruction, illegal cutting, vandalism, unauthorized and/or illegal occupation.
- 2.9 If so deputized by the DENR, arrest offenders, as witness, assist the DENR in filing cases in court, and seize illegally harvested forest products.
- 2.10 Establish check stations at entry-exit points of the PROJECT area and man the same with deputized forest officers.
- 2.11 Where feasible, establish and man look-out towers at strategic locations to detect occurrences of fires and other incidence of forest destruction.
- 2.12 Report to the CENRO on the incidence of any serious insect pest and disease infestation.
- 2.13 Carry out TSI pursuant to the Management/Development Plan.

#### FOREST PRODUCTS UTILIZATION

3. Forest products harvesting, utilization and sales shall be carried out pursuant to the provisions of the approved CRMDP.
4. Harvesting of timber and minor forest products shall be regulated by the DENR

pursuant to prevailing rules and regulations.

5. Selective cutting shall be in accordance with the Harvesting Schedule set forth in the PLAN. The CFMA awardee shall strictly observe the following prescriptions:
  - 5.1 Only trees and minor forest products marked for harvest shall be harvested.
  - 5.2 Harvesting operations shall be confined inside the working unit scheduled for operations pursuant to the PLAN. The cutting/harvesting of trees and minor forest products outside the duly-scheduled working unit shall be prohibited.
  - 5.3 Residuals damaged during the process of harvesting/operation shall be assessed for payment of corresponding fines in accordance with forestry rules and regulations.
  - 5.4 The use of heavy equipment or machineries, such as bulldozers and yarder, shall not be allowed. Exclusively for felling and bucking, use of power saws for flitching or slicing shall be cause for the imposition of fines, suspensions or cancellation of the CFMA.
  - 5.5 The use of 2 man saw and other tools recommended by the BFD/ILO Training Program on Appropriate Technology for Philippines Forestry shall be adopted.
  - 5.6 Timber cut to standard market dimensions, flitches, quarter-sawn logs, log end not exceeding thirty centimeters in length, long ends, tops and branches not exceeding twenty centimeters may be allowed for disposition and/or processing. However, production and sale of round logs and boules shall be strictly prohibited. Slabs edging and scrap and log ends, tops and branches less than twenty centimeters in diameter may be sold as firewood or converted to charcoal and then sold when harvested from plantation forest.
  - 5.7 When transported/disposed, all forest products shall be covered with Certificate of Origin (C.O) signed by the CENRO or fully authorized representative pursuant to existing rules and regulations. All products transported/disposed shall be covered by an auxiliary invoice and with the required forest charges paid. CENRO shall appoint at least two (2) authorized representatives to sign C.O and other documents so that CFMA operations are not unduly delayed for lack of an authorized signatory.

- 5.8 Only registered members of the CFMA organization shall be allowed to participate or be employed in on-site harvesting/utilization activity to non-members is prohibited.
- 5.9 The CFMA holder shall plant not less than five (4) seedlings for every tree cut during harvesting operations. These seedlings shall be planted on understocked sites and other areas that require enrichment planting. Planting of indigenous species shall be encouraged.
- 5.10 Harvesting operations shall be undertaken primarily during the dry season, so the farmlot development (agro-forestry) and reforestation may be vigorously pursued during the rainy season.
- 5.11 Transport of forest product during night time and non-working days or holidays shall not be allowed except by special permission from the CENRO on each such occasion. Unauthorized transport at prohibited times shall be cause for imposition of fines, suspension or cancellation of the CFMA. Cutting/harvesting of timber and minor forest products in excess of the Annual Allowable Cut, as specified in the Management/Development Plan, is strictly prohibited.

#### DURATION OF THE AGREEMENT

This AGREEMENT shall have a tenure of twenty five (25) years counted from the date of signature hereof and be eligible for renewal thereafter for an additional twenty five (25) years, subject to compliance by the COMMUNITY with the agreement and pertinent laws, rules and regulations.

#### RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES

8. Any disputes among the parties hereto arising from or related to the provisions of this Agreement shall be settled by arbitration, with each party represented by one (1) arbitrator and a third arbitrator named by two (2) parties. If it is not possible to settle the dispute through arbitration, then it shall be submitted for decision to the appropriate court of law having jurisdiction on the matter.

#### TERMINATION AND AMENDMENT OF AGREEMENT

9. The DENR has the right to terminate this agreement based on the non-performance of the COMMUNITY or violation of any provision herein stated.

Further, DENR may amend and supplement this Agreement with conformity of the COMMUNITY. Similarly, the COMMUNITY may request DENR to amend this Agreement.

FORCE MAJEURE

- 10. If any event of force majeure and other causes such as earthquakes, typhoon, storms, floods, epidemics and other similar phenomenons affecting the performance of the PROJECT, the COMMUNITY shall give notice to DENR within ten (10) days after the occurrence, including a statement describing the force majeure and its effect upon performance of the PROJECT. The parties shall, within five (5) days after such notice, agree regarding the action to be taken.

PENALTY CLAUSE

- 11. In the event of default in any of the above undertaking by the COMMUNITY, nothing herein shall preclude the DENR from resorting to such judicial remedies, civil or criminal, to which it may be entitled under existing laws.

The parties hereto have signified their agreement to the foregoing provisions by affixing their signature hereunder on this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_ in the City/Municipality of \_\_\_\_\_ Province of \_\_\_\_\_, Republic of the Philippines.

FOR THE DENR: (Name)
Secretary
DENR, Diliman, Quezon City

FOR THE COMMUNITY: (Name)
Chairman, \_\_\_\_\_

WITNESSES:
Names Signatures
\_\_\_\_\_
\_\_\_\_\_


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
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 19  
\_\_\_\_, at \_\_\_\_\_ affiants personally appeared and exhibited to me their respective  
community tax numbers.

DOC NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
PAGE NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
BOOK NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
SERIES OF \_\_\_\_\_

## Appendix B. Examples of Community Group Organizational Charts





## **Appendix C. Start List of Categories and Indicators**

### **Categories and Indicators for Assessing Assistance from Support Organizations**

#### **Service Delivery**

The category for rating the performance of support organizations with respect to their ability to delivery services contains six indicators.

- ! Training activities (includes a sub-set of indicators, namely, diverse activities, financial, forest protection, inventory, leadership training, marketing, forestry techniques)
- ! Efficient delivery
- ! Target Population
- ! Process
- ! Skill Transfer
- ! Linkages

#### **Participatory Methods**

The category for rating the performance of support organizations with respect to their use of participatory methods contains seven indicators.

- ! Access to information
- ! Consultation and decision making
- ! Contribution
- ! Degree benefit
- ! Degree share
- ! Availability and use of mechanisms to enhance participation
- ! Representation

#### **Capacity Building**

The category for rating the performance of support organizations with respect to their ability to build the capacity of the community group contains nine indicators.

- ! Group formation
- ! Involvement as a way of increasing capacity
- ! Collective effort
- ! System of norms
- ! Community group's ability to resolve conflict
- ! NGO's (or other support organization) ability to resolve conflict
- ! Leadership development
- ! Linkages
- ! Weaning from the support organizations

## Appendix D. Codes and Code Comments<sup>1</sup>

HU: Phil-HU1

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About the PO

“Information about the community group.”

Assistance--AO

"Assistance from the Assisting Organization"

Assistance--NRMP

"Assistance from NRMP"

Assistance--Other

"Assistance from other organizations besides NRMP, AO, or DENR, such as university, church"

Assistance--DENR

"Assistance from DENR"

BACKGRND--State of the Resource

"Gives some background on the condition of the resource past and present."

BACKGRND: PROCEDURES

"Gives information some of the programmatic procedures of the CBFM program"

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<sup>1</sup>Acronyms were used to simplify the coding process, including:

PO = People's Organization, a term used by the Philippine government for community group;

AO = Assisting Organization, a term used by the Philippine government for contract NGO's;

CB = Capacity Building category;

IN = Innovation category (later eliminated);

PA = Participatory category;

POI = Policy Impact category (later eliminated);

PR = Poverty Reach category (later eliminated); and,

SD = Service Delivery category.

## BACKGRND: REGULATIONS

"This code provides background information on various DENR regulations, especially if they impact the behavior and actions of the POs."

## BACKGRND INFORMATION

"Refers to general background information that is important for setting the context of the research"

### CB--AO resolve conflict

"CB: AO ability in conflict resolution"

### CB--Collective Action

"CB: Evidence of group collective action. Evidence that group is learning to cooperate in effective management of common resources or collective tasks"

### CB--Com resolve conflict

"CB: Growth in community ability to resolve conflict"

### CB--Group Formation

"CB: Group creation/formation"

### CB--Involvement as a way of increasing capacity

### CB--Leadership develop

"CB: Development of leadership to deal with the outside (environment, society, institutions with bargaining, mobilization...)"

### CB--Linkages

"CB: Progress toward acquisition of linkages to public or private services/resources after termination of the AO contract"

### CB--System of norms

"CB: Existence and Reinforcement of system of rewards and sanctions for compliance with group norms"

### CB--Weaning

"CB: Progress toward weaning of the PO and progress towards greater independence and autonomy"

### CB-General capacity

“CB: Information relating to the general status of the level of capacity.”

#### COLLECTIVE ACTION

"This may be a super-code. The intention is to identify evidence for or against the collective action practices."

#### General theme

"This code relates to comments that summarize a general theme appearing throughout the research--one in which one of the major conclusions will relate to in some way."

#### IN--Institutional approaches

"IN: Development of more effective institutional approaches, training, extension methods, group processes of possible wider application."

#### IN--New techniques

"IN: Emergence of new or improved techniques that have potential for diffusion"

#### Level--outstanding

"Indicates a high level of development for the indicator. The job, task, process, have been done very well."

#### Level--initiated

"Indicates a low level of development of skills and processes. The task, job, process has been initiated but is not developing."

#### Level--established

"Indicates that the level of performance is at a satisfactory level; the skills or processes have been developed and are established with."

#### Level--not evident

"Indicates that the level of performance can not easily be determined by this evidence, but that it may be clearer as further study of the data proceeds."

#### Level--developing

“Indicates that there is some potential that situation relating to the indicator will improve, but strong establishment of processes and abilities has not occurred.”

#### Level--failed

“Evidence that a PO-support interaction had failed.”

NTFP – non-timber forest products

"This codes identifies references to specific issues/people/comments regarding NTFPs"

PA--Access to Information

"PA: Accountability: Community members have access to records, information"

PA--Consultation

"PA: Implementation: Opportunities for consultation or for shared decisionmaking during design of plans or management practices"

PA--Contribution

"PA--Resource Mobilization: Community member contribution (labor, materials, funds) to the project outputs"

PA--Decision making

"PA: Initial Decisions: Degree of community member participation in management plan design; and availability of mechanisms to facilitate such involvement"

PA--Degree benefit

"Relates to the degree that the members are seeing the benefit of their participation, or other issues related to participation and receiving a benefit. Will be connected to collective action code."

PA--Degree share

"PA: Resource Mobilization: Relative equity of sharing labor and other costs within the community group"

PA--mechanisms

"PA: Mechanisms to facilitate participation"

PA--Motivation

"PA: Evidence of motivation issues/problems/strategies."

PA--Representation

"PA: Accountability: Degree of representation of community leaders and members"

POI--Horizontal

"PO: Horizontal Reach--Evidence of reaching a significant number of members of

the community"

POI--Horizontal networking

"Evidence of coalition building, networking, to the extent it will benefit the community groups (i.e., learning from other's experience)"

POI--Macropolicy, program

"PO: Macropolicy: Program changes and other shifts in government procedures in relation to the community members"

POI--Macropolicy, redirect

"PO: Macropolicy: Mobilization or redirection of public-sector resources more favorable to the community members"

POI--Vertical

"PO: Vertical Influence: Influence on public sector institutions to improve the quality of the service. Influence on DENR policy."

PR--Benefit distribution

"PR: Extent of the poverty reach--the access and distribution of benefits"

SD--Activities

"Comment that makes references to the types of activities"

SD--Efficiently delivered

"SD: Services efficiently delivered"

SD--Financial

"SD: Training for financial planning/management"

SD--Inventory

"SD: Training inventory/survey"

SD--Leadership training

"SD: Information pertaining to leadership training activities."

SD--Linkages

"SD: Encourage and build linkages"

SD--Marketing

"SD: Training in marketing"

SD--Process

"How is the process for delivering services (poor, fair, good, excellent)"

SD--Skill transfer

"SD: Sustainability, skill transfer"

SD--Target Population

"SD: Target population reached; for instance, were occupants within the CFP area involved."

SD--Techniques

"SD: Training for growing and extraction techniques, processing forest products."